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ABSTRACT 
During the first quarter of the sixteenth century the 
relations between the power ruling over North India, namely, 
the Lodi Empire and the Deccan kingdoms were generally at a 
very low key. But it is, of course, true that the Deccani 
kingdoms were not indifferent to the situation in the North. 
The sending of congratulatory letters to Babur by trte rulers 
of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Berar, on his success in 1526, 
goes to testify their eagerness to win favour with any ruler 
who appeared to gaining an upper hand in North India. Among 
them Ahmadnagar seemed to be particularly responsive to the 
developing political scenario in the North. The short term 
consideration of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom in cultivating 
friendly ties with the Mughals from the very beginning of 
their rule down to the end of Humayun's reign, and also with 
the Surs during their short lived rule over North India, was 
possibly that their military pressure on Malwa and Gujarat 
would render the latter two states less belligerent towards 
Ahmadnagar. But at the same time it should not be overlooked 
that from 1535 onwards Humayun appeared to be interested in 
extending his influence, if not actual rule, over Khandesh 
and Ahmadnagar which is borne out by his correspondence with 
Burhan Nizam Shah I as well as his making, while returning to 
Mandu from Ahmadabad, a detour across Khandesh. It was, 
however, only after the annexations of Malwa and Gujarat in 
1562 and 1572 respectively to the Mughal Empire that a 
situation was created where Mughals were gradually sucked 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
into the power politics in the Deccan. 
In this thesis an attempt is made to focus on the 
history of Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations from 1526 down to 1636 
when a major part of Ahmadnagar was finally absorbed into the 
Mughal Empire. 
The Introductory Chapter of this thesis traces the 
history of the emergence of Ahmadnagar as a powerful and 
independent Kingdom by the time Mughal rule was established 
in North India. In this chapter special attention is paid to 
Ahmadnagar's relations with the neighbouring kingdoms with 
particular emphasis on those with northern powers, namely, 
Gujarat, Khandesh and Malwa. 
The Khandesh state played an important role in shaping 
the Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations. It was sought to be used by 
Akbar to further the strategic aims of the Mughals in the 
Deccan, particularly, for not allowing the consolidation of 
Ahmadnagar's hold over Berar after it was annexed by that 
Kingdom in 157^. A brief survey of these diplomatic and 
military moves of the Mughals involving Khandesh down to its 
annexation to the Mughal Empire forms the central theme of 
the Chapter I of this thesis. 
Chapter II deals with Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations 
between 15S6-72, In this chapter, after noticing early 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
diplomatic contacts between Nizam Shahi rulers and Humayun, 
Sher Shah and Islam Shah, the attention is mainly focused on 
the developments of the period following the annexation of 
Malwa to the Mughal Empire, for tracing the stages through 
which Mughal Empire started getting involved in the power 
equations of the Deccan. 
It was only during 157S-95, that the Mughals started 
openly endeavouring to intervene in the affairs of 
Ahmadnagar. But these attempts at intervention always stopped 
short of a full fledged invasion. On several occasions large 
scale military mobilization was made with the declared aim of 
intervening militarily but every time these were used for 
pressurising the Deccan rulers to agree to Akbar's two fold 
demands that (i) Khandesh should remain aligned with the 
Mughals and (ii) the nobles of Berar be helped by Khandesh to 
continue their struggle against Ahmadnagar's occupation of 
their Kingdom. The only occasion when such a mobilization 
led to an actual armed conflict was the disastrous advance of 
Aziz Koka into Berar in 1586. This story is briefly narrated 
in Chapter III here. 
The crucial developments of the period 1595-1600, 
leading to the advance of the Mughal forces into Berar and 
northern parts of Ahmadnagar Kingdom, are discussed in 
Chapter IV. During this period, despite the settlement of 
1596, the struggle between the Mughals and the section of the 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Nisam Shahi nobility, who were not prepat^efir^^;*handover to 
the Mughals the ceded territories, had continued unabated. 
The Mughals carried out vigorous operations culminating in 
the second seige of the fort of Ahmadnagar and its capture 
by the Mughals in 1600. Later, the capture of Asirgarh in 
1601 and resulting annexation of Khandesh placed the Mughals 
in a firm position to face the continuing resistance by 
remnants of the Nizam Shahi nobility which, as is well 
known, tended to become more fierce and well organized with 
the coming of Malik Ambar on the scene. 
Malik Ambar's role in reorganizing the Ahmadnagar 
administration, both civil as well as military, for 
successfully resisting the Mughal advance into Ahmadnagar 
forms the main theme of Chapter V. In this context Malik 
Ambar's military campaigns and his over all contribution to 
the struggle against the Mughal occupation forces during 
1601-16 are also noticed. 
Chapter VI covers the second phase of Malik Ambar's 
struggle for ending the Mughal occupation of the parts of 
Ahmadnagar territory during 1617-S6. In this chapter on the 
one hand, Prince Khurram's military successes against the 
Nizam Shahis are critically assessed. But, on the other 
hand, the negative impact of his revolt on the position of 
the Mughals in the Deccan is also discussed. The military 
successes of Malik Ambar during his last days as well as his 
achievements in recovering a large portion of Ahmadnagar's 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
territory, earlier conquered by the Mughals, are also 
highlighted in this discussion. 
The last and decisive phase of Mughals' aggression 
during 1627-36 against Ahmadnagar ultimately leading to the 
annexation of a major part of Ahmadnagar Kingdom to the 
Mughal Empire is discussed in Chapter VII. The unstable 
political conditions, particularly factional tussles among 
the nobles and the weak regimes of the successive pesrtwas, 
are also noticed here as the factors contributing to final 
collapse of Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 1636. 
Chapter VIII is devoted to analysing the peace 
settlements of 1636. In this discussion an attempt is made 
to answer the question whether the settlements of 1636 could 
be interpreted as termination of the Mughal military 
offensive against the Deccani kingdoms. 
The Safawid rulers of Persia were maintaining close 
diplomatic relations with the rulers of the Deccan kingdoms 
since very beginning. Therefore it is very important to 
examine as to what was the Safawids' response to the Mughal 
expansionist drive in the Deccan. This is attempted in the 
Chapter IX. 
The main conclusions of the thesis are briefly restated 
in a separate section which is placed after the Chapter IX. 
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Ill 
PREFACE 
The history of the relations of the Mughals with the 
Deccan kingdoms has not yet been studied in all its various 
aspects. Most of the modern studies on the theme have been 
centred round the Mughals' Deccan policy or, perhaps, their 
political aims in the Deccan. Some of the arguments advanced 
and hypothesis projected in these studies are no doubt very 
relevant to a proper appreciation of the history of the 
Mughals' relations with the Deccan kingdoms. But these do 
not fully explain the varied problems relating to the latter 
theme. The need for a detailed examination of the evidence 
relating to this theme in its entirety very much remains to 
be done-
The present thesis is an attempt to study the relations 
of the Mughal Empire with one of the Deccan states, namely, 
Ahmadnagar, which, from its very inception, was involved in 
the mutual relations of Khandesh, Gujarat and Malwa, and, 
therefore, attracted the active attention of the Mugnal 
Emperor from a very early date. In this thesis the Mughals' 
growing involvement in the affairs of the Deccan kingdoms, in 
the context of their relations with the Nizam Shahis down to 
the final absorption of Ahmadnagar into the Mughal Empire 
(1636), has been examined in the light of contemporary 
Persian texts and records. 
In this study it is sought to be examined as to what 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
IV 
were the circumstances which led to the involvement of the 
Mughal Empire in a rivalry with Ahmadnagar Kingdom ovsr Berar 
and Khandesh. It is proposed to examine if Akbar's attitude 
over Berar from 157^ onwards was a response to Ahmadnagar's 
aggressive and forward policy in the region or it was a part 
of his larger design to annex the Deccan? 
Akbar's policy declarations and public posturing from 
1581 onwards giving an impression that he was planning the 
use of military force not only against Ahmadnagar but against 
Bijapur and Golkonda as well to force them to accept his 
overlordship is, again, examined in this thesis to discern 
his real motives and ambitions in the Deccan. This is, of 
course, attempted keeping in view his compulsions arising out 
of military challenges that he faced in the North-West down 
to 1598. It is in the light of such an examination that an 
attempt is made to explain Akbar's decision, in 1595, on a 
massive military intervention in Ahmadnagar, wnich 
culminated, by 1601, in the annexation of Berar, Khandesh and 
northern Ahmadnagar to the Mughal Empire. In this 
examination, whenever it was felt necessary and useful, the 
V'^jork done by me earlier for my M.Phil, dissertation has also 
been incorporated. 
It is also sought to be assessed in this thesis as to 
how it could be possible for a section of the Nizam Shahi 
nobility to sustain its resistance against the Mugnal 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
occupation forces for such a long time even after the Mughals 
had succeeded in occupying Ahmadnagar in 1600. This has 
naturally directed the focus of the study to the role played 
by the Nizam Shahi nobles in reviving the Ahmadnagar Kingdom 
under Malik Ambar's leadership. In this context the nature 
and extent of support extended by the Maratha sardars and the 
Adil Shahi Kingdom to the Nizam Shahi nobles in resisting 
Mughal occupation has also been examined in some detail. 
The diplomatic manoe uvres and military strategies 
adopted by the Mughals from the beginning of Shan Janan's 
reign, which marked the crucial phase of Mughal-Ahmadnagar 
struggle leading to the extinction of Ahmadnagar Kingdom, are 
also noticed in detail. This was aimed at locating the 
factors contributing to the final collapse of Anmadnagar 
nobility's resistance following Fateh Khan's joining the 
Mughals in 1633. The settlements of 1636, which flowed from 
this collapse Are also examined, not only as the CLslminacion 
of Mughal-Ahmadnagar struggle, but also as the starting point 
of a new phase of the struggle in the De\zc3in, whi-h, on the 
one hand, resulted, in the annexation of Bijapur and Golkonda 
in 16S6 and 1687 respectively, to the Mughal Empire, ana on 
the other, also paved the way for the emergence of Maratha 
power as an independent entity. 
The role played by the Safawids cannot be ignored while 
dealing with the Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations. A separate 
chapter is devoted to this theme for examining tre question 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
VI 
whether, in their occasional moves against Qandanar, the 
Safawid rulers really planned to divert the Mughal military 
pressure on the Deccan states. 
In examining the liughal-Ahmadnagar relations, in this 
thesis, mainly the evidence furnished by Persian nistanes 
and records is relied upon. But, occasionally, -he 
information gleaned from European travellers' accDunts or 
from the reports of Jesuit Fathers, staying at Akoar's 
court, is also used. The major Persian histories used far 
this thesis may be divided into two perceptible categonas: 
(a) the histories v-gritten by the chroniclers writing at rhe 
Mughal court or by individuals who otherwise identi-isd 
themselves iMith the Mughals and, (b) other texts written ar 
compiled by the individuals patronized by the rulers of :;ne 
or the other Deccan Kingdom. A third minor category 
comprises those Persian texts which were written outside Doth 
the Mughal Empire as well as the Deccan states. Euch 
histories, while dealing with the developments of the regions 
(for example Gujarat and Iran), where these were penned, 
sometimes do throw interesting light on the Mughal-Anmadnagar 
relations. Besides, the Persian Chronicles, the Insna 
collections throwing light on the Mughal-Ahmadnagar 
relations have also been used. Though a comprehensive list 
of all these histories and other texts is given in the 
bibliography, a few observations regarding the general nature 
of the information available in Persian texts belonging 'a 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
VI 1 
the above categories, shall not be out of place here. It 
goes without saying that for these observations, I have 
relied heavily on the information put together about the 
individual authors and their works by C.A. Storey in Persiari 
Li ter^ture-A Bi o-BibliogrMphi cal Survey, London, 1970. 
Tarikh—2 Ferisbta. of Muhammad Qasim Ferishta was 
completed in 1607 at the Bijapur court. The author named his 
chronicle as 6alshan-i Ibrahimi after the name of his patron 
Ibrahim Adil Shah II. Although Tarikh-i Ferishta is planned 
as a general history of Hindustan, the regional histories 
have also been widely covered in it. It is one of the most 
important sources for the history of the Dec<z3:n kingdoms. 
Since the author spent his adult life in Ahmadnagar and 
Bijapur, he possessed a fairly good knowledge of not only the 
political affairs of the Deccan, but was also intimately 
familiar with its topography as well as the social and ethnic 
fabric. His is an eye witness account of the events taking 
place in the Deccan down to 1607. But the main problem of 
Ferishta's information pertains to the inaccuracy of specific 
dates, particularly of the earlier period. But this minor 
blemish is more than compensated by the very systematic 
arrangement of his account. Tari kh-i Feri shta has been 
translated into English by John Briggs and published under 
the title History of the Rise of Mahomed an Pohier in India. 
It needs to be mentioned that the translation, though useful 
in a more general way, is far from being very accurate. 
Many a names and terms have been misspelt which .night prove 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
V I H 
to be misleading for a scholar relying entirely on the 
translation. The text of Tarikh-i Feri sht^ has been 
published by Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow, 1864. 
Barhsn—i hsa.sir is essentially a history of the Nizam 
Shahi rulers of Ahmadnagar. It was compiled during 1592-96 
by Saiyid Ali Tabataba under the patronage of Burnan Nizam 
Shah II. Tabataba begins his account from the foundation of 
Bahmani Kingdom and comes down to the settlement of 1596 
between Chand Bibi and Murad. Since Saiyid Ali Tabataba was 
an eyewitness of many of the events of the period, he 
provides a factually reliable account. The only weakness of 
his account is that it is written from a biased angle, all 
the time tending to glorify the achievements af the Nizam 
Shahi rulers. The chronology is also sometimes inaccurate. 
It should, however, be treated as one of the primary sources 
for the history of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Burhan-i Ma ssir 
has been published from Delhi in 1936. 
Tszkz rst—ul Muluk of Rafiuddin Ibrahim Shirazi was 
compiled at Bijapur during the reign of Ibrahim Adil Shah 
II. Though it is basically a history of the Adil Shahi 
dynasty doi-gn to 161S, but it also gives interesting 
information regarding the histories of other kingdoms of the 
Deccan as well as of the Mughal Empire. The text of 
Tazki rat-ij.1 Mulak has not been published yet and is available 
only in the manuscript form. I have used the British Museum 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
IX 
MS, the microfilm of which is available in the Research 
Library of C.A.S. in History, A.M.U. Aligarh. 
Fusuni Astarabadi compiled his Futahat-i AdiJ Shshi in 
1644-45 under the patronage of Muhammad Adil Shah (16S7-56). 
It is divided into six chapters < i>a£>) , each chapter giving 
an account of the reign of one of the Adil Shahi rulers. 
Fuzuni Astarabadi does sometime indulges in exaggerating the 
achievements of the Adil Shahis but he often gives very 
detailed account of important happenings of the period 16S4-
S5, which include feets not always complimentary for his 
employer. For example ite account of Bhataudi campaign (1624) 
is detailed and appear to be quite reliable, v>jhich is helpful 
in the study of Malik Ambar's military career. I have used 
the manuscript preserved in the British Museum, a microfilm 
of which is available in the Research Library of C.A.S. in 
History, A.M.U. Aligarh. 
Another Adil Shahi history, namely Basstin—us Salatin, 
written by Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi in 1SE4 is also quite 
useful. Although it is a latter work but the author has 
given a list of the texts which he used; all of which being 
contemporary sources for the Adil Shahi history of our 
period. Some of these texts are no longer extant. Since its 
account is based on these texts it could be treated safely as 
a work furnishing near authentic evidence for the history of 
Adil Shahi dynasty. The text has been published from 
Haidarabad, Deccan. (year not indicated) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Tarikh-i Sultan Huhamasd Qutb Shah is the history of 
Golkonda Kingdom from its foundation dovMn to 1616-17. The 
name of the author is not mentioned in the manuscript. This 
is particularly useful for the study of the relations of 
GolVionda rulers with those of the neighbouring kingdoms. A 
rotograph of the India Office MS of this work is available in 
the Research Library, C.A.S. in History, A.M.U. Aiigarh. 
Amongst the Mughal chronicles Abdul Fazl's 
Akbarnamaycompiled in 160S, is the most valuable source 
throwing light on the Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations through the 
period of my study. Though an official history of Akba.r's 
reign it provides detailed information regarding stages 
through which Mughal expansion towards, the Decca.n took place 
leading to the capture of Ahmadnagar (1600) and annexation of 
Khandesn (1601). Abul Fazl's presence in the Deccan and his 
personal involvement in the military operations during 1599-
160S, enabled him to provide first hand information regarding 
the developments in the Deccan, particularly during 1600-OS 
period. Abul Fazl's chronology is very reliable and his 
narration of events is also quite systematic. But his 
verbose prose style and exaggerated estimation of the 
"beneficial" nature of Mughals' rule sometimes could mislead 
a reacer who is not always on his guard. The text of 
AkbcirnamB has been published in three volumes in Bibliotheca 
Indica Series by Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, during 
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1897-Sl. Its English translation by A.S. Severidge is 
generally quite accurate and reliable. 
Another important Mughal chronicle, having a bearing on 
my theme, is Khwaja Nisamuddin Ahmad's Tsbsqat-i Akbari 
compiled in 1593-9'^. The author was appointed Bakhshi of 
suba Gujarat in 1575 and Bakhshi of the Empire in 15S3. He 
died at Kabul in 1594. Nizamuddin Ahmad wrote a general 
history of Hindustan from the time of Mahamud Ghaznavi down 
to 1593-9'^. The regional histories given by him in a 
separate section also included the histories of the Deccan 
kingdoms. Nizamudding Ahmad has also focused occasionally on 
the Mughal diplomatic and military moves in the Deccan down 
to 159S. For the events of Babur's and Humayun's reigns and 
also for th.e early years of Akbar's reign, Nizamuddin Ahmad 
has incorporated the information given in Tarikh-i Alfi , 
compiled by a group of historians on Akbar's order in 1585. 
Unfortunately it could not be possible for me to consult 
Tarikh-i Alfi which is not yet published. But this has been, 
perhaps, partly compensated by the information furnished by 
Nizamuddin for the same period. Tabaqat-i Akbari has 
published in Bibliotheca Indica Series by Asiatic Society of 
Bengal, Calcutta during 19S7-31. 
Likewise, Abdul Qadir Badauni's HuntakhAb—ut TauArikh 
is also a general history of Hindustan from the time of the 
Ghaznavide down to 1594. It is particularly valuable for the 
history of early years of Akbar'-3 reign. Badauni has 
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specially mentioned Pir Muhammad Khan's role in Khandesh as 
the commander of the Mughal army that went there in 1562, and 
has also highlighted the atrocities committed by him there. 
It provides vital information regarding the involvement of 
the Mughals in Malwa and Gujarat having bearing on the 
Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations. The text of Mantskhab-at 
Ta.w^rikh was published in Bibliotheca Indica Series by 
Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta during 1864-69. 
Tazuk—i Jahsngiri, the memoirs of Emperor Jahangir, is 
a simple and forthright narration of the events. It contains 
detailed references to the Mughal military operations against 
Malik Ambar as well as to the recruitment of the Maratha 
chiefs into the Mughal service, which go a long way in 
enabling one to reconstruct the history of the Mughal 
endeavors, during 1605-S7, to stabilize their position in 
the Deccan. The text of Tazuk-i Jahangiri edited by Saiyid 
Ahmad Khan was published in ISo^- from Aligarh and Ghazipur. 
Khwaja Kamgar Husaini's rtaasir—i Jshangiri (Comoiled in 
1630) and Mu'tamad Khan's- Iqbslnsms—i Jahsngiri (compiled in 
163S) are the reliable supplements of Tazuk-i JabBngiri . 
Both these authors narrate the story of the struggle between 
the Mughals and Malik Ambar in a simple style without 
concealing or distorting the facts. Since Mu'tamad Khan was 
prominently present in the military operations against Malik 
Ambar, his account is particularly -elevant for the history 
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of the reign of Jahangir. The edited text of rtaasir-i 
JahaTigiri was published in 1978 from New Delhi, while 
I qbailnama-i Jsh^ngi ri was published in Bibliotheca Indica 
series by Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta during 186S-65. 
Similarly, Ma.a.sir-i Rahimi , complied in 1616, throws 
significant light on the Mughal activities in the Deccan. 
Its author, Abdul Baqi Nihawandi, was in the service of Abdur 
Rahim Khan-i Khanan. He presents an eyewitness account of 
his patron's campaigns against Malik Ambar. He also mentions 
the activities of Raju Deccani against the Mughals. The text 
of Maasir-i Rahimi was published in Bibliotheca Indica 
Series, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1910-31. 
Qazvini's Bads/>a/ii>aDia (compiled in 1636-37) and 
Lahori's Badshahnama (compiled in 1654-55) describe in detail 
the process of the extinction of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom 
during 16S7-36. Qazvini's Badshahna7j)a is the history of 
first ten years of Shah Jahan's reign. Lahori, while 
compiling the history of the entire reign of Shah Jahan 
follows Qazvini for the account of the happenings of first 
ten years. Both the authors furnish ample details relating 
to the Mughal campaigns against Nizam Shah is and their 
diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at isolating the latter from Adil 
Shahis culminating in the extinction of the Ahmadnagar 
Kingdom in 1636. Qazvini's BadshahnaDa is still unpublished. 
I have used the MS preserved in E-iritisn Museum, a rotograph 
of which is available in the Researc.-: _ibrarv of C.A.S. in 
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History, A.M.U. Aligarh. The text of Lahori's Badshahnama 
has been published in Bibliotheca Indica Series by Asiatic 
Society of Bengal, Culcutta during 1866-72. 
Zakhirat-al Kh^wanin of Far id Bhakkari is a 
biographical dictionary of the Mughal nobles from the time of 
Akbar down to 1650. It is divided into three sections each 
section deal with the nobles of Akbar's, Jahangir's ana Shah 
Jahan's reigns respectively. The information proviaed by 
Zakhi rat-Ill Khauanin regarding the activities of the 
important nobles, sent to the Deccan, is important for the 
history of iiughal-Ahmadnagar relations. The text has been 
published from Karachi in 1941. 
Shahnawaz Khan's Maasi r—u2 Usiara is also a biographical 
dictionary of Mughal nobles from Akbar's time down to 1740. 
It also includes notices on the lives of many of the Mughal 
nobles vjhc were serving in the Deccan down to 1636. Thcugn 
written in early eighteenth century, it is based on aurnentic 
information gleaned from texts written during the sixteenth 
and first half of the seventeenth centuries, one of them 
being Zakhi rat-ul KhaManin of Farid Bhakkari that has alreadv 
been noticed above. The text of Maasi r-ul Umara was 
published by Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta in 1890. 
Haji-ud Dabir's Zafar-ul Hal eh Bi Huzaffar Ha Alihi (An 
Arabic History of Gujarat compiled in 1606) and Sikannar bin 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
XV 
hanjhu Gujarati's Mirat-i siksndari (compiled in 1611), are 
essentially the histories of Gujarat providing interesting 
information on not only the relations of the SultBTis of 
Gujarat with the Nizam Shahi rulers but, occasionally, on the 
Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations also. The detailed notices m 
both these works on the SultBTi af Gujarat's involvement in 
the affairs of the Deccan, particularly of Khandesh and 
Ahmadnagar, make them very relevant for the present study. 
The English translation of Zsfsi—al Haleh Si Mazaffar Ina 
Alibi by M.F. Lokhandwala was published from Earoda in 1970. 
The edited text of Mi rat-i Sikandari was published from 
Baroda in 1961. 
Iskandar Beg Turkman Munshi's Ta.rikh—i Alstm Arai-i 
Abbasi (compiled in 1616-17) and Nasrullah Falsafi's 
ZindagsTii—i Shah Abbas Awual (compiled in 16S7) are the 
histories cf the Safawid dynasty. Both the v-jorks ars 
important for the occasional reflections en the attitude of 
the Deccan kingdoms towards the Safawid Empire ana the 
attitude that the Safawids adopted with regard to Mughal 
Ahmadnagar relations. The texts of both these works have 
been published from Tehran in 1932 and 1955 respectivelv-. 
Apart from the above chronicles some of the Insha 
collections containing the texts of the documents having a 
bearing on the Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations have also been 
used. Of these collections mention may be made of War Seh 
Daftar of Abul F-azl. Some of Akbar ' s letters addre-i^sed to 
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the Deccan rulers drafted by Abul Fazl represent a very 
authentic source of information on the theme of thesis. I 
have used the text published from Luc know in ISSS-S-^-. 
Another important Insh^. collection deserving special 
mention in an anonymous collection containing letrers and 
orders of Nizam Shahi rulers, which is preserved in 
Bibliotheque National, Paris. THe letters written dy Burhan 
Nizam Shah I to Humayun and Sher Shah Sur as well as Islam 
Shah contained in this collection furnish unique information 
on Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations during Humayun's reign. The 
MS of this collection is available in the microfiln form in 
the Research Library of C.A.S. in History, A.M.U. Aligarh. 
HskMtib—i ZMBi^n^—i SAlstin—i Sar'awiya/}, coiTciled in 
1658-29 by an anonymous author, has been introduced sy Nazir 
Ahmad in one of his papers published in Med i ewa^ Inaia-a 
Miscellariy, vol. I, 1969. It contains letters axchanged 
between the rulers of the Deccan kingdoms and the Safawid 
rulers. These letters shed significant light on the 
Safawids' attitude towards the Mughals' expansionist drive 
in the Deccan. The MS of this collection is preserved in the 
Asafia Library, Hyderabad. The texts of six letters written 
by the rulers of Bijapur, Golkonda and Ahmadnagar to Shah 
Abbas I during 1609-27 have been reproduced by Nazir Ahmad in 
Hedie^I India.—M Mi see I lany. I have used these texts for my 
study of the Safav^jids' response to the Mughal exzansionast 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
XVI 1 
drive in the Deccan during 1605-2S (Chapter IX). 
Munshi Bhag Chand's collection Jaai—al Inshs contains 
the letters written by Akbar to Abdullah Khan Usbeg as well 
as to the Safawid rulers, Shah Tahmasp and Shah Abbas I. The 
MS of this collection is preserved in the British Museum. A 
rotograph of this MS is available in the Research Library of 
C.A.3. in History, A.M.U. Aligarh. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
INTM0DUCTO1Y CHAFTIR 
Emergence of Ahmadnagar Kingdom and its 
Relations uith the Neighbouring Pouers 
Doun to 1535. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
During the last quarter of the fifteenth century the 
Bahmani Kingdom had began to weaken. The Bahmani Sultan had 
become ineffective i-is a i-is his nobles administering 
different territories in the Deccan. The powerful nobles had 
started working at cross purposes with each other. The 
reckless party strife at the court led to the murder of the 
efficient Bahmani uazir, Khwaja Mahmud Gawan, in l^Sl, which 
precipitated the break up of the Kingdom. Subsequently the 
Bahmani Kingdom gradually disintegrated gis'ing rise to five 
independent kingdoms, namely, the Adil Shahi Kingdom of 
Bijapur, the Qutb Shahi Kingdom of Golkonda, the Barid Shahi 
Kingdom of Bidar, the Imad Shahi Kingdom of Berar and the 
Nizam Shahi Kingdom of Ahmadnagar. Since there were no 
clearly defined boundaries of these newly independent king-
doms, their rulers were constantly at vjar with each other 
over territorial disputes reinforced by other controversies. 
Malik Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, 
declared his independence in lA-90, adopting tne sovereign 
title Ahmad Nizam Shah Bahri. He was the son of a prominent 
Bahmani noble, Malik Hasan, who, after the murder of Mahmud 
Gawan, had become l^akz 1-us Saltan ate. According to Ferish-
ta, Malik Hasan was a convert to Islam; his original name 
being Timma Bhatt. He was the son of a Brahmin of Pathri in 
1. Muhammad Qasim Ferishta, Tari kh-x Feri shta, Munshi Nawal 
Kishore Press, LucknovM 186^, vol.1, p-357. 
a.Ibid^ vol. il, p-93 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Vijaynagar Kingdom. Timma Bhatt as a young boy, alongwith 
many other inhabitants, was made captive by Saltsn Ahmad Shah 
Bahmani during one of his campaigns against Vijaynagar.^ 
Being impressed by the qualities of Timma Bhatt, the Suitar-
raised him from the position of a slave to that of a noble. 
In the process he was converted to Islam assuming the name 
Malik Hasan. He was imparted education and training in the 
company of Prince Humayun. Later on, during the reign of 
Muhammad Shah Bahmani, he received gradual promotions and was 
entitled Ashraf-i HamByari Hizam-al Malk Bahri . The Makil of 
the Bahmani Kingdom, Mahmud Gawan, appointed him tBrafdar of 
the territory of Tilangana while assigning the iqta of Rajah-
mundry. He excelled himself in the military as well civil 
administration and was subsequently given the positions, 
Malik Naib and Sar-i Lashkar . 
In 1^82, Muhammad Shah Bahmani had died and was 
succeeded by his son Mahmud Shah. Earlier in 1481, Mahmud 
Gawan was murdered. Malik Hasan Nisam-ul Mulk was suspected 
of complicity in the assassination of Mahmud Gawan- The new 
Saltart y Mahmud Shah, raised Malik Hasan to the position of 
Nakil-us Saltanate^ and some more territories, including the 
3 . Ibid 
4 . Rajahmundry( 17 °N,81 <>£), l o c a t e d i n T e l i n g a n a , 
5 . Tarikh-i Feri shta, v o l . I I , p - 9 3 
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S^rkars of Bir and Junnar were added to his i qta. The 
removal of Mahmud Gawan had, thus left the field open for 
Malik Hasan Nizam-ul Mulk to fulfil his ambitions. He began 
to promote his own men in the administration. He 
particularly paved the ground for his son, Malik Ahmad, in 
the nobility. Malik Ahmad was assigned Bir, Dharur and 
Junnar as his iqta. A well equipped army was deputed to 
serve under him. To ensure the safety and future prospects 
of his son, Malik Hasan appointed Malik Wajihuddin as the 
sabedar of Daulatabad on a promise of firm support to Malik 
9 Ahmad. A similar promise of support was exacted trom 
Fakhruddin Dakhni after his appointment as subedar of Parenda 
and Sholapur. Being patronized and encouraged by his 
father, Malik Ahmad thus emerged as a powerful and 
accomplished military commander and administrator. He 
carried many raids in the Konkan region capturing several 
forts and exacting heavy peshkash from the petty Maratha 
sardars. For carrying out these raids he had raised a strong 
army. Particularly during the period of four years, i.e. 
6. Bir(19° N, 75" E ) . 
7. Junnar(I90N, 73°E). The fort commanding Junnar was known 
as Sh i vner. 
8. Ibid. For the description of the murder of Mahmud Gawan, 
see Tari kh-i Feri shta, vol. I, p-357. 
9. See Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol, II, pp-93-94. 
10. Ibid. Sholapur(17 0 N , 7 5 O E ) , was in the Nizam Shahi 
kingdom but after its capture by Bijapur in 1511, it remained 
a bone of contention between Ahmadnagar and Bijapur until it 
was ceded to the latter by the Mughals in 1636. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1^8S-86, his position had become very strong on account of 
his successes against the Maratha sardars of Konkan. 
In the meantime, while running the Bahmani 
administration as Hski 1-as S^I tBritate-, Malik Hasan Nizam-ul 
Mulk antagonised a powerful section of the nobility. 
Prominent among his opponents was Yusuf Adil Khan, who, 
later on, carved out Bijapur as an independent Kingdom for 
himself. The Suitar/, Mahmud shah Bahmani, too, was 
dissatisfied and obsessed with the behaviour of Malik Hasan. 
Consequently, a conspiracy was hatched against Malik Hasan 
at the instance of the Saltan. He was murdered by his 
12 
opponents in 1^86. His father's murder was a severe blow 
to Malik Ahmad but he was not dismayed by the changed 
situation at the Bahmani court. The new NakiI~us Saltanate, 
Qasim Barid, was a bitter enemy of Malik Hasan. New he began 
to work on a plan to curtail Malik Ahmad's authority. Malik 
Ahmad, on his part, was, however, not much perturbed by these 
developments, which in fact provided him pretext to work for 
carving out an independent principality for himself. 
11. For Malik Ahmad's appointment and his subsequent mili-
tary exploits, see Saiyid Ali Tabataba, Burhan-i Maasir, 
Hyderabad, 1936, pp-176-a8. See also Tarikh-i Ferishta , vol. 
11, p-9^.' 
The Konkan is described as a tract along the coast including 
the ports of Chaul and Dabhol, and containing in part hills, 
passes, rockey wastes, and forests. Part of it lay within 
the Adil Shahi kingdom but most of it belonged the Nizam 
Shahi kingdom. The Konkan was taken to contain the entire 
Western Ghat. See Irfan Habib, An Atlas of the Mughal 
Empiref New Delhi (reprint) 1986,p-55 
12. Barhan-i Maasir, pp-190-91; See also Tarikh-i Feri shta , 
vol. II, p-9^. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Immediately after his father's murder, he adopted Malik 
13 Hasan's title of HiZMm-al Malk. Although, at this time, he 
did not assume the sovereign title 'Shah', but for all 
practical purposes henceforth he began to act like an 
independent ruler. 
At the Bahmani court, Qasim Bar id was very apprehensive 
of the growing power of Malik Ahmad Nizam-ul Mulk. He 
persuaded Suitarr Mahmud Shah Bahmani to send a force towards 
Junnar for putting down Malik Ahmad. A farmari was sent to 
Yusuf Adil Khan, then quartered at Bijapur, to join the army 
14 
sent against Malik Ahmad. But, by this time, the 
equations at the court had changed. Yusuf Adil Khan, who was 
a rival of Malik Hasan, now refused to comply with the fBrmari 
to join expedition against Malik Ahmad; instead he warned 
Malik Ahmad about the military preparations of the Saltan and 
Qasim Barid. Thus, despite utmost exertions of the Sultari 
and Qasim Barid, the rising power of Malik Ahmad could not be 
checked. At this stage Yusuf Adil Shah started encouraging 
13. Tarikh-i Feri shta^ vol. II, p-94. While referring to 
this occurrence Saiyid Ali Tabataba says that after Malik 
Hasan's murder the Sultan himself conferred the title at 
Ashraf-i HamayuT) Hi zam-al Mulk Bahri on his son, Malik Ahmad. 
See Burhan-i Maasir p-190. 
14. Burhan-i Maasir, pp-199-200; Tarikh-z Ferishta, vol. II, 
p-94. 
15. Tarikh-i Ferishta^ vol. II, p-94. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1 i^ 
Malik Ahmad to proclaim his independence. Malik Ahmad, who 
had already acquired a large army and established his 
control over a considerable territory, was himself inclined 
towards setting himself up as an independent ruler. 
In 1^90, Malik Ahmad replaced Bahmani Saltan's name by 
his own in the Friday khatbB and raised white canopy <chatar 
SBfedi) over his head, which signified declaring himself a 
sovereign ruler. As king of Ahmadnager he assumed the title 
17 Ahmad Nizam Shah Bahri. In the beginning, some of his 
close associates, including Khwaja Jahan Deccani, objected 
to his declaring himself a sovereign ruler. In the face of 
this opposition Malik Ahmad had to defer, for sometime, 
(about two months), the reciting of khatba in his name. But 
he continued to raise the canopy over his head on the absurd 
excuse that this was meant for protection from the 
18 
sunrays. Around May, 1490, he again started to have the 
khutba. recited in his name. This time it was done after 
boldly declaring himself free of allegiance to the Bahmani 
1 o 
Sultan, ' Malik Ahmad was encouraged to take this decisive 
16. Saiyid Ali Tabataba says that during the reign of Mahmud 
Shah Bahmani many powerful amirs had began acting independ-
ently. Yusuf Adil Khan had declared himself independent in 
Bijapur. Following his example Ahmad Nisam-ul-Mulk Bahri and 
Fatehullah Imad-ul-Mulk also asserted their independence. 
cf.Barhan-i Maasir , p-204. 
17. Tarikh-2 FerishtSf vol. II, p'-96; See also Surhari-i 
Maaszr, p-204. 
18. See Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-96. 
19. Ibid 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
step by senior amirs, particularly Makhdum Jahan and Khan-i 
Azam. After declaring himself independent Ahmad Nisam Shah 
embarked on a campaign to subjugate the smaller chieftains of 
the Marathwara region with the aim of expanding the territory 
of his newly founded Kingdom. In this process he moved from 
his headquarter, Junnar, westward and within a very short 
period succeeded in capturing Danda Rajpuri, " the sea-port 
pi 
of Chaul and many other forts in the Konkan region. To 
north of Junnar, he carried out raids into the territory of 
Daulatabad, then ruled by Malik Ashraf. Earlier in 1^82, 
Daulatabad was granted to Malik Wajihuddin by Malik Hasan 
Nizam-ul Mulk after he had pledged to co-operate with Malik 
Ahmad. After Malik Wajihuddin's death his brother, Maiik 
Ashraf, however, took control of Daulatabad. Not being close 
to Ahmad Nizam Shah, he began to assert his independent 
authority over the region. To capture Daulatabad, therefore, 
became one of the main aims of Ahmad Nizam Shah after assum-
ing kingship. He carried repeated raids into that territory 
but was not successful in achieving his goal. In 1494, Ahitiad 
Nizam Shah founded the city of Ahmadnagar and shifted his 
capital there so as to be able to make annual raids into 
Daulatabad territory. Finally in 1500, he succeeded in 
20. Danda Rajpuri (18«N, 72<>E). The 'castle' of this port 
was situated in an island, now known as Janjira. See Irfan 
Habib" Atlas^ op.ci t.f p-55. 
21. Tarikh-i FerishtiR, vol. II, p-97. 
22. See Surhan-i WaasiV, pp-21S-13; Tsrikh-i Ferisht^, vol. 
II, p-97. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
8 
23 
capturing Daulatabad. 
Side by side, with his efforts to expand his Kingdom, 
Ahmad Nizam Shah also continued to take interest in the 
affairs of the Bahmani court. In 1493, Yusuf Adil Shah of 
Bijapur had besieged the Bahmani Saltan in Bidar. In 
desperation, Saltan Mahmud Shah and Qasim Barid sent farmans 
to Ahmad Nizam Shah and Fatehullah Imad Shah of Berar to came 
to the rescue of the Saltan. In response of this appeal 
Ahmad Nizam Shah promptly marched out towards Bidar for 
assisting the Saltan. In making this move he did not show 
any consideration for Yusuf Adil Shah's helping attitude 
towards him earlier in 1490.'^ The reason behind this 
attitude of Ahmad Nizam Shah seems to be that he, perhaps, by 
this time, came to look upon Yusuf Adil Shah as his potential 
rival in the Deccan. Moreover, he would also have remembered 
that Yusuf Adil Shah was believed to be one of the 
conspirators responsible for his father's assassination. In 
any case, while he was still on the way to Bidar, he received 
the news of Yusuf Adil Shah's success in defeating a Bahmani 
army. He, thereupon, thought it prudent to return to 
Junnar without involving himself in an open contest with 
23. Sarhan-i Maasi r p-ElS; Tarikh-i Feris/ita, vol. II, p-99. 
2^. Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, p-97. At this time Ahmad 
Nizam Shah was proceeding to invade Daulatabad, but on Sal-
tan's call, he put-off his march, instead marched to relieve 
Bidar. See Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Yusuf Adil Shah.^^ 
Subsequently, he resumed raids into regions surrounding 
Junnar. His intrusions into the territory of Daulatafaad 
becoming more frequent. Malik Ashraf, the ruler of 
Daulatabad, was compelled in 1499 to seek military assistance 
from Sultsn Mahmud Begadah of Gujarat, on a promise of 
reciting the khatba in his name at Daulatabad and also -of 
paying annual peshkash to him. Responding favourably, Mahmud 
Begadah marched to Daulatabad for forcing Ahamd Nizam Shah tc 
lift his seige. According to Ferishta, Mahmud Begadah had 
come to Daulatabad, on this occasion, for two purposes; 
first, to help Malik Ashraf and second, to realise the annual 
peshkash from Adil Khan Faruqi II of Rhandesh. In the 
battle that took place at the bank of Tapti near Burhanpur, 
Mahmud Begadah was defeated by the combined armies of 
Khandesh, Ahmadnagar and Berar. In 1500, Mahmud Bega::ah 
returned with a well-equipped army. This second time ne 
succeeded in exacting a heavy oeshkash from the ruler of 
Khandesh and in forcing Ahmad Nizam Shah to lift the 5eige of 
Daulatabad. Malik Ashraf fulfilled his promise by paying 
peshka.sh and having the khatba. recited in Mahmud Begadsn's 
25. Ibid. 
26. See Ibid, p-98. Nizamuddin Ahmad says that Mahmud Bega-
dah invaded Khandesh in 1499 because Adil Khan II had not 
sent pes/}AasA> for sometime past. See f abaqat-i Akbari , sd. 
B.iie and M. Hidayat Husain, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 
1935, vol. Ill, p-165. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
name at Daulatabad. 
lO 
27 
However, as soon as, Mahmud Hegadah withdrew to 
Gujarat, Ahmad Nizam Shah again besieged Daulatabad and this 
time succeeded in capturing it. On this occasion, he was 
also able to pacify adjoining territories of Galna and 
Baglana forcing the local rajas to submit and agree to pay 
peshkash. These new acquisitions strengthened his position 
considerably. The frontiers of his Kingdom now extended up 
to the confines of Gujarat and Khandesh in the north and 
north-west. 
Having, thus, consolidated his position Ahmad Nizam 
Shah now began to meddle in the affairs of the neighbouring 
kingdoms. Apart from the on-going disputes with his 
immediate rivals in Bijapur and Bidar, he also began 
interfering in the affairs of Khandesh. In Khandesh, after 
Adil Khan II's death in 1501, his younger brother, Dawud 
Khan, occupied the throne by setting aside the claims of the 
deceased ruler's heir. Those of Khandesh nobles, who were 
opposed to Uawud Khan's accession, requested Ahmad Nizam 
Shah to help them in securing the throne for Alam Khan, whom 
they declared as the legitimate heir. Ahmad Nizam Shah 
marched to Burhanpur in 1503-04 on the request of the 
Khandesh nobles. In the meantime, Dawud Khan had sought the 
£7. BarhBn-x Maasxr, pp-216-ia; 7arikh-z Ferz shta, vol. II, 
p-99 
2 8 . Barhan-i Maasir , p - 2 i a ; Tarikh-i Feri shta, v o l . I I , p - 9 9 . 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
11 
help of Malwa ruler, Sulta.n Nasiruddin Khilji, against Ahmad 
Nizam Shah's impending invasion. In the face of a formidable 
Malwa army, Ahmad Nizam Shah had to eventually withdraw rrom 
Khandesh on this occasion. In the subsequent years Ahmad 
Nisam Shah again tried to interfere in the affairs of 
Khandesh over the issue of succession, and this time came 
into a clash with Mahmud Begadah of Gujarat, who was keen to 
place his own protege (another Alam Khan) on the throne of 
Khandesh. In 1508, after Dawud Khan's death, Mahmud 
Begadash's protege succeeded in occupying the throne. In 
desperation Ahmad Nisam Shah demanded from Mahmud Begadah, at 
least, a part of the Khandesh territory to be assigned to his 
protege. But Mahmud Begadah did not entertain his request, 
refusing even to recognise him as a sovereign ruler. He 
3("i 
accused Ahmad Nizam Shah of usurping the Bahmani domains. ' 
In 1510-11, Khandesh ruler, Alam Khan entitled Adil Khan III, 
assisted by a Gujarat army, invaded Ahmadnagar, forcing the 
local raja of Galna (till then a tributary of Ahmadnagar' to 
pay peshkash and be subservient to the Khandesh Kinqdci-n.^  
From this time onwards, till 1559-60, Galna remainen a 
tributary of Khandesh. In 1559-60, Ahmadnagar forces 
29. Tabaqat-i Akdari, vol. Ill, p-37£; VariArt-i Ferishta, 
vol. II, p-aSE. 
30. Tabagat-i Akbari , vol. Ill, pp-170-71; Tarikh-i Ferz shta, 
vol. II, p-g83. 
31. Tabaqat-i Akbari, vol. Ill, pp-170-71; Tarikh-i Fen shta, 
vol. II, p-S83. See also Haji-ud Dabir's iar'ar-ui-Maie,''^  bi 
Muzaffar 14a Alibi, ed. by Dennison Ross, translated by M.F . 
Lokhandwala, Baroda, 1970, p-S5. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
IS 
succeeded in capturing this territory again. 
On his south-eastern frontiers, Ahmad Nizam Shah was 
constantly involved in the struggle for supremacy with his 
main rivals, Qasim fctarid and Yusuf Adil Shah. In 1504, he 
was drawn into a conflict between Qasim Bar id and Yusuf Adil 
Shah. "I hey were fighting for the possession of the territory 
of Bulbarga, till then occupied by Dastur Dinar, a Bahmani 
governor. Both of them were eager to anne;-; that territory. 
Being more powerful and resourceful, in 1504, Yusuf Adil Shah 
succeeded in capturing Gulbarga inspite of Qasim Barid's 
32 trying to help Dastur Dinar. Later, during the same year 
(i.e. 1504-) Qasim Barid died and was succeeded by his son. 
Amir Ali Barid, as the wazir of the defunct Bahmani Kingdom. 
Amir Ali Barid continued his father's policy. In the name or 
the nominal Bahmani ruler, Mahmud Shah, Amir Ali Barid 
organized an offensive against Yusuf Adil Shah for avenging 
his father's humiliation over Gulbarga. He raised the 
religious plank for uniting the mutually rival rulers of 
Ahmadnagar, Berar and Golkonda, In fact, in 150S-U3, YusuT 
Adil Shah of Bijapur had adopted Shi'ism as the state 
'JO 
religion. Since, till this time, the other rulers of the 
Deccan were staunch Sunnis, they readily agreed with Mahmud 
Shah Bahmani and Amir Ali Barid to invade Bijapur for 
3a. Tarikh-i Ferxshta, vol. II, pp-8-10; vol. I, p-372. 
33. l!?id, vol. II, p-11. See also (iirza Ibrahim Zubain, 
Ba.satzr)-ij.s~S^lMtirif Hyderabad, Deccan, pp-18-SO. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
13 
punishing Yusu-f Adil Shah for his "heresy". Alauddin Imad 
Shah, being friendly towards Yusuf Adil Shah, refused to join 
this coalition against him. It is obvious that Ahmad Nizam 
Shah's joining of this coalition was more influenced by 
political considerations rather than by his religious zeal. 
It must be viewed in the perspective of his ongoing dispute 
with Yusuf Adil Shah over the territories of Sholapur and 
Naldurg. On this occasion he, actually, demanded from Yusuf 
Adil Shah the surrender of Naldurg as the price of his 
OCT 
neutrality. It was only on his refusal to surrender Naldurg 
that Ahmad Nizam Shah finally decided to march with the 
forces of Amir Ali Bar id. But, before the actual invasion 
could take place, this coalition broke up. Phis was brought 
about by Yusuf Adil Shah's tactful diplomacy. He had 
solicited Alauddin Imad Shah's mediation in stalling the 
march of the allied forces. Also, on the suggestion of Imad 
Shah, he agreed to temporarily cease to follow the Shia 
practices. Ahmad Nizam Shah was also prevailed upon by 
Alauddin Imad Shah to give up his demand of Naldurg. But, 
as soon as, Ahmad Nizam Shah and Quli Qutb-ul Mulk, agreeing 
to suspend military operations, returned to their respective 
capitals, Adil Shahi farces attacked and plundered f\lx 
Band's camp forcing him and the Sultan to retire to Bidar."^*^ 
34. Jsrikh-i Feri shts^ vol. II, P-lc!. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid; See also Basatin-us-Saiati n , pp-dl-dcl. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1^ 
Subsequently, Yusuf Adil Shah again started observing the 
Shia practices in his dominion and his adversaries were not 
able to do anything about it. 
In the last few years of his reign, Ahmad Nizam Shah 
had, no doubt, suffered a number of serious reverses. Apart 
from the unsuccessful campaign against Adil Shah (1505) and 
the setbacks suffered by him in the Khandesh affairs, he 
also lost in the western part, the important sea-port of 
Chaul to the Portuguese (1507) and had to agree to pay them 
tribute. He died in 1510, leaving behind his minor son, 
Burhan, as the successor, who was called upon to hold 
together the newly established Nizam Shahi Kingdom already 
under pressure of its adversaries in the north as well as 
south.^® 
During the minority of tfurhan, tiukammal Khan, the 
peshija, and his son Aziz-ul Mulk, the sar-z naabat, 
controlled the administration. Iheir harsh and di-tatorial 
attitude alienated a section of the Nizam Shahi nobility. 
Some of these nobles solicited Alauddm Imad Shah's help in 
their efforts to place one of Burhan's brothers on the 
throne. But Mukammal Khan foiled their attempt forcing them 
37. Chaul was an important port and trading centre situated 
in IS'-'N, TO^E. For the Portuguese operations in the coastal 
region, see F.C. Danvers, The Portuguese in India^ London 
(reprint), 1966, p-129; pp-l'^l-'^S. 
38. Burtian-i Maasir^ pp-SiiS-S-^; farikh-i Ferishta, vol. ii, 
p-ioe. 
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39 to seek shelter in Berar. 
Around the same time, a similar situation developed in 
Bijapur. Yusuf Adil Bhah died in 1510. He was succeeded by 
his son Ismail Adil Shah under whom the u>a.zir, Kamal Khan, 
had concentrated all the powers in his own hands. In 1511, 
he attacked Sholapur, then held by i!ain Khan on behalf OT the 
Nizam Shahi ruler. Before any help could reach there, the 
Bijapuri army captured Sholapur, which remained a bone of 
contention between the two kingdoms ever after. Owing to 
factional divisions amongst the Nizam Shahi nobles, no 
immediate steps could be taken to recover Sholapur, but,later 
on, frequent clashes took place between the Adil Shah is and 
Nizam Shahis for the possession of this stronghold. Even a 
matrimonial alliance between the two ruling families could 
not help in resolving the dispute over Sholapur. In 1524-, 
when Surhan Nizam Shah's marriage vMas solemnised with Ismail 
Adil Shah's sister through the mediation of Shah fahir, the 
former expected that Sholapur would be returned to him as a 
part of dowry. But Ismail Adil Shah's flat refusal made this 
"matrimonial alliance" an occasion for generating more 
bitterness between the two kingdoms. Burhan Nizam Shah 
39. T<3rikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-102. 
40. Ibid, pp-l^-lb. 
'•I. For Burhan Nizam shah's meeting with Ismail Adil shah at 
Sholapur and the subsequent matrimonial relationship, see 
Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, pp-SO-Hl. 
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invaded Sholapur in the very next year (i.e. 15E5). In this 
invasion he was assisted by Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar. But 
the allied had to beat a hasty retreat when faced with a 
well-equipped Adil Shahi army. 
On the whole, with his eastern neighbours, Alauddin 
Imad Shah of Berar, Burhan Nizam Shah maintained a sort of 
love-hate relationship. If on one occasion, he was 
soliciting Imad Shah's assistance in his struggle against 
Adil Shahi ruler of Bijapur, on other occasions, one finds 
him making incursions into the Berar territory. He, for 
instance, wrested the wilsyat of Fathri from Berar in 1518-
19. As stated by Ferishta, Pathri being the ancestral place 
of Malik Hasan Nisam-ul Mulk, the Nizam Shahi rulers felt an 
emotional attachment with that town. They always coveted 
that place. Sometime in 1518-19, the populace of Pathri 
invited Burhan Nizam Shah to take possession of that 
wiiayat. Thereupon, Mukammal Khan, the peshii-'s., on behalf of 
Burhan Nizam Shah, urged the ruler of Berar to surrender 
Pathri to Ahmadnagar. Alauddin Imad Shah naturally turned 
down this outrageous proposal. On his refusal, the 
Ahmadnagar forces led by Mukammal Khan invaded Pathri and 
brought it under their control. 
^a. Ibid 
h3. Ibid, vol. II, p-103. 
44. Ibid. For detailed discussion of the capture of Pathri 
by the Ahmadnagar forces, see 8urhBri-i Waasir, pp-c;'4-9-50. 
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The occupation of Pathri increased the prestige of 
Burhan Nizam Shah I enormously. Henceforth, he asserted 
himself in the administration freeing himself from the 
influence of Mukammal Khan. The arrival of Shah Tahir, 
sometime in 15S1-SE, brought about drastic changes in the 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom. He became the pes/?wa as well as 
political and religious guide of Burhan Nizam Shah. Under 
his influence Burhan Nizam Shah I converted to Shi'ism. Shah 
Tahir came to wield great influence in the affairs of 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom. He was instrumental in arranging a 
meeting between Burhan Nizam Shah I and Ismail Adil Shah at 
Sholapur (15c£4), which resulted in the marriage of Burhan 
Nizam Shah I with Ismail Adil Shah's sister. Gn this 
occasion, he persuaded Burhan Nizam Shah not to press for the 
surrender of Sholapur, thus averting a military clash between 
the two kingaoms. Again it was Shah Tahir, who negotiated a 
resettlement with Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, v^hen the latter 
had come tc assist Alauddin Imad Shah and Muhammad Shah 
Faruqi I of Khandesh against the Nizam Shah (15£9-30'. Shah 
Tahir, on that occasion, managed to secure the title Shah' 
for Burhan Nizam Shah from the Gujarat ruler vlSSl).*^*^ 
According to Ferishta, on this occasion, Bahadur Shah gave to 
45. Burhari-i M,3asir, pp-t!51-52; Jarikh-i Feri shta^ vol, II, 
p-104. 
^6. Burhan-i Ma'asxr, p p - £ 7 4 - 7 S ; >arikh-i Feri shta^ v o l . I I , 
p p - 1 0 7 - 0 8 . See a l s o Tabaqat-z akbari ^ v o l . I l l , p-c;17. 
S i k a n d a r b i n t i a n j h u , Mi rat-i Sikaridari , ed . by S a t i s h Chandra 
Mis ra and L u t f u r Rahman, Baroda , 1961 , p - 2 7 9 . 
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Burhan the title OT' 'Shah' because he hoped that Burhan Nizam 
Shah I would help him in the war with Humayun, which he 
intended to carry on. But in reality its outcome was just 
opposite. Burhan Nizam shah I is reported to have sent an 
emissary to Humayun urging him to come and attack Gujarat. *" 
Ahmadnagar's relations with its northern neighbour, 
khandesh, appear to have been largely dictated by its an;;iety 
to prevent khandesh from aligning itself with the more 
powerful Suitanate's of Malwa and Gujarat situated on its 
northern and western flanks respectively. The rulers of 
Ahmadnagar tried, as far as possible, to prevent both these 
S'lItariBtes from establishing their sway over Khandesh. As it 
would be discussed at some length in the next chapter, till 
1535, being not very powerful, Khandesh Kingdom, thus, often 
found itself caught in the midst of a struggle amcng 
Ahmadnagar, Gujarat and Malwa for extending their influence 
aver the valley of Tapti. In reality the Ahmadnagar Kingciom 
was always keen to have Khandesh Kingdom as a friendly buffer 
in the north providing easy access to Gujarat and Malwa. 
That is why, in early, fifteen thirties, Burhan Nisam Shah I 
was not averse in persuading Humayun to invade Gujarat. 
This was possibly aimed at having Gujarat's military clout 
curbed which had come to pose a serious threat to Ahmadnagar 
owing to Khandesh's passing almost totally under the 
h7. cf. Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, p-cJ19. 
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domination of Gujarat. This struggle between Ahmadnagar, 
Gujarat and Malwa over Khandesh, during the first half of the 
siKteenth century seem to have disappeared after the Mughal3 
came closer to the Deccan as a consequence of their annexing 
Malwa and Gujarat in 156S and 157S respectively. However, on 
establishing themselves in Malwa and Gujarat the Mughals seem 
to have also inherited the problems that the Saltanates of 
Malwa and Gujarat had if is a I'is Ahmadnagar. Exactly as was 
the attitude of the Sultanates of Malwa and Gujarat, the 
Mughals, after they were established in Malwa and Gujarat 
began to pressurise Khandesh to became a pawn in their 
diplomatic and military manoeuvres against Ahmadnagar. After 
Berar was annexed by Ahmadnagar in 157"-, Akbar was always 
pressurising Khandesh rulers, Muhammad Shah II and after him 
Raja Ali Khan, down to 1586, to help the ousted nobles of 
BerAr in their struggle against Ahmadnagar's occupation 
forces. 
In the ensuing chapters the histcry of the Mughal-
Ahmadnagar relations is discussed in its different aspects 
some of which are highlighted above m the context of 
Ahmadnagar's emergence as a powerful state in the Deccan 
plateau during the first half of the sixteenth century. 
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APPENDIX-I 
Description of the Boundaries of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 
1526-
For preparing a tentative map of the boundaries of 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 15S6, information has been taken for 
different places from the chronicles. These places are 
depicted on the map with the help of Irfan Habib's ,4n Atlas 
of the Hiigha.1 Empire. If the name of a place mentioned by 
the chronicle is identified as being included in Ahmadnagar 
Kingdom in 1526, then the whole sarAvar or pargana arse, of 
that particular place is treated as a part of the Ahmadnagar 
Kingdcm. In the map, the boundaries of the sarkars ars the 
same as depicted in Irfan Habib's Art Atlas of the Mughal 
Empire, where these are drawn along the natural cznfines of 
individual units running along the rivers and hills with the 
help of 1:2 million map. 
Ahmad Nizam Shah, after declaring himself independent 
in 1490, had made Junnar <19<'N, 73'-^ E) his capital. Later, in 
lA-94, he laid foundation of the town of Ahmadnagar (I'^ N^, 
yS^E) and shifted his capital there.^ In the north, he 
1. See Irfan Habib, An Atlas of the Mughal Empire, New Delhi 
(Reprint), 1986, p-X, sheets 7-A; 9-A, 1H-A. 
2. Burhan-i Maasiry pp-212-13; Tarikh-i Ferx shta, vol. H, 
pp-96-97. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
succeeded in capturing Daulatabad (19*'N, 75'^ E) in 1^99.^ 
Towards south, he took control of Parenda (IS^N, VS'^E). 
However, in the west, the Portuguese had occupied Chaul 
(18"N, 7'd°E) , an important sea-port in 1507. 
After Ahmad Nizam Shah's death (1510), the Adil Shahi 
forces attacked and captured Sholapur (17°N, 75"E) in ISll."'' 
Henceforth, Sholapur remained a part of Bioapur and was 
always a bone of contention between the two kingdoms. 
However, Burhan Nizam Shah had succeeded in capturing Pathri 
(15<'N, 76°t) in 1519-ciO,^ from Berar, thus, extending his 
boundaries in the eastern direction. 
Thus, in 15c;6, the boundaries of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom 
extended from sarkar Pathri in the east upto sarkat- Kalyan in 
the Konkan region in the west excluding the Chaul sea- port . 
In the north, it extended from sarkar Daulatadad, bordering 
Khandesh, upto sarkar of Parenda in the scuth bordering 
Bi japur. 
3. Burhan-i Maasirf pp-cil6-18; {ari kh-i Feri shta^ vol. II, 
pp-98-99. 
^ . Tarikh-i Ferishta, v o l . I I , p p - 1 4 - 1 5 ; Sasatin-us Salatir, , 
p p - 3 3 - 3 4 . 
5 . Tarikh-i Ferishta^ v o l . I I , p - 1 0 3 . 
6 . See the appended Map-A. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTIR " I 
Mughal - Khandesh Relation57 1526-1601. Prelude 
to the Mughal Advance into Ahmadnagar. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The Mughal advance towards Ahmadnagar frontier was 
facilitated by the entry of the Mughals into Malwa and 
Gujarat regions in 1!D6E and ItiVS respectively. After the 
annexation of these two kingdoms to the Mughal Empire Akbar 
was continuously trying to use the rulers of Khandesh for 
turthering his policy aims with regard to Ahmadnagar. In 
this context a detailed eKamination of Mughal relations with 
Khandesh, particularly from 156c: onwards, becomes very 
significant which is attempted in this chapter. 
Since its inception as an independent state in 1400, 
the Kingdom of Khandesh had territorial or other disputes 
with its neighbouring powers namely Gujarat, Malwa and 
Bahmani Kingdom. Lntangled beti<jeen these three pcwerful 
states Khandesh had to occasionally ally itself with m e or 
the other of these powers to ward-off the threat frzi\ the 
rest of them. This course had become necessar. for 
Khandesh ' s survival in the face of the territorial amizitions 
of its immediate neighbours. It may, therefore, be noted 
that throughout this period Khandesh had maintaired a 
peculiar type of love-hate relationship with the neighDouring 
states which was aimed at ensuring its own survival as a 
small regional state. 
Khandesh'5 relations with Gujarat were throughout 
effected by a running dispute between the two states oser the 
1. Jarmh-i Fen shtB, vol. II, pp. ^77-78. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
S3 
P 3 
control of the territories of Nandurbar and Sultanpur. It 
seems to have originated when Malik Raja as the hakim of 
Khandesh Lappointed by Firoz Tughlaq] tried but failed to 
capture these territories from the governor of Gujarat in 
l;d94-95. This was the starting point of the long drawn out 
tussle between the rulers of Gujarat and Khandesh for the 
possession of the territories of Nandurbar and Sultanpur. 
Subsequently, in I'^ IV, Khandesh ruler, Malik Nasir, made an 
alliance with Hoshang Shah of Malwa to capture Nandurbar and 
Sultanpur, which again failed miserably. Subsequently, 
Malik Nasir was compelled to pay peshkash to Saltsri Ahmad 
Shah I of Gujarat and the latter reciprocated by giving 
Malik Nasir a robe of honour and the title of 'Khan'.'^ 
'this conferment of title reduced the status of Malik 
Nasir to a protege of the ruler of Gujarat which humiliated 
him greatly. He was also disappointed with Hoshang Shah as 
he had separated the Malwa forces in the midst of the 
campaign against Nandurbar (1417). He now resolved to 
a. Nandurbar (cIl^ N, 7<^ <'E). 
3. Sultanpur (cIl'^ N, 74°E). 
^ . f'<BDaqat-i Aktari , v o l . I l l p - 8 6 . 7arikh-i Ferishta, v o l . 
I I , p . 277 . S i k a n d a r b i n Manjhu, in t h i s c o n t e x t , men t ion 
the name of Mal ik N a s i r , who was t h e son and s u c c e s s o r of 
Malik Ra ja . T h i s a p p e a r s t o be a c o n f u s i o n b e c a u s e t i l l 
1394-95 Khandesh was s t i l l gove rned by Malik Raja a s t h e 
hakim. See Hirat-i Sikandari p - T ? . 
5 . Tabaqat-i Akbari , v o l . I l l , p - 1 0 4 ; larikh-i Ferishta, v o l . 
I I , p - 2 8 0 ; Mirat-i Sikandari, p p - 4 7 - 4 8 ; See a l s o iiafer-ul-
Ualeh i^i Huzatrar Ha Alihi, ( t r ) , v o l . I , p - 4 9 . 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
E;^ 
establish close relations with the Bahmanis reinforced by 
matrimonial ties. This was, apparently, aimed at getting 
Ahmad Shah Bahmani's help in his struggle to shake - off the 
Gujarati dominance. Such an opportunity presented itself in 
1^S9, when Malik Nasir, alongwith Ahmad iihah Bahmani, 
extended military assistance to Raja Kanha of Jhalawar, a. 
tributary Chief of Gujarat, on his falling out with Ahmad 
Shah I. But they were not very successful. The combined 
forces of the Bahmanis and Khandesh were compelled to 
withdraw from Jhalawar in the face of strong military 
response of Gujarat. Now the Khandesh ruler Malik Nasir was 
left with no alternative but to improve his relations with 
Gujarat. By 1436-37, his relations with Gujarat had become 
cordial which is borne out by a subsequent event. In 1436, 
Malik Nasir w^s provoked to invade the Bahamani Kingdam due 
to the strained relations between his daughter and her 
husband, Alauddin Bahmani. But prior to invading the Bahmani 
- 7 
territory he sought approval of Ahmad Shah I of Gujarat.'' 
However, against the Bahmanis as well, he was not able to 
gain an advantage, Ahmad Shah I's "approval" 
notwithstanding. 
6. /a£)ac7at-i Akb^n , vol. Ill, pp. 115-17; Tarikh-i Ferishta, 
vol. II, p.280. 
7. "bssauabdid Sultan Ahmad Shah tiajarati " . cf. '/arikh-i Fei— 
ishta, vol. II, p-cfSO. Ferishta's statement suggest that 
Ahamd Shah I gave only moral support to Malik Nasir and not 
military support. 
8. Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, p-BSO; Also vol. I, p-332-
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
25 
It might be conjectured that, perhaps, from this time 
(l<+37) onwards, the rulers of Khandesh started paying an 
annual peshkash to the SultMn of Gujarat once again. This 
practice seems to have continued down to the end of fifteenth 
century. This is suggested by Mahmud begadah's invading 
Khandesh in 1499 purported for realizing the peshkssh which 
9 
were not paid by Adil Khan II tor sometime past. 
An understanding reached between Mahmud Begadah and 
Adil Khan II in 1501, was further strengthened when Alam 
Khan, a Khandesh prince and a grandson of Mahmud Begadah, 
succeeded to the throne of Khandesh in 1509 with the title 
Adil Khan H I - . ' In between 1501-09, as aftermath of 
success of Dawud Khan in the tussle for successor of Adil 
Khan II with the help of the Sultan of Malwa, the relations 
of Khandesh with Gujarat and Ahmadnagar (successor state of 
the Bahmani Kingdom in the region to the south of Khandesh) 
became distant. However, after Dawud Khan's death, .^ dii 
Khan III once again established close relations raintarced 
by kinship ties with the Saltan of Gujarat. This situation 
continued after the death of Mahmud Begadah (liill!. Adil 
Khan III even accompanied his uncle and father-in-law, 
9. Tasaqat-i Akbari ^ vol. Ill, p-l(b5. 
10. Idid^ p-166; Tarikh-i Ferishta^ vol. II, p-2aa; tlirat-i 
Sikandarz y p-149. 
11. For details, see faoaqat~i Akbari, vol. Ill, p-J72; 
Tarikh-i Feristha, vol. II, pp-281-a£. 
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Muzaffar Shah II, in his expedition to Malwa in 1517-18, 
when the latter went there to support Mahmud Khalji against 
Medini Rai of Lhanderi. Adil Khan III also accompanied him 
against Rana Sanga of Chittor who had made a common cause 
with Medini Rai.^^ After Adil Khan Ill's death in 15c:0, 
Muhammad Khan I, who succeeded him, also continued cordial 
relations with Gujarat. 
II 
Under Muhammad Khan I, from 15E6 onwards, Khandssh got 
involved first in a conflict between Burhan Nizam Shah I of 
Ahmadnagar and Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar, which forced him 
to seek help from Bahadur shah of Gujarat. Later, he also 
got involved, though to a lesser extent, in a conrlict 
between Gujarat and the Mughals. 
In 15E7-SS, Burhan Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar and Amir 
Ali Band of Bidar jointly attacked Berar. Alauddin .mad 
Shah sought help from Muhammad Khan I. On this occasion, on 
Muhammad Khan I's appeal, Bahadur Shah, the ruler of Gujarat 
(15S6-37), came to the rescue of the rulers of Khandesh and 
Berar eventually forcing Burhan Nizam Shah I to retire to 
Daulatabad. On the Ads/air\CB of the combined forces of 
Gujarat, Khandesh and Berar upto the confines of Ahmadnagar, 
12. Tstaqat-i Akc^ri , vol. Ill, pp. 180-82; T^rii^h-i 
Ferishta, vol. II, p-c;07; i^aifai—al-ytaleh (tr) , vol. I, 
pp-9^-95. 
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Burhan Nizam Shah I was forced to acknowledge the 
overlordship of Bahadur Shah by allowing the inclusion of his 
name in the khatbs within Ahmadnagar territory. '-' 
Bahadur Shah again marched with a large army against 
Ahmadnagar in 15S9. Muhammad Khan I and Imad Shah also 
joined him. Their combined forces marched into Ahmadnagar 
territory by way of Baglana, where Raja Bharji agreed to 
14 
attach himself to Bahadur Shah. Ihese invading forces 
gained a victory over the army mobilized by Ahmadnagar and 
Bidar at Bir. 
On receiving an appeal from Imad shah in 1530, Bahadur 
Shah was again inclined to attack Ahmadnagar once more, but 
Muhammad Khan I, who in the meanwhile appears to have 
somewhat softened towards Ahmadnagar ruler. At this 
occasion, he played the role of an intermediary and 
peacemaker. His good offices were accepted by both Bahadur 
Shah and Burhan Nizam Shah I. ^  Muhammad Khan I helped in 
restoring amicable relations between Bahadur Shah and Burhan 
Nizam Shah I by arranging friendly meetings between them. It 
13. 7a£>a<7at-i Aktsri , vol. Ill, p-'dl'd; '/arikh-i Ferishta^ 
vol. II, p-E84; Mirat-i Sikandari ^ pp.a6S-6v. 
14. Mi rat-i Sikandarif pp-c!71-7ci; see also Ali Muhammad 
Khan, Mirat-i Ahmadi ^ ed. by Saiyid Nawab All, Calcutta, 
19a8,p-70. 
15. Taoaqat-i Akbari , vol. Ill, p-c:17; farikh-i Ferishta^ 
vol. II, p-ai9; Mirat-i Szkandari , p-279. 
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was at one of these meetings at Burhanpur that Bahadur Shah 
had bestowed the title of 'Shah' on Muhammad Khan I. He 
also conferred the title 'Shah' on Burhan Nizam, thus 
recognizing Nizam Shahi ruler, who had earlier (1528) 
1 7 
accepted his overlordship as his equal. Ferishta says 
that Bahadur Shah gave to Burhan the title of 'Shah' in the 
hope of Burhan Nizam Shah I's help in the war with the 
Mughals that he anticipated and planned, though what actually 
happened, later on, was the apposite of Bahadur Shah's hopes. 
Burhan Nizam Shah went out of his way to send an emissary to 
18 Humayun for urging him oto invade Gujarat. At another 
place, Ferishta explains this attitude of Burhan Nizam Shah 
with reference to his conversion to Shi'ite beliefs (1533-
34) and promotion of Shi'ism in Ahmadnagar which created a 
sharp Sunni reaction in the neighbouring states of Gujarat, 
Khandesh, Berar and Bijapur; their rulers farming an alliance 
with the declared aim of overthrowing Burhan Nizam Shah for 
his "heresy". It was to ward-off this serious threat to his 
position that, according to Ferishta, Burhan Nizam Shah 
decided to seek Humayun's protection by sending to him Rasti 
1 O 
Khan with a request that he should invade Gujarat. 
As already related, Muhammad Shah I, being closely 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid . 
18. See T^rikh-i Ferishta., vol. II, p-219. 
19. Ibid. vol. II, p-116. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
29 
allied with Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, always accompanied him 
in his expeditions. In 1531, he accompanied Bahadur Shah 
HO during his Malwa campaign, and later also assisted him in 
the seige of Chittor. This made him a party to Bahadur 
Shah's military moves directed primarily at weakening the 
Mughal authority in Eastern Rajputana. This was the time 
when relations between Bahadur Shah and Humayun had become 
generally strained, as the former had given refuge to some of 
the Lodi amirs, and also to Muhammad Zaman Mirsa, who were in 
HE revolt against Humayun. As is well-known, Bahadur Shah's 
refusal to comply with Humayun' s demand for the handing over 
of Muhammad Zaman Mirza to the Mughals had precipitated the 
23 
war between the two in 1535. During Bahadur Shah's flight 
from Mandasor to Mandu on 25th April, 1535, Muhammad Shah I 
of Khandesh and Mallu Qadir Shah of Malwa are reported to 
HA-have accompanied him. It seems Muhammad Shah I retired to 
ao. Ibid., vol. II, P-S84; Also Hirat-i sikBTidari , p-2H9. 
21. Tai>ag3t-i Akbari vol. Ill, pp-SE2-E3; Tarikh-i Ferishta, 
vol. II, p-S85 Mi rat-i Sikaridari , pp-E85-86. 
22. Abul Fazl's Akbarnama, ed. by Maulvi Agha Ahmad Ali and 
Abdur Rahim, Bibliotheca India, Calcutta, 1876-86, vol. I, 
p-lE7. See also Tabaqat-i Akbari , vol. Ill, p-227; hi rat-i 
Sikandari, pp-295-96. For details of the revolt, see Ishwari 
Prasad, The Life arid Times of H away art , Calcutta, 1955, 
pp-6^-65. 
23. Akbarnama, vol. I, p-127; Tabaqat-i Akbari , vol. Ill, p-
228. For details, see R.P. Tripathi, .•'Rise and Fall of the 
Mughal Empire, Allahabad, 1956 (reprint), 1981, p-7A. 
24. Akbarnama, vol. I, p-13E; Tabaqat-i Akbari , vol. Ill, 
pp-229-30; Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-E85; Mirat-i sikand-
ari, pp-296-97. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
30 
Burhanpur after the fort of Mandu was abandoned by Bahadur 
Shah <1535) without a fight. 
After expelling Bahadur Shah from Gujarat, and having 
made over the government of Gujarat to Mirsa Askari and other 
liughal officers, Humayun decided to return to Mandu by way of 
Burhanpur. Humanyun had taken this decision of going to 
Khandesh, apparently, to punish Muhammad Shah I for his 
siding, till then, with Bahadur Shah against the Mughals. 
25 During this march Humayun ransacked Burhanpur. On 
Humayun's advance against Burhanpur, on this occasion, it was 
vacated by Muhammad Shah I, who had taken shelter in the fort 
of Asirgarh. This severe punishment inflicted on the ruler 
of Khandesh alarmed and frightened other rulers of the 
Deccan. Burhan Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar and Alauddin Imad 
Shah of Berar promptly wrote submissive letters to the Mughal 
Emperor. At this occasion, Muhammad Shah I is reported to 
have written a letter to Burhan Nisam Shah I requesting him 
to intercede on his behalf with Humayun.*^ In a rather 
longer letter reproduced in Insha-i Tanir Husairn , Burhan 
Nizam shah offered to Humayun his submission. He also 
25. Akbarnama^ vol- I, p-14S; Tabaqat-i Akbari vol. Ill, p-
S3E; Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-£S5; Zafar-al-Haleh (tr>, 
vol. I, p-aoi. 
26. Tarikh-i Feri shta^ vol. I, p-S15. 
27. Ibid, vol. II, P-S85. 
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28 pleaded with the Mughal Emperor on Muhammad Shah's behalf. 
However, it seems, the ransacking of Burhanpur by Humayun 
further embittered Muhammad Shah I against him. He, 
subsequently, remained firmly allied with Bahadur Shah. 
After Humayun's withdrawal to Agra in 1536, he again co-
operated with Bahadur Shah in latter's drive to expel the 
Mughals from the territories of Gujarat and Malwa. 
Gn Bahadur Shah's death in February 1537, Muhammad shah 
I was declared the Sultan of Gujarat by the deceased Saitar;'? 
e;<-follawers. Khuibs was recited and coins were struck in 
Muhammad Shah's name in the territories of Gujarat.'^"' Before 
Muhammad Shah I could make any move to take charge of Gujarat 
Sij.ltMns.te, he died in March 1537. Muhammad Shah I's 
successor and his younger brother, Mubarak Shah II, hoped 
that he too would be invited by Gujarati nobles to occupy the 
throne of Gujarat Saltanate, but his hopes were dashed when 
the Gujarati nobles chose to place prince Mahmud, till then 
imprisoned in the fort of Asirgarh, on the throne of Gujarat. 
Under pressure from the Gujarati nobles, Mubarak Shah II had 
to release Prince Mahmud, who was declared the Sultan of 
S8. For text of the letter, see Insha-i Tahz r .HusBini , 
British Museum MS, HARL-A-99, vol. I, ff-15-17. 
29. Aktarnamaf vol. I. pp-l^S--^^; Tarikh-i Ferishta vol. II, 
p-285; Mirat-i Sikandari , p-318; Zafar-ul-Naleh (tr.), vol. 
I, p-215. 
30. Taoaqat-i Akbari , vol. Ill, pp-S34-35; Tarikh-i Ferishta, 
vol. II, p-286; Mirai-i Sikandari , p-326. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Gujarat with the title Sultan liahmud Shah III 
32 
31 
In 1537, taking advantage of Humayun's march to yihar 
and Bengal, Mubarak Shah II invaded Malwa and annexed the 
32 territories of Bijagarh and Handia. This boasted his 
prestige as well as military potential. In the meanwhile, 
there began a power struggle in Gujarat. Tv-^o powerful 
Gujarati nobles, Darya Khan and Imad-ul Mulk, fell out with 
each other. From this conflict Darya Khan emerged 
victorious, forcing Imad-ul Mulk to take refuge in Khandssh. 
Mubarak Shah II seized this opportunity for intervening xn 
Gujarat by coming forward to assist Imad-ul Mulk. But faced 
with a large Gujarat army under Darya Khan and Sultan Mahmud, 
Mubarak Shah II had to retire to Asirgarh, while Imad-ul Mulk 
fled to Mandu. As the Gujarat forces advanced into Khandesh, 
on this occasion, Mubarak Shah II was obliged to agree to pay 
33 peshkash to the Sultan of Gujarat. At the end of this 
campaign, Mahmud Shah III gave away Nandurbar and Sultanpur 
to Mubarak Shah. This was, purportedly, done to fulfill a 
promise which he had given to Mubarak Shah II during the time 
31. Tabaqat-i Aktarz , vol. Ill, pp-S35-36; Tarzkh-i Fen shta , 
vol. II, p-296; Mirat-i Sikandari, pp-326-S7. 
32. Zafar~ul-Haleh (tr.), vol. I, p-57. 
33. Tabaqat-i Akbari , vol. Ill, pp-236-37; Tarikh-i Fen shta , 
vol. II, p-2a6; Zafai—ul-l4aleh (tr.), vol. I, p-57. Sikandar 
bin Manjhu mentions that khutba was also recited and coins 
were struck in Burhanpur in the name of Mahmud shah III. 
i-ide, Mirat-i Sikandari , pp-331-32. But it seems to be an 
exaggeration just to highlight the prestige of the Sultan of 
Gujarat. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
33 
when both of them were confined in the fort of Asirgarh. 
The move was obviously aimed at cementing newly established 
ties between the two rulers by meeting one of the standing 
territorial claims of the ruler of Khandesh. 
Although Mubarak Shah II had agreed to pay peshkask to 
the Saltan of Gujarat but even after this unequal agreement 
he remained powerful ruler in his own rights. As a matter of 
fact, he benefitted more substantially from this agreement, 
in so far, as he was successful in regaining the territories 
of Nandurbar and Sultanpur which were bones of contention 
between Gujarat and Khandesh for long. In transferring these 
territories to Khandesh, Mahmud Shah III was obviously 
aiming at placating Mubarak Shah II, who had strengthened 
his position by invading Malwa in the previous year. Manmud 
Shah III, apparently, wanted to ensure that Mubarak Shah II 
would desist from intervening in the affairs of Sujarat in 
future. 
The next phase of tensions in Khandesh's relations with 
Gujarat commenced in 15^3, when Mubarak Shah II decided to 
give shelter to Darya Khan, the powerful ioazi r of Gujarat 
3^. Tarikh-i Feri shta^ vol. II, p-286. 
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35 Salt^Tia^te, after he had fallen out with his master. It 
seems, around this time, Mahmud Shah III was making 
preparations for invading Khandesh. This can be inferred 
from the contents of a letter written by one of the 
Ahmadnagar nobles to Khudawand Khan, the diwBTi-i kul of 
Gujarat, who was, apparently, very influential in the affairs 
of Gujarat Sultanate at that time. In this letter, the writer 
(Ahmadnagar noble) specifically asks Khudawand Khan to 
dissuade the Saltan of Gujarat from attacking Mubarak Shah 
II. The same letter also tends to give the impression that 
during this time the relations between khandesh and 
Ahmadnagar had improved somewhat. This is suggested by 
Mubarak Shah II's sending khatib Burhanuddin as his envoy to 
the Ahmadnagar court. Apparently, Mubarak Shah II himself 
35. Sikandar bin Manjhu does not mention clearly whether 
Mubarak Shah II assisted Darya Khan or not. But it is re-
ferred that the Suitan issued a farman and recalled 
Imad-ul-Mulk from Mandu, whom Darya Khan had expelled from 
Gujarat during their struggle for power. See Mirat-i Sikarid-
ari, pp-343-45. 
36. Anonymous Insha collection (Miscellaneous MS), MS Biblio-
theque Nationale, Pans Supplement, 135S, Paris, f*-SE-a3 
(margin). An English summarised translation of the text cf 
this letter is as follows: 
"Its is to be reported that khatib Burhanuddin has ccme 
to this place, and through him Mir Miran Mubarak Shah intend 
to appeal for mercy and that he (Mubarak Shah) counts himself 
among those who are pledged to be loyal". 
"The arrival of the above mentioned (Burhanuddin) could 
start a correspondence between the two states. Your (art 
hazrat) intervention will help him (Mubarak Shah) to reach 
his goal. As it is against a thoughtful mind to attack his 
fellow religionist (ahl-i Islam) ^ and also against mansab-i 
khilafat. So you should intervene to dissuade His Majesty 
(hazoor nawab kibriya) from attacking". 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
35 
was also anxious to revive cordial relations with Ahmadnagar. 
This, he hoped, would help in overcoming the difficulties 
that had lately arisen in his relations with the Saltan of 
Gujarat. As, one may infer from the above cited letter, 
Mubarak Shah II had requested one of the Ahmadnagar nobles to 
37 intercede with the Sultan of Gujarat on his behalf. 
For the next ten years the relations between Khandesh 
and Gujarat were largely cordial. There was no attempt by 
either side to intervene in each others affairs. Mubarak 
Shah II next tried to intervene in the affairs of Gujarat 
only in 1553. In this year, following the death of Mahraud 
Shah III, factional fight flared up among the nobles of 
Gujarat on the issue of succession. He decided to take 
advantage of this situation, but was opposed by a strong 
Gujarat army raised by the faction of the nobles, who had 
3S installed Ahmad Shah II as the new Sultan. This 
confrontation did not lead to actual hostilities. A 
settlement was arrived at between the two sides fallowing 
which the two armies withdrew to their respective regions. 
The chroniclers do not clearly spell out the terms of 
the settlement arrived at by Mubarak Shah II with the faction 
of Gujarati nobles led by Nasir-ul Mulk. It may, however, be 
37. See Ibid. 
3 8 . Mirat-i Sikandari ^ pp -390 - -91 . 
3 9 . Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
36 
inferred that Mubarak Shah II's march to Gujarat frontier, 
at this time, was largely in the nature of a show of force 
aimed at farcing the new Saitan of Gujarat to reiterate and 
confirm the special ties uniting the two ruling dynasties. I 
seems, once an acknowledgement of these ties was forthcoming 
from the new ruler of Gujarat, Mubarak Shah II was no longer 
interested in putting further military pressure on him. 
Ill 
Akbar's earliest move towards Khandesh began with the 
annexation of Malwa (156S). With this annexation, the 
Mughals also came to have a common frontier with Khandesh. A 
Mughal army under Adham Khan, and later under Pir Muhammad 
Khan, had occupied Malwa. In pursuit of Baz Bahadur, Pir 
Muhammad Khan also invaded the territory of Khandesh. He 
suspected that the treasure of Bahadur Shah of Gujarat was 
hidden in the fort of Asirgarh, and had written to Akbar for 
more reinforcement to besiege that fort. He ransacked and 
burnt down the city of Burhanpur ordering a general massacre 
40. Akbarnams, vol. II, pp-134-35; see also Abdul Qadir 
Badaoni's Muritakh^ib-at-Tauarzkh, ed. by Maulvi Ahmad Ali and 
Kabiruddin Ahmad, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1868, 
vol. II, pp-47-48; Tarikh~i Feri shtB, vol. I, pp-250-51. 
4^ 1. Rafiuddin Ibrahim Shirazi, Tazki rBt-uI-Malak, British 
Museum MS, Add. S3, 888, f-SO-^ . 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
37 
of the inhabitants. In this destruction carried out by the 
Mughals at Burhanpur a large library containing many precious 
43 books and manuscripts was also burnt down. Later, on 
hearing about the advance of a combined army under Bar 
Bahadur and Mubarak Shah II, he retreated towards Mandu, but 
was drowned while crossing Narbada. In the subsequent 
fighting Bas Bahadur appear to have regained temporarily 
some of the territories including those of Bijapur and 
Handia, which he, apparently, agreed to hand over to the 
Khandesh ruler, Mubarak Shah II in recognition of help 
received in his struggle against the Mughals. 
Akbar was naturally unhappy over Mubarak Shah II's role 
in this respect. He was also not reconciled to the transfer 
of Bijagarh and Handia to Khandesh. In 1564, when Akbar came 
42. AkbarriamSf vol. II, p-166; Badaoni gave a detailed 
account of the atrocities committed by Pir Muhammad Khan in 
Burhanpur. He says that Pir Muhammad Khan behaved like 
Change: CChavtgezi rs. ka.r farmud^l massacring or taking 
prisoners the in habitants of Burhanpur and Asir. Vide 
MuritBknab-ut-Tahiarikhf vol, II, pp-50-51 . 
43. Tazkirat-al-Maluk , f-204. 
44. Akrarnama, vol. II, pp-167-68. Badaoni gave a chronogram 
yielding the year AH. 969 (AD. 1562) of Pir Muhammaa Khan's 
death by drowning which reads as follows: az rah-i ab ba 
atish raft CHe went by water to fire (i.e. hell)]. Vide 
Hantaknab-at-Tauarikh, vol. II, pp-50-51. See also TaDaqat-i 
Akbari, vol. II, pp-156-57; Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. I, 
PP-E51-5S. 
45. Muntakhab-ut-Tauarikhf vol. II, pp-51-5S; Tarikh-i 
Feri shta, vol. I, pp-251-5S. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
38 
to Malwa to suppress the rebellion of Abdullah Khan Usbeg, 
the Mughal army also entered into Khandesh territory and 
captured Bijagarh. This annexation alarmed Mubarak Shah II 
who, apparently, to avoid further confrontation with the 
Mughals, entered into a matrimonial alliance with Akbar. 
He also transferred some more territories belonging to 
sa.rka.r Bijagarh and Handia to the Mughals in the form of 
"dowry", thus providing the Mughals an important foothold 
south of Narbada. 
It is not clear whether any formal treaty was concluded 
between Mubarak Shah II and Akbar on this occasion."^' In any 
case, Akbar was satisfied with what he had achieved and, 
apparently, did not press for a formal recognition of his 
^6. Abdullah Khan Uzbeg was one of the officers of Humayun. 
In the conquest of Malwa he had assisted Adham Khan. After 
Pir Muhammad Khan was drowned, Akbar appointed him to Malwa 
with the mBT!sa.b of five thousand, with an aim to chastize Baz 
Bahadur. In the year 1563-64 hs rebelled against Akbar. 
For Abdullah Khan Uzbeg's biography and his rebellion see 
Samsamuddaul lah Shah Nawaz Khan, MB 3.si r-ul-Uma.ra^ ed. by 
Abdur Rahim and Mirza Ashraf Ali, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 
Calcutta, 1890, vol. II, pp-76'^-69. 
^7. ZBfar-ijLl-Maleh (tr.), vol. I, 0-60. 
48. AkbarTiams.^ vol. II, p-30. Abul Fazl says that Mubarak 
Shah II requested the Emperor that his daughter should be 
included into the His Majesty's hBrem^ while Haji-ud-Dabir 
says that Mubarak Shah II gave his daughter to Akbar on 
"demand". See Zafar-ul-i-ialeh, (tr.) vol. I, p-60, 
49. Zafar-al-Haleh (tr.), vol. I, p-60. 
50. T.W. Haig, 'The Faruqi Dynasty of Khandesh' Indiari 
Antiquary^ 1918, p-141, does maintain that on this occasion 
Mubarak Shah II had agreed to have Friday khutbs recited in 
Akbar's name, but the source of this information could not be 
traced. 
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overlordship or a regular payment of peshkash. Following 
this alliance Khandesh's relations with other neighbouring 
states appears to have become strained. These powers, 
particularly Ahmadnagar and Gujarat, did not approve Mubarak 
Shah II'3 close alliance with Akbar as they, perhaps, feared 
that extension of Mughal hegemony over Khandesh was a 
prelude to the conquest of Gujarat and the Deccan plateau. 
This apprehension of Mughals' advance towards the 
Deccan was confirmed with the annexation of Gujarat in 157E. 
With this annexation the seemingly cordial relations betv«4een 
the Mughals and Khandesh continuing since 1564 became 
somewhat strained once again. This was caused by the Mughal 
action in unilaterally annexing the territories of Nandurbar 
and Sultanpur. The annexation of these territories by the 
Mughals is borne out by Abul Fasl's statement suggesting that 
in 1577, when Todarmal went to Gujarat for setting the 
revenues of that region, he started his work from Suitanpur 
51 
and Nandurbar. 
Muhammad Shah 11 of Khandesh sent his brother Raja Ali 
Khan to meet Akbar in Gujarat in 1573, but probably the 
real mission of Raja Ali Khan's visit, at this occasion, was 
to dissuade Akbar from depriving Khandesh of the territories 
51. cf. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, p-30. 
52. Ibxd, p-30; 33. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
40 
of Nandurbar and Sultanpur. Apparently, his mission was not 
very successful which made the Khandesh ruler bitter and 
recentful towards the Mughals. One might suggest that the 
lukewarm attitude of the ruler of Khandesh, after 1574 
towards Mughal efforts to prevent Murtaza Nizam Shah I from 
strengthening his hold over the newly annexed territory of 
Berar, was partly an outcome of the distrust that was created 
between them in 157S. Although at the time of the annexa-
tion of Berar to Ahmadnagar in 157A-, Muhammad Shah II had 
actively sided with the ruler of Berar but subsequently in 
1575, an agreement was concluded between Murtaza Nizam Shah I 
and Muhammad Shah II, under which the latter scrupulously 
refrained from helping the nobles of Berar against Ahmadnagar 
5A-
authorities. 
Muhammad Shah II continued to abide by this 
understanding with the ruler of Ahmadnagar, but he took care 
to proceed in such a manner that the Mughals should not be 
provoked to attack him. In a way he tried to appease Akbar 
by not agreeing to Murtaza Nizam Shah I's proposal that the 
nobles of Berar, then staying in Khandesh, be handed over to 
the Ahmadnagar authorities. It is, in any case, significant 
that he also did not accede to Mughal's proposal that either 
he himself should undertake to help the nobles of Berar 
53. cf. Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, p.136. Surhan-i Maasir, 
p-466. 
54. See Burhan-i Maasi r, p-^ fSB. 
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against Ahmadnagar or allow them to crass aver to lialwa for 
receiving military assistance from the Mughals. In not 
allowing the nobles of Berar to proceed to Malwa, Muhammad 
Shah II was not only motivated by his anxiety not tc prcvoke 
Murtaza Nizam Shah but he did so also because he feared that 
if they were allowed to proceed to Malwa and afterwards they 
were equipped by the Mughals there, then there would be 
further pressure by the Mughals on him to allow a passage to 
this force through his territory for attacking the Ahmadnagar 
forces in Berar. 
After his accession in 1576, initially Raja Ali Khan 
was anxious not to give offence to Akbar by not as5u;Ting ; the 
title 'Shah', he instead made it a point to send pesnkash to 
the Mughal Emperor. But, later on, he became relQ-tant to 
continue to pay peshkssh. Setting annoyed by this, a Mughal 
army was sent by Akbar in 1577 to punish him.'^ This army 
besieged Raja Ali Khan for sometime in the fort of Asirgarh. 
But before this expedition could achieve its objective, it 
had to be diverted towards Gujarat, where Muzaffar Husain 
57 Mirza had started a rebellion against Akbar. Thus on this 
occasion the Mughal officers had to agree to receive from 
Raja Ali Khan whatever amount of peshkash, he was tr.en in a 
55. Tsrikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, p-288. 
56. TAbaqat-i Aktari , vol. II, p-333; Akbarnama, vci . H I , 
pp-197-98; MuTitakhab-at-Tavarikh y vol. II, p-a^4. 
57. Tabaqat-i Akbari ^ vol. II, p-333; Akbarnama, vol. Ill, 
p-206; MuT>takhab-at~Tauari kh, vol. II,p-S50. 
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58 position to pay. 
After Muzaffar Husain Mirza was chased out from Gujarat 
by the Mughals, he, enroute to Ahmadnagar, entered Khandesh 
and was captured by Raja Ali Khan. Thereupon, Akbar sent 
another ultimatum to Raja Ali Khan demanding the surrender of 
59 Muzaffar Husain liirza as well as payment of peshkash . ^ Raja 
Ali Khan considered this to be a favourable opportunity for 
defusing the tension in his relations with the Mughals, 
promptly complied i<*ith Akbar' s demand. "^  However, it seems, 
the Khandesh ruler was not happy at this course of events. 
This signify his conceding that he was no longer an 
independent ruler. This unhappiness of Raja Ali Khan is 
borne out by his subsequent behaviour. 
Subsequently, Raja Ali Khan persisted in his attitude 
of not sending regular peshkssh which caused friction leading 
to an armed clash betvMeen him and Shah Budagh Khan, the 
Mughal governor of Malwa, in 1579. In this particular 
58. Muritakhab-ut-TsiKiarikh-vol . II, p-£50. 
59. 7abaqat-i Akbari , vol. II, p-336; Akbarviaina, vol. H I , 
pp-26i-6S; MuTitakhaci-ut-Tai^ari kh , vol. II, p-253. 
60. Tabaqat-x Akbari, vol. II, p-3^0; AkbarriaTna, vol. Ill, 
pp-a61-62; Huntakha£>-ut-Tai>iarikh , vol. II, p-£66. 
61. This event is not mentioned in any of the Mughal 
chronicles, neither does Ferishta make any reference to this 
occurrence. But Haji-ud-Dabir, the author of Zafar-ul-i-taleh 
Si Huzaffar Wa Alihi, describes it at length. See 
uafar-al-l^aleh (tr.), vol. I, p-63. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
43 
clash the Mughal forces were humiliated which caused Shah 
Budagh Khan's death due to shame. 
The decision of Akbar to give shelter to Burhan-ul Mulk 
in 1583 was a part of his forward policy with regard to the 
Deccan states in general and Ahmadnagar in particular. 
Around the same time, embassies were sent to the Deccan 
states demanding their submission. The outbreak of 
dissension among the nobles of Ahmadnagar in 1584 came as a 
much coveted opportunity for Akbar to intervene in the 
affairs of Ahmadnagar militarily. In 1585, an expedition 
was sent under Mirza Aziz Koka to help one of the warring 
factions of the nobles of Ahmadnagar. Simultaneously, Mir 
Fatehullah Shirazi was sent to advise Raja Ali Khan to assist 
the Mughal army in its operations in the Ahmadnagar 
territory. At this time, instead of assisting the Mughals, 
Raja Ali Khan, who was nursing a secret grudge against the 
Mughals, sought an alliance with Murtaza Nizam Shan I of 
Ahmadnagar. While outwardly pretending to be supporting 
the Mughal cause, Raja Ali Khan did not co-operate with the 
Mughal envoy, Fatehullah Shirazi, and ensured his departure 
6a. Ibid. 
63. Akbarnama^ vol. Ill, pp-a66-67; 280. 
64. Tat>a.qat-i Akbari ^ vol. Ill, pp-383-S'^; Akbarnama. vol 
III, p-489. 
65. Zafar-ul-Naleh <tr. ) , vol. I, pp-63-64. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
from Burhanpur without completing his mission. 66 
Now the Mughal army headed by Mirza Aziz Koka proceeded 
towards Khandesh from the side of Berar. But soon dissension 
broke out in the Mughal camp. There also cropped up 
differences between Aziz Koka and Fatehullah Shirazi. The 
latter, in disgust, left Aziz Koka's camp and proceeded 
67 towards Gujarat. Then started large scale desertion from 
the Mughal camp making Aziz Koka's position in Berar 
desperate. In a valiant bid to save the situation Aziz Koka 
advanced against Ellichpur and Balapur in Berar. ° Faced 
with this situation, an alliance was formed between Khandesh 
and Ahmadnagar. Raja Ali Khan and Mirza Muhammad Taqi, the 
Nizam Shahi commander, led a combined force against the 
69 Mughals. The arrival of the Deccani forces in Berar 
panicked Aziz Koka. Being convinced of his disadvantageous 
position against this combined force, Aziz Koka escaped into 
Gujarat in the hope of getting help from Abdur Rahim Khan-i 
Khanan, the Mughal governor of Gujarat. As the rainy season 
was approaching, the Deccani farces led by Raja Ali Khan also 
66. Tabaqat-i Akbari , vol. II, pp-383-8^; Akbarna^a , vol. 
Ill, p-4a9; Maritakhab-at-Tawarikh ^ vol. II, pp-360-6£; 
Tarikh-i ferishta, vol. I, p-E65; Surhan-i Maaszr, p-550. 
67. Muritakhab-ut-TaMari kh f vol. II, pp-360-6S; 3urhan-i 
Ma'asiTf p-550. 
68. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, p-489; Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, 
p-a65. 
69. Akbarrtama, vol. Ill, p-489; Muntakhab-ut-Tawari kh , vol. 
II, pp-360-62, Tarikh-i Ferishta^ vol. I, p-S65; Surhari-i 
Maasir, p-5^9. 
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70 played safe; they returned to their respective regions, 
allowing Aziz Koka to retreat to Gujarat unmolested. 
After this humiliating experience, the Mughals desisted 
from intervening in the affairs of the Deccan for sometime. 
But in 1588, the dramatic turn of events in Ahmadnagar 
provided a pretext to Akbar to intervene. In 15SS, Murtaza 
Nizam Shah I was murdered by his son, Husain, who in turn was 
also murdered a few months later. These developments in 
Ahmadnagar encouraged Akbar to try to extend his sway over 
Ahmadnagar by helping Burhan-ul Mulk, one of the brothers of 
Murtaza Nizam Shah I, who, till then was a fugitive at his 
court. Accordingly, Burhan was sent to Burhanpur. While, at 
the same time, Akbar asked Raja Ali Khan to assist Burhan 
militarily in his efforts to establish himself as the ruler 
71 
of Ahmadnagar, However, in his first attempt Burhan 
failed. In 1591, Burhan again sought Raja Ali Khan's help 
for another attempt to enter Ahmadnagar and establish himself 
there. The willing help extended to Burhan by Raja Ali Khan, 
who by now had started co-operating with the Mughals, went 
much beyond the limit of complying with Akbar's directions. 
It is obvious that Raja Ali Khan regarded the installation of 
a competent ruler at Ahmadnagar as the safest guarantee of 
70. Tadaqat-i Akbarz , vol. II, p-3S5; Zafar-uI-Maleh (tr.), 
vol. I, p-66; Burhan-i Maasir, p-551. 
71. Tataqat-i Akbari ^ vol. Ill, p-75; Akbarnama, vol. Ill, 
pp-538-39; Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-151; cafar-al-l^aleh 
(tr.), vol. I, p-66. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
46 
his protection against possible Mughal designs on his 
principality. He was perhaps convinced that Burhan, once 
established at Ahmadnagar, would, contrary to Akbar's 
expectations, refuse to act as an stooge of Mughal policy in 
the Deccan. For ensuring Durban's success in Ahmadnagar, 
Raja All Khan also tried to secure the co-operation of the 
ruler of Bijapur. He entered into a correspondence with 
Ibrahim Adil Shah II and eventually succeeded in securing 
the latter's co-operation in his efforts to instal Burhan on 
•70 
the throne of Ahmadnagar. It was a combined force 
consisting of Raja Ali Khan's troops as its major component 
but also including Burhan's personal contingent as well as a 
small body of Mughal cavalry that defeated the Ahmadnagar 
troops commanded by Jamal Khan at Rohankhed. In this battle 
the Khandesh troops led by Raja Ali Khan did most of the 
fighting. As a matter of fact Raja Ali Khan was chiefly 
instrumental in installing Burhan on the throne of 
73 Ahmadnagar. 
It may be noticed at this point that by co-operating 
vMith the Mughals and assisting Burhan in his efforts, Raja 
Ali khan had temporarily made his position quite 
unassailable. Thus, by becoming a willing ally of Akbar, on 
this occasion, Raja Ali Khan, on the one hand, managed to 
7S. See AkbarnamB, vol. Ill, p-587. 
73. T^stsqat-i Aktarz , vol. Ill, p-75; A^ tSarr^ ama, vol. Ill, 
p-587; 7arikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-151. 
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save his small Kingdom from being overrun by a Mughal army 
that would have certainly come to help Burhan. On the other 
hand, he was also able to strengthen his position ^--i s-a-vi s 
the other Deccani states, particularly Ahmadnagar. 
Akbar, however, was greatly disappointed by the 
subsequent behaviour of Burhan, for his acting in the 
manner of an independent ruler and refusal to send peshkash 
that he had agreed to pay before occupying the Nizam Shahi 
throne."^^ It may be argued that Burhan Nizam Shah II was 
quite justified in not acknowledging Akbar's overlordship 
and not fulfilling other commitments made by him before 
setting from Akbar's court, as he had occupied the Nizam 
Shahi throne without using the Mughal forces placed at his 
disposal. By contrast his attitude towards Raja Ali Khan 
during the same period was particularly warm and friendly. 
He fully recognized that without Raja Ali Khan's assis-ance 
it could have been very difficult for him to come to powe* at 
Ahmadnagar. 
In 1591, Sheikh Faizi was sent to Khandesh for asking 
Raja Ali Khan to give proper advice to Burhan Nizam Shan II 
and to persuade him to acknowledge Akbar's overlordship. 
Simultaneously, three other ambassadors, namely, Khwaja 
Amiruddin, Mir Muhammad Amin and Mir Munir were sent to the 
7^. cf. Akd^rn^maif vol. Ill, pp-596-97. 
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rulers of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkonda respectively. ^ 
In his messages to these rulers Akbar demanded their 
submission, and in case of their refusal to do so, threatened 
to dislodge them from their territories. It seems, from 
this time onwards, Akbar was giving more and more importance 
to the task of achieving his aims in the Deccan. He began 
preparations for invading Ahmadnagar. Prince Murad was 
appointed governor of Malwa with the order that, in case 
there was no positive response to the four embassies sent to 
the Deccan kingdoms, he (Murad) should be prepared to advance 
77 into the Deccan at a short notice. 
The four ambassadors returned from the Deccan in 1593 
without achieving anything worthwhile. Faizi's mission to 
Khandesh proved successful to a limited extent, where Raja 
Ali Khan had paid peshkash and promised to remain 
subservient. But, in Ahmadnagar, Burhan Nizam Shah II 
refused to pay peshKash, neither did he agree to formally 
78 
submit to Akbar. This attitude of Burhan greatly annoyed 
Akbar, who decided to make a show of strength against 
75. Tabaqat-i Akbarz , vol. II, p-^i2; Akbarnama vol. Ill, 
pp-596-97; Muntakhab-ut-Takiarikh, vol. II, p-377; Tarzkh-i 
Ferishta, vol. I, p-S67. 
76. Akbarnama^ vol. Ill, pp-597-98. 
77. "His Majesty's idea was that i t the ru lers of the Deccan 
vMere not impressed by the good advises, punishment should be 
prepared for them." c f . Akbarnama, vo l . I l l , pp-597-98. 
78. Akbarnama, f vo l . I l l , p-639; see also Muntakhab-at-
Tawarikh, vo l . I I , p-389. 
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Ahmadnagar by ordering a large scale mobilization of forces 
in lialwa. These forces, however, did not move towards the 
Deccan until 1595. The actual march began only after a 
struggle for succession had begun at Ahmadnagar following 
Burhan Nizam Shah II's death in 1595. On the issue of 
succession the nobles of Ahmadnagar came to be divided into 
four factions led by Chand Bibi, Miyan lianjhu, Ikhlas Khan 
and Abhang Khan respectively. Each one of these factions put 
up their own protege as the candidate for the throne. 
Failing to gain an upper hand in this struggle, Miyan lianjhu, 
leader of one of the factions, in despair, invited Prince 
79 Murad to help him. The tiughals, who apparently, waiting 
for such an opportunity, promptly marched to Ahmadnagar. 
In the meanwhile, to ensure Raja Ali Khan's willing 
co-operation in the planned military operations in 
Ahmadnagar, Akbar returned the territory of Nandurbar to 
80 him. Already by this time Raja Ali Khan had joined the 
81 Mughals in their campaign in Ahmadnagar. Returning of 
Nandurbar to Khandesh should have further cemented these 
ties. 
The Mughal army besieged Ahmadnagar in December, 1595. 
7 9 . t^rikh-i Feri sht^^ v o l . I I , p - 1 5 9 . 
8 0 . AkDBrnamB, v o l . I l l , p - 6 9 7 ; Zafar-u i -Wai<?r t ( t r . ) , v o l . 
I , p - 7 1 . 
8 1 . AkbarnamiBf v o l . I l l , p p - 6 9 S - 9 9 ; Tarikh-i Feri shta ,vol. 
I , p - S 6 9 ; v o l . I I , p - S 8 9 ; Zafar-uI~NaIeh ( t r . ) , v o l . I , p - 7 1 . 
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Their siege operations did not progress satisfactorily due to 
the dissensions in the Mughal camp, of which the hostility 
between Prince Murad and Adbur Rahim Khan-i Khana was the 
most conspicuous aspect. Taking full advantage of these 
dissensions, Chand Bibi, who acted as the regent of the 
infant contender for throne, Bahadur, defended the fort of 
8P Ahmadnagar most stubbornly. Raja Ali Khan, despite his 
close ties with the Mughals at this time, was not reconciled 
to the idea of the total destruction of Ahmadnagar Kingdom, 
tried to help the garrison of the fort to hold on to their 
position in various ways. When it was discovered that he 
was helping the garrison, he was removed by Prince Murad's 
S3 
order from the position that he commanded. 
The garrison of the fort under Chand Bibi were, surely, 
not in a position to continue to resist the Mughal pressure 
indefinitely. Ultimately on S3rd February, 1596, they made a 
proposal for peace, which was promptly accepted by Murad. 
The terms of the settlement were: (a) Bahadur shall be 
82. AktarnBma, vol. Ill, pp-699-700. 
83. "Traditions of old friendship of Raja Ali Khan, ruler of 
Khandesh, still remained and he maintained an uninterrupted 
intsrccurse with those within the fort, so that they were 
enabled by his means, to introduce any supplies that they 
might require, and occasionally when a body of gunners came 
from the other forts in the kingdom to reinforce those in 
Ahmadnagar they were able to enter the fortress by the conni-
vance of Raja Ali Khan and greatly strengthened the defence", 
cf. Bu.rhan-i tfa'asir, p-612. 
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recognized as the ruler of Ahmadnagar, (b) he would accept 
Akbar's over lordship, <c) the territory of Berar shall be 
ceded to the Mughals, and (d) the Ahmadnagar authorities 
OCT 
shall also give other valuable gifts to Akbar. ^  Murad 
promptly accepted the proposal because he was inclined to end 
the operations as early as possible, in view of the 
persisting dissensions in his camp and the threat posed by 
the fortes advancing from the side ot Bijapur. There is no 
mention in the sources of Raja Ali Khan playing a role in 
arranging the peace between Ahmadnagar and the Mughals on 
this occasion. Perhaps he was not included in the 
negotiations because both the Mughals and Nizam Shah is were 
suspicious about him. 
Even after the peace settlement of 1596, the struggle 
between the Mughals and Nizam Shahi officers for the control 
of the territory, over ran by the former, continued. Many of 
the Nizam Shahi officers, apparently, were not happy on 
ceding of Berar to the Mughals. They appeared to be 
determined not to let the Mughals occupy particularly the 
territory of Berar. A major clash took place between the 
84. Abul Fazl writes that "the territory of Ahmadnagar would 
be given as iqtB to Bahadur and he would be made a servant of 
the Mughal court". See AkbBrnams, vol. Ill, pD-699-700. 
Abul Fazl's statement indicate that as if the territory of 
Ahmadnagar was a part of the Mughal Empire. 
85. Akbarnamai, vol. Ill, pp-699-700; Tarikh~i F^ri snta , vol. 
II, p-162. 
86. Tarikh-z Ferishta, vol. II, p-l62; See also Snrhan-x 
Maasir, p-625. 
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Mughals and dissenting Nizam shahi officers near Pathri in 
1597. In this clash Raja Ali Khan was killed fighting on the 
87 Mughals' side. At the end of the clash, when the Mughals 
did not find any trace of Raja Ali Khan, they jumped to the 
conclusion that he had either fled from the field or had 
deserted the Mughal army to join the Deccanis. Suspecting 
his loyalty, they plundered Raja Ali Khan's camp.--' Ne;;t 
day, in any case, his body was found amongst the dead, which 
proved to be a great embarrassment for the Mughals. They 
promptly restored to the Khandesh detachment his banners, 
kettle drums and other property that were taken away as 
D O 
plunder on a day earlier. To pacify the feelings of 
Khandesh officers. Raja Ali Khan's body was buried with full 
honours. Despite these steps the Mughal-Khandesh relations 
came under a serious strain by this incident. Bahadur Shah, 
who succeeded Raja Ali Khan, found it difficult to offer 
support tc Akbar's moves in the Deccan. He, in fact, 
adopted a defiant attitude towards the Mughals. This was 
reflected in his not sending customary peshkash to the Mughal 
Emperor at the time of his ascending the throne. ' "' But the 
Mughals, on their part, appeared to be very anxious to 
87. Aktarnsm^, vol. Ill, pp-717-SO; 7arikh-i Ferz shts , vol. 
II, p-163; Zafar-uI-HsIeh (tr.), vol. I, pp-72-73. 
88. Akbarna^a, vol. Ill, pp-717-20. 
89. Ibid. 
90. See Faizi Sirhindi, AkbarnamBf in Elliot and Dowson 
(ed.), History of India as told by its own Historians, vol. 
• VI pp-13^-35. 
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continue their alliance with Khandesh. Murad sent a formal 
message of condolences to Bahadur Shah on the death of his 
father. He also sent congratulations to him on his 
accession to the throne of Khandesh and invited him to visit 
91 the Mughal camp. But Bahadur Shah remained aloof and 
unfriendly. On each occasion, that he received an 
invitation from Murad to visit the Mughal camp, he evaded 
92 
accepting it on one pretext or the other. ^ 
On 2nd May, 1599, Prince Murad died at Shahpur in 
Berar. In his place, Prince Daniyal was appointed as the 
overall commander of the Mughal forces in the Deccan. At the 
time of his appointment to the Deccan, Daniyal was directed 
to continue the ongoing campaign against the dissenting 
93 
officers of Ahmadnagar. Around this time having been 
relieved from his pre-occupations in the North-West, Akbar 
personally came to the Deccan. He was still hopeful of 
pacifying Bahadur Shah through personal contacts which he 
planned to establish after reaching Burhanpur. Akbar arrived 
at Burhanpur at a time when there was no consensus amongst 
the Khandesh nobles on their future line of action. Instead 
of welcoming Akbar, Bahadur Shah promptly retired to the fort 
of Asirgarh and began preparations for facing a prolonged 
91. Zsfar-ul-Ualeh (tr.), vol. I, p-73. 
9 2 . Ibid. 
9 3 . Akbarnam^if v o l . I l l , p - 7 5 6 ; Tarikh-i Ferzshta v o l . I I , 
p - 2 9 0 . 
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siege. Despite desertions by some of his followers, he 
remained stubborn in his decision not to submit to Akbar and 
also not to co-operate with him in his campaigns against 
Ahmadnagar officers. 
Initially Akbar tried to defuse the prevailing tension 
in his relations with the Khandesh ruler, Bahadur Shah, 
through negotiations. He sent envoys inside the fort to 
persuade Bahadur shah to submit to the Mughals. But these 
efforts were not successful. The futility of his peaceful 
overtures greatly angered Akbar, who finally decided to 
95 
capture the fort by use of force. 
Abul Fazl was entrusted with the task of occupying 
Khandesh territory. He sent troops in different directions 
and v-jithin a short time almost whole of Khandesh, with the 
exception of the fort of Asirgarh, was under the Mugnal 
occupation. As is well known, after a prolonged siege the 
fort of Asirgarh was surrendered by its garrison to Akbar in 
1601. Bahadur Shah was taken prisoner and was sent with his 
family to Gwalior fort. With this the Faruqi dynasty of 
Khandesh came to an end, and the territory of Khandesh, 
called Dandesh later, came to be annexed to the Mughal 
Empire as one of its subas in the Deccan. 
9^. Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-S90. 
95. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp-766-67. 
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IV 
While concluding this chapter one may, thus, say that 
from the very beginning of its establishment as an 
independent state, Khandesh was involved in a complex pattern 
of relationship with the neighbouring kingdoms. Particularly 
with the Sultan of Gujarat its relations were of the nature 
of a tributary state; Gujarat exercising a dominating 
position i-is a i-is khandesh. Later this relationship was 
strengthened through matrimonial ties and the khandesh ruler 
actively co-operated with the Saltari of Gujarat in his 
military exploits. Khandesh's alliance with Gujarat against 
Humayun's invasion in 1535 invited the wrath of the Mughal 
Emperor. 
The occupation of Malwa by Akbar in 156E changed the 
entire situation. Now the Mughals began to play crucial role 
in shaping the relations of khandesh with the neighDcunnq 
kingdoms. The annexation of Gujarat to the Mughal Empire 
gave a new dimension to the inter-state relations. The 
khandesh ruler resented the annexation of Nandurbar and 
Sultanpur refusing to play the Mughal game against 
Ahmadnagar, who had captured Berar (ISV-'f). Raja All Khan 
never reconciled to becoming a vassal of the Mughal Emperor. 
Throughout his reign he seems to have played a dubious 
policy. On the one hand, he tried to form A\-\ alliance of the 
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Mughals, on the other, he often also entered into an alliance 
with them. Dramatic turn at the Ahmadnagar court compelled 
him to ally with the Mughals in 1595. Yet his true 
sympathies were always with the Deccani states. It was this 
dubious attitude that made him a suspect in both the camps. 
Though he allied with the Mughals in 1597, but the military 
alliance with the Mughals did not help in promoting friendly 
feelings and cordiality between them. Deep rooted suspicions 
continued to mark the Mughal-Khandesh relations. Witn the 
death of Raja Ali Khan and accession of Bahadur Shah, began 
the final phase of Mughal-Khandesh relations which culminated 
in the extinction of the latter in 1601. Bahadur shah was 
determined not to succumb to the Mughal pressure. He 
refrained from allying with them in the military operations 
against Ahmadnagar. Bahadur Shah, in fact, failed in 
diplomacy by opposing the Mughals openly, thus, provided them 
pretext for justifying their virtual occupation of large 
tracts of the Khandesh territory. The annexation of 
Khandesh paved the way for the full-scale offensive by the 
Mughals against the Deccani states during ensuing four 
decades, finally leading to the dismantling of Ahmadnagar 
Kingdom in 1636. 
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The year 1526 witnessed the extinction of the two 
powerful kingdoms, the Bahamani in the Deccan and the Lodi in 
North India. Babur's victory at Fanipat had far reaching 
consequences in the Deccan also. Earlier throughout the 
fifteenth century as well as the first quarter of the 
sixteenth century, the relations between the Deccani kingdoms 
and the northern states were always at a very low key. But 
with the establishment of the Mughal Empire this isolation 
seems to have ended. The Deccani rulers namely, Ismail Adil 
Shah of Bijapur, Burhan Nizam Shah I of Ahmadnagar and Sultan 
Quli Qutb Shah of Golkonda, sent congratulatory letters to 
Babur on his victory. On hearing the news of the despatch of 
these messages, the last Bahamani ruler, Shah Kalimullah, who 
was only a pawn in the hands of his wazir, Amir Ali Barid, 
also sent one of his confidants with a letter to Baour 
complaining against the "old servants of his Kingdom (i.e. 
Adil Shah, Nizam Shah and Qutb Shah)". He also requested 
Babur to secure his release from virtual captivity in the 
hands of Amir Ali Barid. In return far this help Shah 
Kalimullah promised to cede to the Mughals the domains 
(mumlikat) of Berar and Daulatabad, which he incidentally no 
longer controlled as an effective ruler. When this news 
leaked out, apparently, in sheer fright of his wazir, Ali 
Barid, Kalimullah fled to Bijapur. Disappointed over not 
1. Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. I, p-376. 
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being welcomed there, he finally took refuge at Ahmadnagar. 
Owing to his preoccupations in the North, Babur seems 
to have paid no heed to the communications from the Deccani 
rulers. Moreover, as it comes out from Babur's brief notice 
of the Bahmanis in his memoirs, he was aware that "no 
3 independent authority is left them". So far as Ahmadnagar, 
Bijapur and Golkonda rulers were concerned, he, apparently, 
did not recognize them as sovereign rulers and refers to 
them only as the "great begs" of the Bahmani Kingdom. This 
should explain why Babur decided to ignore their 
congratulatory letters. 
Perhaps it was the tendency of the Deccani rulers to 
placate the powerful rulers invading North India. On an 
earlier occasion also, in similar circumstances, when Taimur 
had captured Delhi in 1398-99, the Bahmani ruler, Saltan 
Firaz Shah, had sent him peshkash and acknowledged his 
cr 
over lordship. "^  According to Ferishta, Taimur was pleased by 
the gesture and had issued a "farma.Tt" conferring on the 
Bahmani Salta^n , lialwa and Gujarat with permission to use all 
a.Ibzii. 
3. Zahiruddin Babur's B^burnama^ translated from the original 
Turkish text by A.S. Beveridge, (reprint), London, 1969, p-
631. 
4. Ibid. 
5 . Tarikh-i-Feri shta, v o l . I , p - 3 1 2 . 
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the insignia of royalty. By conferring the territories of 
lialwa and Gujarat on Firoz Shah Bahmani, Taimur was behaving 
in a manner, as if these territories were parts of his 
Empire. At the time of Babur's invasion the same ritual of 
sending congratulatory letters was repeated. As a matter of 
fact, after the Battle of Khanwah (1527) Babur appeared 
inclined towards advancing into northern Malwa controlled by 
the Rajput chieftains, who had co-operated with Rana Sanga. 
This can be conjectured from his occupation of Chanderi in 
15S8, which placed him in a commanding position on the 
7 
northern confines of Malwa. Babur's advance into Malwa in 
1528 could also be interpreted as revealing his long term 
plans to e:<tend influence towards the Deccan. Thus one 
could justifiably conjecture that Babur might have played, 
for sometime, with the idea of moving southwards in response 
to the letters received from the Deccani rulers. But his 
preoccupations in the North obviously would not have allowed 
him to make any such move. 
Subsequently, Humayun's invasion of Gujarat (1535-36) 
brought the Mughals into a direct contact with Khandesh tm 
as well as Ahmadnagar . When Humayun started his operations 
against Bahadur Shah, the latter hotly chased by the 
Mughals, fled from Mandsor to Mandu and then to Champaner and 
6. Ibid. 
7 - See Sa^urnama , ( t r . ) , p - S 9 8 . Babur a l s o p l a n n e d t o annex 
R a i s i n , B h i l s a and S a r a n g p u r bu t was p r e v e n t e d from do ing so 
by t h e news of renewed Afghan r e b e l l i o n in Awadh. 
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Ahmadabad. Eventually he was forced to take refuge at Diu on 
the Kathiawar coast. Thus, the whole of Gujarat came under 
p 
the Mughal control. While Humayun was still in Gujarat, he 
received submissive letters from Burhan Nizam Shah I of 
Ahmadnagar, Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar and "other Deccani 
rulers idiga-r hakka.m-i dafcan )". According to Ferishta, 
during this time, Humayun sent a certain Asaf Khan to 
Ahmadnagar to demand peshkash (talib-i peshkssh shad) from 
Burhan Nizam shah. It may be conjectured that Asaf Khan 
was sent to reciprocate the embassy of Rasti Khan sent 
earlier by Burhan Nizam Shah to persuade Humayun to invade 
Gujarat. The despatch of Asaf Khan to Ahmadnagar is also 
corroborated by a subsequent letter of Burhan Nizam Shah I, 
which he sent after Humayun's invasion of Khandesh. In this 
letter, which , according to Ferishta, was drafted by Shah 
Tahir Junaidi, acknowledging the receipt of imperial farmari 
ifarmari-i ham^yiiTi misa.1) sent through Asaf Khan, he states 
that, " letters have been received from 
Muhammad Khan Faruqi, the ruler ikabir :^utasa.ddi-i iyalat) of 
Burhanpur and Asir" seeking protection for his small Kingdom 
8. Akbarnam^f vol. I, pp-132-33. For details of Humayun's 
war with Bahadur Shah, see Ishwari Prasad's Life and Times 
of Humayunf Calcutta, 1955, pp-68-77. 
9. 7arikh-i Ferishta, vol. I, p-S15; See also Khafi Khan, 
Muntakhals-ul Lubab^ ed. by Kabiruddin Ahmad, Asiatic Society 
of Bengal, 1869, vol. I, p-79. 
10. Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, p-S85. 
11. Ibidf p-1 16;pp-9-10. 
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from Mughal invasion. Burhan Nizam Shah requested Humayun to 
pardon Muhammad Khan Faruqui's "errors" and pleaded that the 
12 Mughals should not occupy Khandesh. 
After Humayun•s withdrawal from Khandesh (1536) and his 
subsequent discomfiture at the hands of Sher Shah (15^0), the 
correspondence between him and the Nizam Shahis was 
discontinued. But these contacts are reported to have been 
revived around September-October, 1550, which =nall be 
noticed in some detail after having surveyed the Nizam 
Shahi-Sur relations during 1537-50. 
After the Mughals were displaced from North India, 
Burhan Nizam Shah I established diplomatic relations with 
the Sur Empire in order to secure their help in his struggle 
against his neighbours. Although hardly any infor-nation is 
furnished by the chronicles regarding Burhan Nizam shah's 
contacts with the Sur rulers, but an anonymcus Insh^ 
collection contains letters (maktubat) written by Burhan 
Nizam Shah I to Sher Shah and after him to Islam Shah as 
12. Tsrikh-i Feri shts, vol. II, p-SS5. For the letter of 
Burhan Nizam Shah I to Humayun, see Insha-i Tahir Hasairn , 
British Museum MS, HARL-it99, ff-179-199. From the contents 
of the letter it appears that, at this time, Humayun was in 
Khandesh and the letter was despatched in August-September, 
1536. 
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well.^^ Later, with the decline of Sur fortunes, Burhan 
Nizam Shah again opened correspondence with Humayun. In one 
of the letters, sent sometime in 1550 (by this time Humayun 
had established himself at Kabul after defeating 
Kamran), he recalls his earlier relations with the 
Mughals and apologizes for not keeping in touch. 
He further writes that " the present 
communication is aimed at renewal of allegiance 
(tajdxd-i marasim-2 ita'at)", and expresses gratitude 
and pleasure on receiving Humayun' s farntari brought by 
the companions of the late Rasti Khan. In this latter 
Burhan Nizam Shah also conveyes that "he expects that Humayun 
will launch a campaign to liberate territories still held by 
rebels (possibly a reference to Surs) and assures all 
assistance in the campaign". "Having broken-off relations 
with the enemies of the imperial power (i.e. the Surs)", the 
letter goes on to say, "this writer is now awaiting the 
launching of the campaign, success of which is assured". 
13. Iqtidar Alam Khan in his article 'Ahmadnagar and the Sur 
Empire, 1537-53; A study of contemporary Documents', 
Proceedings of Indian History Congress, Burdwan, 1983, 
pp-176-88, has used an anonymous insha collection preserved 
in Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris, which contains Burhan Nizam 
shah's correspondence with the contemporary rulers and other 
related documents. See MS Bibliotheque Nationale, Persian 
Supplement, 1352. 
1^. For full text of the letter, see Anonymous insha 
collection, Persian supplement, 135S, ff-19b-Elb (margin). 
Same letter is also included in Insha-i Tahi r Husami , 
ff-^b-lSb. Riazul Islam has given a summarised translation, 
but he wrongly gives the date of despatch of above letter as 
AH. 937/AD. 1530. See Riazul Islam, Calendar of Documents on 
Indo-Persian Relations, Tehran and Karachi, 1979, vol. II, 
p-120. 
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The contents of this letter indicate that, for some 
reason, the relations between the Nizam Shah and the Surs 
had become strained during this time (1550), which was partly 
responsible for Burhan Nizam Shah's re-establishing 
relations with the Mughals. This correspondence was resumed 
at a time when Islam Shah was reigning and was still powerful 
ruler. Already by this time Islam Shah had succeeded in 
crushing the disaffected nobles, including Isa Khan Niazi, 
Khawas Khan and Shuja'at Khan Sur, the tiBkim of Malwa, •'^"^  and 
appeared to be in a position to intervene in the Deccan. One 
might conjecture that it was, possibly, in the hope of 
persuading Humayun to create a diversion for Islam Shah in 
the North-West, that Burhan Nizam Shah thought it politic to 
approach Humayun with this kind of letter. This is borne out 
by the contents of the letters that are reproduced in the 
anonymaus insha collection. In this context Iqtidar Alam 
Khan rightly suggests that "during the period 1537-33, Burhan 
Nizam Shah I appears to be trying to cultivate alternately 
the Mughals and their Sur rivals depending on who seems to be 
gaining an upper hand at any particular point of time". 
15. For details of suppression of the disaffected nobles by 
Islam shah. See Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui, Some Aspects of 
Afghan Despoti sm in India^ Aligarh, 1969, pp-73-7^. 
16- See Iqtidar Alam Khan's article 'Ahmadnagar and the Sur 
Empire, 1537-53: A study of Contemporary Documents', op. 
czt., pp-176-88. 
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Another letter (Briz^) of Nizam Shah addressed to 
Humayun go to highlight his keenness to establish close 
relations with the Mughals after 1550. The statement in this 
letter that "(the writer) was overjoyed to receive the 
confirmation of the news of His Majesty's (i.e. Humayun's) 
setting out for the conquest of Delhi ibetaskhir-i dar-ul 
mulk Delhi) suggests that it was written sometime after 
November, 1554, when Humayun had left Kabul for re-
establishing his rule in North India. It is noteworthy that 
by this time Burhan Nizam Shah had already died (December, 
1 R 
1553). This letter was possibly sent on behalf of Husain 
Nizam Shah, the successor of Burhan Nizam Shah. There is yet 
another letter ia.riza.) from the Nizam Shahi ruler to Humayun, 
which also seems to have been written on behalf of Husain 
Nizam Shah. The contents of this letter indicate that it was 
19 
written sometime after Humayun had already conquered Delhi. 
It may, thus, be noticed that during the period 1537-
55, the rulers of Ahmadnagar Kingdom, Burhan Nizam Shah I 
and later Husain Nizam Shah, were cautiously keeping an eye 
on the developments taking place in North India leading to 
the .establishment of a powerful state in Gangetic plains 
17. For full tex't of the letter, see Anonymous iusha. 
Col lection, Persian Supplement, 1352, f-lSb (written on 
margin). 
18. Burhari-i Maasi r , p-356. 
19. Arionymoas Insha Col lection , op. c i t . , f-36b (written on 
margin). 
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capable of expanding towards the Deccan. Thus, Ahmadnagar 
rulers were always anxious to remain on the right side of 
the powers that seemed gaining authority in the North. The 
shift of Ahmadnagar's allegiance from Mughals to Surs and 
then uice i-erss during 1535-55 is borne out by their 
correspondence with the Sur as well as the Mughal rulers 
during this period. " 
Under Akbar no information regarding his relations with 
Ahmadnagar is found in the sources till one comes to the 
account of Akbar ' s march to lialwa for suppressing Abdullah 
Khan Uzbeg in 1564. One of the Nizam Shahi officers, 
Mugarrib Khan, came by way of Berar and waited upon Akbar in 
Malwa. He was received in the Mughal service and was 
assigned as ja.gir, sa.rka.r Handia, which was taken from 
21 Khandesh only a shortwhile earlier. 
Thus, during the period 1535-55 the attitude of Burhan 
Nizam Shah I was of a shifting nature. He shifted his 
allegiance according to the demands of the situation. He 
maintained correspondence with either Humayun or the Sur 
rulers depending on the general impression as to which one of 
them seemed to be gaining an upper hand in establishing his 
authority over North India. He was particularly apprehensive 
20. For the detailed analysis af Nizam Shah's correspondence 
with the Surs and the Mughals, see Iqtidar Alam Khan's 
article 'Ahmadnagar and the Sur Empire', op. cit, pp-176-aa. 
21. Akb^rnama, vol. II, p-30. 
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of the Suitan of Gujarat. His main concern during this 
pericd was to keep away the Gujarati Sultan from intervening 
in Ahmadnagar. To a lesser extent the Nizam Shahi ruler 
also regarded the Khalji Kingdom of Malwa as his potential 
rival xn the affairs of Khandesh. He, therefore, was keen 
that Humayun, Sher Shah and, still later, Islam Shah, in 
short, everyone of these rulers controlling North India at 
different points of time during 1535-55, should keep up 
military pressure on Gujarat as well as tialwa to restrain 
them from interfering in Ahmadnagar or from competing with 
it in cultivating the friendship with Khandesh. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTIR « III 
Mughal Relations with Ahmadnagar? 1572-95. 
Circumstances Inducing Akbar to Resort to the Use 
of Force Against Ahmadnagar. 
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It was only after consolidating his Empire in the North 
that in 1595 Akbar was seemingly prompted to extend the 
boundaries of his Empire in the Deccan. Modern writers have 
ascribed different motives to Akbar for adopting this policy. 
Three specific suggestions have been made that "he cherished 
hopes of destroying the Portuguese dominion on the Western 
coast"; or that he desired " to safeguard the trade route to 
the Gujarat sea ports and to dominate "Surat hinterland", or 
finally that in the Deccan "he was seeking larger 
revenues", all of these are undoubtedly relevant. rfut as 
Satish Chandra states, "a critical assessment of Akbar's 
it 
objectives in the Deccan is yet to be made" In this regard, 
it may be suggested that, partly at least, Akbar'= drive 
beginning in 1595 to annex territories in the Deccan may be 
explained with reference to the difficulties that arose in 
Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations from 157S onwards. It is to 
bring out the circumstances and factors which gave rise to 
these difficulties that the Mughal-Ahmadnagar relations of 
the period 1572-95, are examined here. 
1. V.A. Smith, Akbar the Great Moguls New Delhi, 1958, p-263. 
2. Satish Chandra, 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals-A 
Reappraisal ' ,Ir#di an Histories! Rev-i eu ^ vol. IV, No.-l 1977-
78, pp-326-27. 
3. Shireen Moosvi, 'The Mughal Empire and the Deccan-Economic 
Factors and Consequences', PIHC^ Kurukshetra, 1982, pp-365-
66. 
h. Satish Chandra, op. cit. p-326. 
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It was only after the conquest of Gujarat in 157E that 
it became possible for Akbar to intervene in the affairs of 
the Deccan. The annexation of Gujarat had brought about a 
situation where the Mughal Empire came to have a common 
frontier with the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. Moreover, Muhammad 
Husain Mirza,"' a Mughal rebel, who was staying in Gujarat 
till 1572, had taken shelter in Ahmadnagar following the 
conquest of Gujarat by Akbar. This naturally made Akbar 
anxious regarding Murtaza Nizam Shah I's attitude towards the 
Mughals. If he could give shelter to Mughal rebels escaping 
from Gujarat, he could also use them to encourage and help 
the remnants of Gujarat nobility still not reconciled to the 
Mughal conquest, to continue their resistance. It was to 
forestal any such development that Akbar appears to have 
decided to bring about diplomatic pressure on Murtaza Nizam 
Shah for persuading him to desist from giving protection to 
S.Muhammad Husain Mirza was one of the sons of Muhammad 
Sultan Mirza, who vaas a grandson of Suitar/ Husain Baiqara, 
the Timurid ruler of Khurasan. Muhammad Sultan Mirza came to 
India alongwith Humayun in 1555 and was assigned the j^gir of 
Sambhal. At the time Akbar proceeded towards Kabul to repel 
the attack of Mirza Hakim in 1566, Muhammad Sultan Mirza also 
revolted at Sambhal. But his rebellion was crushed and he had 
to flee towards Malwa alongwith his three sons Muhammad 
Husain Mirza, Ibrahim Husain Mirza and Masood Husain Mirza. 
But later on, Muhammad Sultan Mirza was captured and 
imprisoned at Bayana. However, his sons succeeded in 
reaching Gujarat. Following the first invasion of Gujarat by 
Akbar in 1572, Muhammad Husain Mirza took shelter in 
Ahmadnagar, while Ibrahim Husian Mirza fled towards Multan, 
where he was killed by Makhsoos Khan, the governor of Multan. 
For details see Ferishta's Tari kh-i Feri shtB^ vol. I. 
pp-259-61. 
6. Abul Fazl, AktsmsTn^, ed. by Agha Ahmad Ali and Abdur 
Rahim, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1886, vol. Ill, 
pp-77-78; Burhsn-i Waasir, p-464. 
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Muhammad Husain Mirza and his followers. 
In 1573, Mir Muhsin Rizvi, a Mughal envoy returned from 
Ahmadnagar while Akbar was still in Gujarat, He had gone 
there earlier at the time of the first expedition (October, 
157S) to demand the surrender of Muhammad Husain Mirza and 
also to advise Murtaza Nizam Shah I to follow, iln Abul Fazl's 
words, the "path of obedience". It seems that Murtaza Nizam 
Shah I was greatly perturbed by Akbar's conquest of Gujarat. 
He, apparently, feared that an invasion of Ahmadnagar by 
Akbar from the side of Gujarat was a distinct possibility. 
In this situation Murtaza Nizam Shah I's response to the 
message carried by Mir Muhsin Rizvi was a contradictory one. 
On the one hand, he was anxious not to give any further 
provocation to Akbar. He, thus, promptly directed Muhammad 
Husain Mirza and his followers to leave Ahmadnagar territory 
and also send an offering (peshkBsh) to Akbar. But on the 
other hand, he also did not want to sereve his links with 
this determined band of Mughal rebels and the elements of 
Gujarati nobility supporting them, possibly with a view to 
keeping open his option of using these potential allies 
against the Mughals in Gujarat. It was, perhaps, out of 
these contradictory considerations that Murtaza Nizam Shah I 
neither imprisoned Muhammad Husain Mirza nor handed him over 
to the Mughals. 
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As the events of 1573 showed Murtaza Nizam Shah I, on 
his part, continued to be apprehensive of Mughal designs even 
after Akbar had returned to Agra in flay, 1573. Despite his 
conciliatory gestures in response to demands conveyed through 
Mir Muhsin Rizvi, he continued to sympathise with the anti 
Mughal elements in Gujarat. As is well known they made a 
determined attempt to expel the Mughals from Gujarat in 
August,1573. In this attempt the Gujarati noble, Ikhtiyar-ul 
Mulk, was actively supported by Muhammad Husain Mirza, who 
was, apparently, allowed by the Ahmadnagar authorities to 
cross back into Gujarat after the outbreak of insurgency. 
Akbar made his famous lightening march to Gujarat in 
September, 1573 which foiled the attempt to oust the Mughals 
from there; both Muhammad Husain Mirza and Ikhtiyar-ul Mulk 
g 
were killed in the fighting. Subsequently, some of the 
relations of Muhammad Husain Mirza were given shelter by 
Murtaza Nizam Shah I. This showed again his anxiety to 
retain allies among the anti Mughal elements for using them 
to destabilize the Mughal authority in Gujarat. 
8. For details of Muhammad Husain Mirza's revolt and his 
subsequent killing, see /lArdarnama, vol. Ill, pp-56-57; 60-61 . 
See also Tari kh-i Feri shts, vol. I, pp. S59-61. 
9.Gulrukh Begum, daughter of Kamran Mirza and wife of Ibrahim 
Husain Mirza, who was at Surat during this time?, on advance 
of the Mughal forces fled towards Deccan, carrying her son 
Muzaffar Husain Mirza alongwith her. See Tan kh-i Fen shta , 
vol. I, p-a60; See also Akbarnauiaf vol. Ill, p-S06. 
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It is in this background that one should view Murtaza 
Nizam Shah I's decision to annex Berar in 1574. 
Apparently,he was guided in taking this step not only by 
territorial ambition but also by an anxiety to check Mughal 
advance into the region. That, liurtaza Nizam Shah I's 
apprehensions regarding Mughal designs were not entirely 
baseless, is suggested by the history of Akbar's relations 
with Khandesh since 156S. As already noticed in Chapter I, 
after annexing Malwa in 156E, Akbar not only brought under 
his firm control ssrkar Handia that extended beyond the 
Narbada and bordered upon the North-Eastern parts of Berar, " 
but had also gained possession of sarksr Bijagarh bv force. 
This suggested Akbar's plans to advance into the trans-
Narbada tract which placed him not only in a commanding 
position v-is a vis Khandesh Kingdom but also brought him very 
close to the Northern frontier of Berar. Akbar's subsequent 
attitude, in pressing the ruler of Khandesh to help the 
nobles of Berar in expelling the Ahmadnagar occupation forces 
from there, does go to suggest that Murtaza Nizam Shah's 
apprehensions were not far from wrong. There is, thus, 
strong basis for imagining that during this time (157'^) Akbar 
was planning to gain a foothold in Berar which would have 
made Nizam Shah still more exposed to the threat of military 
10. The southern boundary of sar.<car Handia ran along the 
north-eastern confines of the territory of Berar. See Irfan 
Habib, AD Atlas of the Mughal Ejnpi re , op. c i t . Sheet 14-A. 
11. For capture of Bijagarh by the Mughal forces. See 
Zafai—al-i^aleh (tr.), vol. I, p-60. 
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intervention by the Mughals. Before he moved into Berar, 
liurtaza Nizam Shah I had taken the precaution of trying to 
ensure that the ruler of Khandesh should not come to the 
support of the ruler of Berar. It was, apparently, with this 
aim that he sent a letter to Muhammad Shah II of Khandesh 
seeking his help and co-operation in his plans to annex 
IE Berar. This attempt to secure the co-operation of the 
Khandesh ruler was not very successful in the beginning. 
Initially, Muhammad Shah II was very reluctant to help him. 
As a matter of fact, Muhammad Shah II went to the extent of 
siding with the ruler of Berar in his resistance to the Nizam 
Shahi invading forces. Later in 1575, however, an 
understanding was arrived at between Khandesh and Ahmadnagar 
under which Muhammad Shah II agreed not to help the ousted 
13 
nobles of Berar. 
The annexation of Berar and alliance with Khandesh 
emboldened Murtaza Nizam Shah I to assume a more defiant 
posture towards Akbar. He is even accused by Abul Fazl of 
instigating the new ruler of Khandesh, Raja Ali Khan 
(accession 1576), to withhold the payment of p^'s.'i.vas;'? to 
14 Akbar. Towards the end of 1576, a Mughal army under the 
command of Shihabuddin Ahmad Khan, Qutbuddin Muhammad Khan 
12. Burhan-i Maasir, pp-475-76. 
13. Ibid. 
1^. cf. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp-197-98. 
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and others was sent to punish Raja Ali Khan. But, due to 
the dissension in the Mughal camp, and also due to the 
rebellion of Muzaffar Husain Mirsa in Gujarat, this army had 
to be withdrawn from the banks of the Narbada. On this 
occasion, according to Badauni, the Mughal officers had no 
option but to be content with receiving from Raja Ali Khan 
whatever amount he was then in a position to pay as 
17 
At this time a Mughal envoy, Baqi Khan, was sent to 
Ahmadnagar to give" good counsels" to Murtaza Nizam Shah I. 
Baqi Khan returned from there in 1577 accompanied by one of 
Nizam shah's trusted officers, Wafa Khan, who brought with 
IS him a letter and precious gifts sent by his master. 
However, it appears that, this response of Nizam Shahi ruler 
did not contribute to removing the prevailing hostility for 
him at Akbar's Court. Akbar's decision in 1581 to give 
shelter to an imposter pretending to be Burhan, one of the 
younger brothers of Murtaza Nizam shah I and his rival for 
the throne of Ahmadnagar, goes to suggest that, by 1579-80, 
15. AkbsrnavjBf vol. Ill, pp-197-98. See also Tai?;sqat-i 
Akb^rif vol. II, p-333; Munt^khsib-ut-TBuari kh ^ vol. II, p-
2^4. 
16. AkbarnamSf vol. Ill, p-S06. 
17. HuTitakh^o-ut-TsM^rikhf vol. II, p-SSO. 
18. /^ A'^ arnasia, vol. Ill, S05. 
Another Mughal envoy returning from Bijapur in 1579, was also 
similarly accompanied by an Adil Shahi envoy alongwith a 
letter and peshkash from Ali Adil Shah. See Akbarn^ma. , vol. 
Ill, pp-266-67. 
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he had made up his mind on a policy of obtaining the 
submission of the Nizam Shahis as well as other rulers of the 
Deccan, by exerting pressure upon them in a variety of ways, 
granting of shelter to the person pretending to be Burhan was 
one such attempt. From this time onwards he also began to 
write to the Deccani rulers to accept his overlordship or be 
19 ready to face Mughal military might. This attitude OT 
Akbar is further highlighted by his sending in 1579, two 
envoys, Peshrau Khan and Hakim Ali Gilani, to Ahmadnagar and 
Bijapur respectively asking the rulers of these states to 
PC) 
accept Akbar's overlordship. " Abul Fasl goes on to add that 
the envoy to Ahmadnagar succeeded in his mission since 
Murtaza Nizam Shah I promptly responded to Akbar's message by 
sending one of his trusted officer, Asaf Khan, along with 
21 precious gifts. 
These diplomatic moves of Akbar were, apparently, aimed 
at, all the time, impressing the Nizam Shahi ruler that he 
was being watched closely, so that he does not resort to 
further anti Mughal intrigues in Khandesh. The opportunity 
to intervene in the affairs of Ahmadnagar presented itself 
19. "The sole idea of the Shahinshsh was to clear the 
territory of Ahmadnagar of the weeds and rubbish of 
rebellion, and then to prevail over Bijapur, Golkonda and 
Bidar, so that the rulers of these places should make binding 
treaties of obedience", cf. Akb^rnams, vol. Ill, p-7S9. 
20. Akbarnama^ vol. Ill, pp-26(b-67; p-ESO. 
21. Ibid , p-280. 
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to Akbar when real Burhan-ul Mulk, a younger brother of 
Murtasa Nizam Shah I and his competitor for the Nizam Shahi 
throne, came to take refuge at the Mughal court in 1583. 
Burhan-ul Mulk is reported to have described to the Mughal 
authorities the chaotic condition then prevailing in 
Ahmadnagar. Around this time a virtual civil war had 
started among the Nizam Shahi amirs for controlling the 
administration. In 1584, after being defeated by Salabat 
Khan, the uskiI of Ahmadnagar, Saiyid Murtaza, the Nizam 
Shahi governor of Berar, and Khudawand Khan arrived in 
Khandesh with the hope of getting help from Raja Ali Khan."^ "^  
But he, instead of helping them, captured their 
paraphernalia. In desperation, they asked for help frcm 
Akbar urging him to recover their baggage from Raja Ali Khan 
and to restore order in Ahmadnagar. They were sent to 
Khan-i Azam Mirza Aziz Koka, the Mughal sabed^r of Malwa, 
with the order to help them. "* An order was also issued to 
Raja Ali Khan to restore the plundered goods. "^^ 
Simultaneously, Mir Fatehullah Shirazi was deputed to advise 
Raja Ali Khan to assist the Mughal amy in its operations 
2 2 . Ibid , p - 4 0 7 . 
2 3 . Tarikh-i Ferishta, v o l . I I , p - 2 S 8 . 
2 ^ . 7aca<7at-i Akbari ^ v o l . I I , p - 3 9 3 ; Hun takhab-ut-T awar i kh , 
v o l . I I , p - 3 4 3 . 
2 5 . Akbarnamaf v o l . I l l , p - 4 8 9 ; TaDaqat-i Akbari , v o l . I I , 
p p - 3 8 3 - a 4 . 
2 6 . Tarikh-i Feri shta, v o l . I , p - S 6 5 . 
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against Ahmadnagar. This indicates Akbar's eagerness, 
around this time, to use all the means to subjugate the 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom. However, in the military operations 
launched by Akbar, Raja Ali Khan was supporting the Mughals 
only outwardly; in reality his sympathies lay with 
Ahmadnagar as he realized that a Mughal advance into Berar 
and Ahmadnagar would be preceded by an entry of Mughal forces 
into Khandesh. Eventually due to sharp dissension in the 
Mughal camp, but mainly because of an alliance between 
Khandesh and Ahmadnagar, no substantial advance could be made 
by the Mughal forces sent under Aziz Koka. ' 
After a humiliating withdrawal by Aziz Koka from Berar 
in 1586, no military demonstration was staged by the Mughals 
against Ahmadnagar during the next two years. In iSSS, 
following the death of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, a virtual civil 
war began in the Ahmadnagar Kingdom ove^ - the issue of 
succession. This was a good opportunity for Akbar to 
intervene in its s^ffsiirs. He recalled Burnan-ul Mulk from 
Tirah, where he was serving against the Afghan rebels and 
asked him to proceed to the Deccan for making a bid for 
Ahmadnagar•s throne. At the same time, Akbar also asked Raja 
Ali Khan to assist Burhan in his efforts to establish himself 
S7. /lAdarnama, vol. Ill, p-46^; Tab^qst-i Akbari ^ vol. II, 
pp. 383-8-^; Tsrzkh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-2S8. 
28. SurhBn-i Massir, p-550. 
29. Akbarnamaf vol. Ill, p-489; Mur>takhab-ut-Tak>ari.sh , vol. 
II, PP-360-6S; Burhan-i Maasir^ p-550. 
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30 
as king of Ahmadnagar. However, Burhan, while leaving 
Burhanpur for Ahmadnagar by the way of Berar, left behind the 
Mughal forces deputed by Akbar to assist him. He took this 
precaution as he was awars that Ahmadnagar nobility would 
resent his going there with a Mughal contingent. He, 
therefore, made his first attempt to enter Ahmadnagar and 
capture the throne with the help of his followers hailing 
from Ahmadnagar itself, but was unsuccessful. In his second 
attempt he preferred to take help from Raja Ali Khan. In the 
second attempt he succeeded in seizing the throne. He 
31 
assumed the title of Burhan Nizam shah II. 
Akbar's long cherished wishes with regard to 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom could not be realized even after Burhan's 
occupying the Nizam Shahi throne. Regarding the Mughals, 
Burhan too began to pursue the same policy as had been 
adopted by his predecessor, namely, a policy of rejecting 
Akbar's suggestion of accepting his over lordship and 
continued to defy the Mughal pressure on the question of 
Berar. This greatly offended Akbar, who viewed this attitude 
of Burhan as bordering upon ingratitude. On the other hand, 
Burhan perceived no moral obligation towards Akbar since he 
30. Akb^rn^mAf vol. Ill, pp.538-39; p-587; Tabsqat-i Akbari, 
vol. Ill, p.75; Tarikh~i Ferishta, vol. II, p.151; Zafaf—ul-
Wai<?rt, (tr.), vol. I, p-66. 
31. AkbBrnama, vol. HI, p-587; Tabaqat-i Akbari ^ vol. Ill, 
p-75; Tarikh~i Ferishta^ vol. 11, p-151. 
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had occupied the throne with the help extended to him by Raja 
Ali Khan. The Mughal troops did not play an important role 
in his success. After his accession, he did not send any 
customary peshkash to the Mughal court making Akbar still 
32 
more resentful towards Burhan. It is, therefore, 
understandable that subsequently Akbar resumed his earlier 
policy of persuasion combined with threats of the use of 
force to bring round Burhan Nizam as well as other Deccani 
rulers to accept his overlordship. In 1591, he sent four 
envoys to the four Deccan kingdoms, namely, Shaikh Faizi to 
Khandesh, Aminuddin to Ahmadnagar, Mir Muhammad Rizvi to 
Bijapur and Mir Munir to Golkonda "warning" them that if they 
did not accept his overlordship, an imperial army would be 
33 despatched against them. At this time, Faizi was deputea 
to proceed to Ahmadnagar after finishing his mission in 
Khandesh, though another Mughal envoy was already present 
there. Faizi's special mission was to use his persanai 
influence with Burhan Nizam Shah II to make him agree tc 
accept Akbar's overlordship. From Abul Fazl's notice of 
these diplomatic missions to Deccan it is oovious that 
Akbar's foremost aim in the Deccan in early 15905 was tc 
extend his sway over Ahmadnagar Kingdom. Around this time a 
32. Akbarnamaf vol. Ill, pp-596-97. 
33. AkbsirnamSf vol. Ill, pp-596-97; Tai?aqat-i Aktari , vol. 
II, pp-412-13; MuT>takhab~ij.t-Tahiarikh^ vol. II, 377: 
Tarikh-i Ferishta vol. I, p-S67. 
3^. AkDarnama,, vol. Ill, pp-596-97; Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. 
I, p-267. 
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farman was sent to Raja Ali Khan, in which he was praised for 
his services to the Mughal cause. A report is given in 
this farmari of Akbar ' s military successes in the region of 
Kabul, Qandahar etc. perhaps, to impress upon Raja Ali Khan 
that Akbar's current pre-occupations in the North-Wast were 
almost over and soon he would be free to march towards the 
Deccan. The farman ends by urging Raja Ali Khan to assist 
Faizi in his mission of persuading the rulers of the Deccan, 
especially Burhan Nizam Shah II to accept Akbar's 
overlordship. Sometime later, another hasb-ul hakjn was 
despatched to Raja Ali Khan, directing him to advise Burhan 
Nizam to accept Mughal overlordship. In a fBrman, sent to 
Burhan-ul Mulk through Aminuddin, the demand for submitting 
37 to Akbar was reiterated, and information, that similar 
farmans were being sent to Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah and 
38 Ibrahim Adil Shah II, was conveyed. 
Akbar appears to have formulated a strategv- for the 
invasion of the Decc3Lr\ as early as 1591. As a part af this 
strategy Prince Murad was appointed the governor of Malwa, 
with the instructions that "if the rulers of the Deccan were 
35. For Akbar's farman to Raja Ali Khan, see Abul Fazl, War 
Seh Daftar Abul Fazlf ed. by Amir Husain Rizvi, Nawal Kishore 
Press, Lucknow, 1863, pp-68-75. 
36. Ibid, PP-1S8-89. 
37. Ibid, pp-75-77. 
38. Ibid. For Akbar's farman to Qutb-ul-Mulk, see Har Seh 
Daftar, pp-186-87. 
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not impressed by the good advices (sent to them), punishment 
should be prepared for them". From this it may be 
conjectured that in 1591 Akbar, anticipating the failure of 
embassies sent to Ahmadnagar and other Deccan rulers in that 
year, was making contingency plans for an invasion of 
Ahmadnagar by a Mughal army formally headed by his son Murad. 
In 1593, the envoys returned from the Deccan. Faizi's 
embassy to Khandesh was successful to some extent. But so 
far as Ahmadnagar was concerned, Burhan Nizam Shah II did not 
send respectable amount as peshkash and also ignored the 
demand to acknowledge Akbar as his overlord. " Akbar was 
naturally greatly annoyed over this defiant attitude of 
Burhan Nizam Shah II. A large scale mobilization of Mughal 
forces in Malwa for invading Ahmadnagar under the command of 
Prince Daniyal and Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan was commenced. 
After sometime, Daniyal was recalled and Khan-i Khanan was 
appointed the overall commander of army that was mobilized in 
Malwa. At this tj.me Prince Murad and Raja Man Singh were 
also ordered to be prepared for joining the army mobilized to 
invade Ahmadnagar. This Mughal force, however, did not 
actually invade Ahmadnagar until 1595. The Mughal commanders 
39. AkbarnamBf vol. Ill, pp-597-98. 
40. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, p-639; Tabsqst-x Akbsri , vol. II, 
p-4£3; Muntakhab-ut-Tsusrikhf vol. II, p-389. 
'i-l. Akbarnamaf vol. Ill, pp-646-if7; Tabaqat-i Akbari , vol. 
11, p-423; Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikhf vol. II, p-389. 
^•2. Akbarnama f vol. Ill, pp-646-47. 
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carefully watched the developments taking place in 
Ahmadnagar. They were apparently waiting for an appropriate 
opportunity to open the campaign. Perhaps they were 
apprehensive that Burhan Nizam Shah II could mobilize the 
other Deccani rulers and form a powerful Deccani alliance. 
Although, at this time. Raja Ali Khan was co-operating with 
the liughals, Akbar was not sure of his fidelity and felt 
that in case an alliance of the Deccani rulers materialized, 
he might also join that alliance. Therefore, to pacify Raja 
Ali Khan and win his whole hearted support in the impending 
invasion of Ahmadnagar, the territory of Nandurbar, which 
had been annexed by the Mughals at the time of the conquest 
of Gujarat, was returned to Khandesh around this time 
(1595).^^ 
The death of Burhan Nizam Shah II in 1595 provided the 
Mughals with a long awaited opportunity to invade Ahmadnagar. 
He was succeeded by his son, Ibrahim, who vMas killed a few 
months later in a battle with the Bijapur forces. Subsequent 
to Ibrahim's death there started a vicious struggle among the 
various factions of Nizam Shahi nobles, each of whom was 
struggling to place their protege on the throne. The 
subsequent events relating to the Nizam Shahi nobles' mutual 
rivalry as well as the siege of Ahmadnagar by the Mughals 
(1595) leading to the peace settlement of 1596 is discussed 
^3. Ibid^ p-697. See also Zafar-ui-Waie-Zj (tr.). vol. I, p-
71. 
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in the ensuing Chapter (Chapter IV). 
From the above narrative it seems that, right from the 
time of annexation of Gujarat, Akbar was perhaps inclined to 
move into Berar and Northern parts of Ahmadnagar. To pursue 
this expansionist drive towards the Deccan, he initially 
adopted diplomatic means. As it is indicated by his 
diplomatic correspondence, from early 1530s onwards, Akbar 
was apparently all set to use force against Ahmadnagar. 
However, due to his preoccupation in the eastern and Northern 
regions he had to delay a full fledged offensive in the 
Deccan upto 1595. 
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The Mughal forces on the Deccan frontier, which had 
begun to be mobilized under Prince Murad and Abdur Rahim 
Khan-i Khanan as early as 1593, did not actually move into 
Ahmadnagar down to 1595. The Mughal commanders were 
seemingly waiting for an appropriate pretext and opportunity 
to start the invasion. As long as Burhan Nizam Shah II was 
reigning at Ahmadnagar the Mughals seem to have avoided 
precipitating a conflict with the Nizam Shah. This caution 
on the part of the Mughals might be attributed to the fact of 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom being quite formidable as long as its 
nobility was firmly united behind Burhan Nizam Shah II. 
After the death of Burhan in 1595 this situation was altered 
providing the Mughals a convenient opportunity to intervene 
in the affairs of Ahmadnagar. Following Burhan's death a 
virtual civil war had broken out over succession issue 
splitting the Nizam Shahi nobles into a number of warring 
factions. Initially Burhan was succeeded by his son, 
Ibrahim, who in his arrogance and at the instigation of the 
Abyssinian noble, Ikhlas Khan, invited a conflict with 
Bijapur, In the ensueing conflict Ibrahim Nizam Shah was 
killed in the battle field and his army fled to Ahmadnagar."" 
After Ibrahim Nizam Shah's elimination, Ikhlas Khan took full 
control of the fort of Ahmadnagar and treasure present there. 
1. Fuzuni Astarabadi, Futuhat~i Adil Shahi, British Museum 
MS, Add. 27,251, f-223. Also Tarj A.rt-i Ferishta^ vol. II, pp. 
156-57. 
2. Ibid. See also Basatin-as-Salatin, pp-£28-S9. 
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He called a meeting of the Abyssinian nobles to select a 
successor of Ibrahim. Finally they all agreed to support 
Chand Bibi, who was espousing the cause of Bahadur, the 
infant son of Burhan Nizam Shah II. Another prominent Nizam 
Shahi noble, liiyan lianjhu, who was a rival of Ikhlas Khan, 
decided to oppose Bahadur. He produced a boy named Ahmad, of 
doubtful lineage and began espousing his claim to the 
throne."^ But Ikhlas KHan, on the other hand, continued his 
efforts to consolidate his position. He released Abhang Khan 
and Habsh Khan, who were detained in the fort of Daulatabad 
since the time of Murtaza Nizam Shah I. They together wanted 
to proclaim Bahadur as the new Nizam Shahi ruler. But the 
commander of the fort of Jonda, where Bahadur was quartered, 
refused to hand over his custody to them. Ikhlas Khan and 
his supporting nobles were, thus, forced to seize yet another 
boy and began to strike coins and recite Khatb^ in his name, 
declaring him as the new Nizam shah. In the meanwhile, 
Miyan Manjhu finding his position weak in this struggle, 
3.Chand Bibi was the sister of Murtaza Nizam Shah I, married 
to Ali Adil Shah of Bijapur. After Ali Adil Shah's death in 
1580, the widowed Chand Bibi came back to Ahmadnagar. When 
Ibrahim was killed in 1595 there started a struggle for his 
successor. On this occasion Chand Bibi espoused the cause 
Burhan's infant son, Bahadur, and acted as his Regent, See 
Tarxkh-i FerishtB, vol. II, p-162. 
4. See Ibid. Also AkbsrnAmaf vol. Ill, pp-699-700 Fatuh^t-i 
Adil Shahi, f-223. 
5. Tarikh-i Ferishta, i^ol. I I , p-lf57; Futuhat-i Adil Shahi, 
f-224; See also Akbarnama, \fOl. I l l , p-670. 
6.Tarikh-i Ferishta„ vol. II, p-158; Fatahat-i Adil Shahi, 
f-225. 
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appealed to Prince Murad, then stationed at Shahpur in Berar, 
for assistance. liurad promptly responded his call by 
marching towards Ahmadnagar alongwith Khan-i Khanan, Sadiq 
Khan, Shahbaz Khan Kambu and other senior nobles. On Akbar's 
order Raja Ali Khan of Khandesh also joined this Mughal 
7 
force. 
While this Mughal army was still on the way Miyan 
Manjhu succeeded in somewhat improving his position by 
gaining an upper hand against his Abyssinian rivals. Now he 
realized the folly of inviting the Mughals. Repenting this, 
he decided to join the garrison of Ahmadnagar against the 
g 
invading Mughal army. Chand Bibi, who commanded the 
garrison of Ahmadnagar had already made a firm resolve to 
defend the fort. The arrival of a strong Bijapuri army with 
seven thousand sawars to reinforce the garrison further 
9 
emboldened her. 
As Murad and Khan-i Khanan advanced to besiege the 
fort, the town of Ahmadnagar was sacked by the contingent of 
7. Akbarnamaf vol. Ill, p-699; Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, 
p-159. 
8. Tarikh-i Ferisftta, vol. II, p-159; fatuhat-i Adil Shahi , 
f-2e6. 
9. Ibid. See also Burhan-i Maasir, p-613. 
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Shahbaz Khan Kambu. ^'"^  They burnt down the city and killed 
many of the inhabitants mercilessly. When Murad heard of 
this savagery he punished many of the subordinates of Shahbaz 
Khan. But this could not earn him the confidence of the 
populace of Ahmadnagar who deserted the town eri masse. '^  
Ikhlas Khan, who was still determined to place his 
protege on the Ahmadnagar throne and, at the same time, was 
also determined to oppose the Mughal advance, went towards 
Daulatabad alongwith his contingent of ten thousand sawars, 
On hearing this news, Khan-i Khanan sent Daulat Khan Lodi to 
pursue him. In a severely contested battle at Paithan Ikhlas 
13 Khan was defeated and fled. 
During this time Murad and Sadiq Khan were supervising 
10. Shahbaz Khan Kambu belonged to the family of ascetics. 
In 1571, Akbar appointed him Chief Bakhshi . In 1539, he was 
made Koti^ai . When Prince Murad was deputed to the Deccan in 
1593, Shahbaz Khan accompanied him. During the siege of 
Ahmadnagar in 1595, Shahbaz Khan's troops sacked the town, 
earning Murad's displeasure. Also Shahbaz Khan was not on 
good terms with Sadiq Khan, ataliq of Murad, therefore he 
left the camp for Malwa without Murad's permission. When 
Akbar commissioned Prince Salim to invade Mewar in 1598-99, 
Shahbaz Khan was present with Salim at Allahabad. In 1599, 
he died due to illness. For his biography. See Farid 
Bhakhari, Zakhirat-uI-Khauanxn Ed. by Moin-ul-Haq, Pakistan 
Historical Society, Karachi, 1961, vol. I, pp-l^a-60. See 
also Samsamuddaula Shahnawaz Khan, Maasi r-al-Umara, ed. by 
Abdur Rahim and Mirza Ashraf Ali, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 
Calcutta, 1890, vol. II, pp-590-601. 
11. Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II,p-159; Futuhat-i Adil Shahi , 
f-a27. 
12. Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. 11, p-159. 
13. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, p-700; Futuhat-i Adil Shahi ^ f-SSB; 
Barhan-i MaasiTf p-61E. 
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the siege operations. The Mughal artillery started 
bombarding the fort heavily causing the walls of the fort on 
one side to be damaged badly. The Ahmadnagar garrison, 
however, defended the fort under the command of Chand Bxbi, 
who clad in full armour would often appear in the midst of 
the Nizam Shahi troops defending the fort. She personally 
supervised the repair of the damaged portion of the 
14 rampart. 
While the Mughals were besieging the fort, Chand Bibi 
was busy in mustering support among the Nizam Shahi nobles. 
She tried to unite the rival factions led by Miyan Manjhu, 
Ikhlas Khan and Abhang Khan for facing the Mughals unitedly. 
She appealed to them to forget their differences and urged 
them for a rapprochment. Simultaneously, she also sent a 
petition to Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur asking for help. 
The Bijapuri ruler promptly responded to her appeal by 
sending to the rescue of Ahmadnagar thirty thousand cavalry 
and very large number of infantry troops under the command 
of Suhail Khan. The ruler of Golkonda, Muhammad Quli 
Qutb Shah, also sent an army comprising ten thousand cavalry 
and twenty thousand infantry to support the besieged 
14. Futuhat-i Adil Shahi \ Burhan-i liaasi r, p-Muntakhab-al~ 
Lubab, vol. I, PP-S04-07. 
15. Futuhat-i Adil Shahi, ff-E29-30. 
16. Ibid; Also Burhari-i Maasi r , p~6£5. 
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17 
Unhesitating and quick response by the rulers of 
Bijapur and Golkonda to Chand Bibi's appeal for help indicate 
that these rulers perceived the Mughal advance into 
Ahmadnagar as posing a threat to their own positions. They 
perhaps, anticipated that after the successful completion 
of the campaign in Ahmadnagar, the Mughals could attack 
Bijapur and Golkonda as well. The Khandesh ruler, Raja Ali 
Khan, despite his close ties with the Mughals at this time, 
was also not reconciled to the idea of the total destruction 
of Ahmadnagar Kingdom. He tried to help the garrison of 
the fort to hold on to their position secretly. When it was 
discovered by the Mughal officers that he was secratly 
helping the garrison. Raja Ali Khan was removed, by Prince 
Murad's order, from the position that he commanded in the 
siege operation. This incident is highlighted by the 
18 
chronicler of Ahmadnagar, Saiyid Ali Tabataba. 
After a prolonged siege, the garrison commanded by 
Chand Bibi realized that they could no longer withstand the 
17. BarhBn-i M^^sir, p-6S5. 
18. cf. Burhan-i MsasiTf p-612. "Traditions of old friendship 
of Raja Ali Khan, ruler of Khandesh, still remained and he 
maintained an uninterrupted intercourse with those within the 
fort, so that they were enabled by his means, to introduce 
any supplies that they might require, and occasionally when 
a body of gunners came from the other forts in the kingdom 
to reinforce those in Ahmadnagar, they were able to enter the 
fortress by the connivance of Raja Ali Khan, and greatly 
strengthened the defence". 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
89 
mounting Mughal pressure. Although the Deccani armies had 
cut-off the supply line of the Mughals but the garrison, on 
its part, was also facing hardships due to the shortage of 
19 provisions inside the fort. Ultimately Chand Bibi decided 
to open negotiations. She wrote letters to Khan-i Khanan and 
EO Sadiq Khan proposing a peace settlement. It seems that, by 
this time", Prince Murad had also grown anxious about his 
position. The news of the arrival of Adil Shahi and Qutb 
Shahi armies made Murad nervous. He immediately called a 
council of war of the senior nobles to discuss the future 
PI course of action. It appears that the Mughals had also 
realized that an early capitulation of the fort was not in 
sight. For this reason they were also inclined to arrive at 
a negotiated settlement with Chand Bibi. Chand Bibi's 
proposal reached the Mughal camp on S3rd February, 1596. The 
offer of a negotiated settlement was promptly accepted by 
Prince Murad. 
19. cf. MuntSikhsb-uI-Labab, vol. I, pp-207-08. 
20. AkbarnamB^ vol. Ill, pp-699-700; Futahst-i Aailshahi^ 
ff-332-33. 
SI. Futtibat-i Adi IShahi f ff-EE9-30; Barhani-i Haasi r , p-6a5; 
Tari kh-i Feri shtaf vol. II, p-16£. 
22. Abul Fazl and Fuzuni Astarabi say that the initiative for 
opening peace settlement was taken by Chand Bihi. See 
Akbarnama^ vol. Ill, pp-699-700, and Fatuhat~i AdulShahi, 
ff-232-33. But Saiyid Ali Tabataba and Ferishta give the 
credit of opening the negotiations to Prince Murad. See 
Burhan-i Maasir^ pp-625-E6, and Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, 
P-16B. 
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Negotiations for the peace settlement were conducted by 
Saiyid Murtaza, an old Nizam Shahi officer and a deserter, on 
behalf of the Mughals, while Afzal Khan, the wskil of 
Ahmadnagar, represented the Nizam Shah is. The terms of the 
treaty (Sulh) agreed on £3rd February, 1596 were: (a) Bahadur 
23 
shall be recognized as the ruler of Ahmadnagar, (b) he 
would accept Akbar's overlordship; (c) the territory of Berar 
shall be ceded to the Mughals, and (d) the Ahmadnagar 
authorities shall give valuable gifts to Akbar. Under the 
terms of the treaty the Mughals also agreed to withdraw to 
Berar.^^ 
It is obvious that even after the conclusion of this 
settlement Nizam Shahis and the Mughals were still suspicious 
and resentful towards each other. This became evident even 
during the negotiations that preceded the settlement. Afzal 
Khan, who was conducting negotiations ar. behalf of the 
Nizam Shahis, getting provoked over the insistence of the 
Mughal officers that the territory of Ahmadnagar be treated 
S3. Abul Fazl writes that "the territory of Ahmadnagar would 
be given as i qta to Bahadur and he would be inade a servant of 
the Mughal court". See Akb^rn<Rma, vol. Ill, p-700. Abul 
Fazl's statement here indicates the meaning attached to the 
terms of the treaty by the Mughals were quite different from 
those of the Nizam Shahi authorities. The Mughal perception 
seems to be that by this settlement Ahmadnagar had become a 
part of the Mughal Empire. One might note that it was this 
conflicting perception of the treaty that contributed to 
disputes and conflicts between the Mughals and the Nizam 
Shahi officers that continued between 1596 to 1600. 
24. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp-699-700; Fatuhat~i AdilShahi, 
ff--a3S-33; Burhan-i Maasi r , p-6S5; Tarikh-i Fen shza , vol. 
II, P-16S. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
91 
as annexed to the Mughal Empire, is reported to have 
sarcastically remarked: "I had heard that Emperor Akbar 
claims divinity. I now find that his nobles claim to be 
prophets. Is it a divine revelation ('ua.hi,' to you that you 
shall succeed in conquering this country and the Almighty God 
25 have no say in this mater"? His remark does give an 
impression that the terms of the treaty were dictated by the 
Mughals. 
However, the settlement arrived at in 1596 between the 
liughals and the Nizam Shah is did not stay for long. Even 
after the settlement the struggle betv'jeen them continued, 
each side acc'using the other of a breach of agreement. While 
the Ahmadnagar authorities accused that the Mughal forces had 
occupied more territories than stipulated in the terms of the 
pi 
treaty, the Mughals, on the other hand alleged that the 
Nizam Shahi troops in Berar were reluctant to leave the 
region. They actually tended to organize themselves in a 
force determined to harass the Mughals. 
S5. cf. Burha,T>-i i1a3.si r , p-6S9. 
26. Fuzuni Astarabadi, the author of Fatuhat-i Adil Shahi , 
ff-235-36, claims that the Mughal forces had occupied Pathri 
and a few other places beyond the confines of Berar. See 
also Akbarnam^i, vol. Ill, p-701-OE; p-751, where Abul Fazl 
boasts of occupying the areas, belonging to the Ahmadnagar 
kingdom. However, T.W. Haig says that the responsibility of 
breaking peace and renewal of hostilities lay with the 
Ahmadnagar authorities, who, after receiving help from 
Bijapur and Golkonda, had decided to make an attempt to expel 
the Mughal troops from Beri^r . See 'The Faruqi Dynasty of 
Khandesh', Indicin Antiquary , 191S, p-173. 
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In the meanwhile, the dissension in the Mughal camp had 
become sharper. Shahbas Khan Kambu, who had differences with 
Sadiq Khan left for tialwa without Prince Murad' s permission. 
The political situation in Ahmadnagar started improving 
following the withdrawal of the Mughal forces from there. 
Miyan Manjhu, who had invited the Mughals to intervene in 
Ahmadnagar went away to join service at the Bijapur court. 
In this situation, Muhammad Khan, who was appointed u>^ki 1 by 
Chand Bibi, began to concentrate more and more powers in his 
own hands. This alarmed Chand Bibi. She again appealed to 
the Adil Shahi ruler, Ibrahim Adil Shah II, for help. The 
latter once again sent Suhail Khan to assist Chand Bibi, this 
time in getting rid of Muhammad Khan. When Munammad Khan 
heard about the arrival of a Bijapuri army, he, in 
retaliation, appealed to the Mughals for help offering to 
surrender the fort of Ahmadnagar to them, but his 
communication to Khan-i Khanan was intercepted in Ahmaanagar 
27 
and he was put under arrest. Subsequent to Muhammad knan's 
dismissal and arrest, Abhang Khan replaced him as uiaki 1 and 
p&shua of the Nizam Shahi ruler. 
After Abhang Khan's rise to the position of uBkiI and 
peshuA, he jointly with the commander of Bijapuri forces, 
Suhail Khan, started mobilising a combined Deccani army to 
27. Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-li:2; l1untakh30-uI-Lu£>iSt>, 
vol. TT. n-PSA. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
93 
oppose the Mughal occupation forces in Berar. The Goikonda 
ruler, Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, also sent an army of ten 
thousand sawar under Mehdi Quli Sultan Talish to reinforce 
pg 
the combined Deccani forces in Ahmadnagar. The Deccani 
29 army marched towards Sonepat, on the bank of Godvari, about 
fifteen miles to the South of Pathri. On the Mughal side, 
Khan-i Khanan and Mirza Shahrukh commanded the force that 
advanced to check the Deccanis. Murad himself stayed bsck at 
Shahpur in Berar. The Khandesh ruler, Raja All Khan, also 
accompanied the Mughal army that came to oppose the joint 
Deccani forces. At this time the Mughal army v-jas not in a 
very strong position. The strength of the Mughal army v-^as 
much less than that of the Deccani army. Additionally, there 
were sharp dissensions in the Mughal camp, as a result of 
which Shahbas Khan Kambu had already left for Malwa without 
taking the permission of Murad. Khan~i Khanan and riirza 
Shahrukh also differed with each other regarding the strategy 
for opposing the Deccanis. They had left Murad benina and 
the entire responsibility of directing the operations against 
the Deccanis was to be shouldered by them jointly, their 
as. Futahat-i Adil Shahi ^ ff-S35-36. 
29. Sonepat (19 ^ N, 75<»E), a small town located fifteen .mles 
south of Pathri. See An Atlas of the Mughal Ernpi re , sneet, 
14-A. 
30. AkbarnamBf vol. Ill, pp-717-20. See also Rafiuddin 
Ibrahim Shirazi, Tazkirat-al~Mulak^ British Museum MS, Add. 
23883, ff-220-21; 
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31 differences not with standing. 
In the battle fought on 8th February, 1597 at Ashti (a 
town near Pathri) on the northern bank of Godavari, at first 
the Deccani army achieved some success, but later on, the 
Deccani artillery was destroyed and Suhail Khan, who was 
commanding the Deccani forces, was injured. He could escape 
from the battlefield with difficulty. The contingents of 
Ahmadnagar and Golkonda also fled to their respective 
territories. The Mughals, thus, achieved a signiticant 
victory which restored their prestige tarnished by their 
earlier failures against Ahmadnagar. 
Raja Ali Khan of Khandesh, who fought at Ashti on the 
Mughals' side, was killed in the battle. When the Mughals 
did not find any trace of Raja Ali Khan at the end of the 
battle, they concluded that either he had fled from the field 
or deserted to join the Deccanis. Suspecting his loyalty to 
the Mughals, they plundered Raja Ali Khan's camp. Next day 
when Raja Ali Khan's body was found amongst the dead, the 
31. T.W. Haig, IrtdiBri Anti guary f 1918, p-178, says that, on 
this occasion, "the prince wished to take the filed in 
person but Khan-i Khanan, whether from selfish motives or in 
the interest of the imperial cause, dissuaded him from this 
course and himself assumed command of the field forces with 
Shahrukh Mirsa". 
38. Akbarnamaf vol. Ill, p-717-SO; Futahat-i Adil Shahi , f-
238; Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, pp-163;S89. 
33. Akbarnamaf vol. Ill, pp-717-20; Tarikh-i Fen shta ^ vol, 
II, p-i63; Tazki rat~al~MaIuk f ff-220-El; Futuhat-i Adil 
Shahif f-239. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Mughals realizing their mistake restored his banners, 
kettle-drums etc. to the Khandesh army. The body of Raja 
Ali Khan was taken to Burhanpur and buried their with full 
I- 35 honour. 
In the meantime the rift between Khan-i Khanan and 
Murad widened. Khan-i Khanan had come forward to engage the 
Deccanis leaving Murad behind at Shahpur (in Berar). His 
convincing victory over the Deccanis at this occasion was, 
naturally, not viewed by Murad with favour. He conveyed the 
news of this victory to Akbar in a distorted version giving 
credit for it to Daulat Khan Lodi, and also recommended a 
• r ^ • - ^ 
rise in his mansab as a reward.'^' Akbar, on his part, was 
perturbed over Ahe strained relations^^etween Murad and 
Khan-i Khanan. To remedy the situation he decided to change 
the command in the Deccan. Prince Daniyal was appointea in 
34. AkbBrnama, vol. Ill, pp-717-SO; Tarikh-i Feri shta , vol. 
II, -163; Tazki rat-al-Hulak f ff-E20-El; Fatahat-i Adil Shah, 
f-S39. 
35. Zafar-al-l4aleh (tr. ) , vol. I, pp-7E-73. 
36. Daulat Khan Lodi, an Afghan, was earlier in the service 
of Mirza Aziz Koka. Later he served under Abdur Rahim Khan-i 
Khanan and assisted him in the campaigns against Gujarat as 
well as Deccan, Under Khan-i Khanan he received the mansab 
of one thousand. zat and sauar, After sometime Daniyal took 
him under his service and raised his mansab to two thousand. 
In 1601, Daulat Khan Lodi died of colic at Burhanpur. See 
his biography in Abdul Baqi Nihawandi, Maasii—i Rahimx , ed. 
by M. Hidayat Husain, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 
1931, vol. Ill, pp-1627-31. See also Maasi r-uI-UrTtara , vol. 
II, pp-5-8. 
37. See Futubat-i Adil Shahi , f-E40. 
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place of Murad and Abul Fazl replaced Khan-i Khanan. Khan-i 
Khanan, however, was allowed to remain in the Deccan. In 
1600 he assisted Prince Daniyal in capturing the fort of 
Ahmadnagar. 
On being deputed to the Deccan, Abul Fasl arrived at 
Burhanpur in May, 1599. He was on his way to Shahpur to join 
Murad. Abul Fazl halted at Burhanpur briefly to meet and 
pacify Bahadur Shah, the son and successor of Raja Ali Khan, 
for securing his co-operation in the impending Mughal 
invasion of Ahmadnagar. Although Bahadur Shah received Abul 
Fazl respectfully but evaded to join the Mughal forces 
personally. Instead, he deputed a contingent of tv-jo 
39 thousand troops under his son to accompany Abul Fazl. It 
is obvious that Bahadur Shah avoided joining the Mughal army 
on this occasion, as he was still resentful over the 
plundering of the Khandesh camp by the Mughal troops, after 
Raja Ali Khan was killed in the Battle of Ashti. He, 
apparently, no longer trusted the Mughals. It was, in fact, 
obvious that there was no guarantee of the Mughals leaving 
Khandesh alone after they occupied Ahmadnagar. It is, 
therefore, understandable that, like his father, Bahadur Shah 
should also have not viewed with favour the Mughal 
expansionist drive in the Deccan. This should explain his 
38. See Tazki rat-uI-MuIak ^ f-BSB; See also Basatin-us-
S<3latinf PP-E53-5A-. 
39. Akb6irn3.m3i, vol. Ill, pp-751-5S. 
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refraining from joining the expedition against Ahmadnagar. 
At the same time, he also realized that, on his own, he was 
not in a position to resist the Mughal army. In this 
situation, he had no option but to placate the Mughals by 
sending a token force of two thousand troops under his son to 
accompany /^bul Fazl. 
Before Abul Fazl could reach the Mughal camp at 
Shahpur, Murad died due to excessive drinking on 2nd May, 
1599. '' Shortly afterwards Daniyal was appointed to the 
formal command of the Mughal forces in the Deccan with the 
direction to continue the ongoing campaign against 
Ahmadnagar. On Daniyal's arrival in the Deccan, Bahadur 
Shah of Khandesh neither sent him a condolence message on the 
death of Murad nor came down from the fort of Asirgarh to 
welcome him. This stubborn attitude of Bahadur Shah 
angered Daniyal. Though he was on his way to besiege 
^O. The Persian chronicles attribute the cause of Murad's 
death to excessive drinking. But, Sanjay Subrahamanyam, 
quoting from contemporary Portuguese accounts, argues that 
Murad was poisoned to death at the instigation of Prince 
Salim. In this context he refers to a letter written by Dom 
Francisco da Gama, Count of Vidigusira (the Portuguese 
Viceroy at Goa from 1597-1600) to the Portugues King Philip 
III. In this letter the viceroy clai.ns credit for having 
Murad poisoned. For details, see Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 'The 
Portuguese, Mughals and Deccan Politics c. 1600: Elements 
for a Conspiracy Theory" paper presented at the Seminar on 
'Akbar and his age', I.C.H.R., New Delhi, 15-17 October, 199a 
(Mimeographed). 
^ 1 . AkbBrnswB, vol. Ill, p-756; Tarikh-i Ferishts vol. II, 
p-290. 
^ 2 . AkbarnajriB, vol. 111 ,pp-766-67; Tarikh-i Fen shta , vol. 
II, p-290. 
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Ahmadnagar, he halted at Burhanpur with an intention to 
punish Bahadur Shah by besieging him in the fort of 
Asirgarh.^'^ In the meanwhile, Akbar, who having become free 
of his pre-occupations in the North-West had set out for the 
Deccan in 1599 and had already reached Malwa. On coming to 
know about Daniyal's plans to invest Asirgarh, Akbar ordered 
him to refrain from such a course and concentrate on the 
invasion of Ahmadnagar. The reason for Akbar's advise to 
Daniyal not to waste his time in Khandesh was obvious. On 
noticing that Mughals were delaying their march against 
Ahmadnagar, the Nizam Shahi troops regaining their confidence 
to seme extent, had started making night raids on Daniyal's 
camp. They also succeeded in recapturing some of the lost 
territories including the important stronghold of Nasik."^ 
These developments tended to make the Mughal military 
position rather uncomfortable. 
When Akbar started marching towards Burhanpur with the 
^ 3 . Aktarnam^^ vol. Ill, pp-766;67 Tarikh-i Feri shta , vol. 
11, p-a90. ' ' ' 
44. AkbarTiama, vol. Ill, pp-766-67. See also Tazkx raz-ul-
Mulakf f-£HS. Abdullah Khan Uzbeg of Turan had died m 1598, 
relieving the pressure from the north-west frontier of the 
Mughal Empire, Thus Akbar, having free from the affairs of 
the North-West, marched toi-jards the Deccan in 1599. 
45. Akbarnama f vol. Ill, pp-766-67; See also Tarikh-i 
Ferishta^ vol. I, p-e71. 
46. The Nizam Shahi troops had recaptured Nasik from asked 
for some reinforcements from Abul Fazl to check the movement 
of Nizam Shahi troops. See Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp-773-74.. 
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declared aim of subjugating the Deccan, he, perhaps, also 
gave the impression that he also planned to drive out the 
Portuguese from places they vjere controlling on the western 
coast of India This, at least, was the impression of the 
Jesuit Fathers then staying at Akbar's court. This 
impression could have naturally led the Portuguese 
authorities at Goa to sympathise with Bahadur Shah of 
Khandesh, who was preparing to resist the Mughal thrust 
towards the Deccan. The Portuguese are also reported to have 
helped the Ahmadnagar forces as early as 1597, when in the 
Battle of Ashti, the Mughals suffered serious losses at the 
^ 7 . In one of the letters written sometime in 1537, Akbar 
informs to Abdullah Khan Uzbeg that "he plans to take an 
expedition against the seditious European unbelievers ikuffar 
a.shrar fi rang) " i an explicit reference to Portuguese, 
positioned at the coast of Gujarat. See Munshi Bhag Chand, 
Jsmi '-al-Irisha., British Museum MS, Rieu, iii/984, or. 170E', 
ff-196 b-99a. The contemporary Portuguese accounts give the 
same impression regarding Akbar's intention against them, 
cf. Father Pierre Du Jarrics Hi stori c des chosen plus 
memorables en. I.Translated into English with 
introduction by C.H. Payne as Akb3.r ar;c/ the Jesuits, Ed. by 
E. Dennison Ross and E. Power, NevM Delhi, 1979, p-lOS. Du 
Jarric's account is based on the unpublished letters of 
Father Xavier and Father Goes, who had accompanied the 
Emperor in his expedition to the Deccan. He writes that 
" he (Akbar) wishes to take first the kingdoms of the 
Deccan and afterwards those of Goa, Malabara and Bisnaga. 
See also V.A. Smith Akba.r the Great Mogul op. c i t . p-190, who 
basing on Portuguese records observes: "He (Akbar) regarded 
the existence of all the Portuguese settlements on the 
western coast, and especially that of Diu and Daman in 
province of Gujarat as an offense and always cherished hopes 
of destroying the Portuguese dominion". M.N. Pearson, 
however, disagrees. He writes: " contact between the 
two sides (the Mughals and the Portuguese) was minimal, the 
Mughal attitude espcecially being one of neglect and 
indifference". cf.'The Portuguese in India', The Ne*^ 
Cambridge History of India, New Delhi, (Reprint), 1190, p-53. 
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48 
In pursuance of Akbar's order, Daniyal abandoned his 
plan of besieging the fort of Asirgarh. He continued his 
march towards Ahmadnagar accompanied by Abdur Rahim Khan-i 
49 Khanan. Around the time Akbar despatched Daniyal and Abdur 
Rahim Khan-i Khanan towards Ahmadnagar, he also despatched 
one of his confidant, Sharif Sarmadi, to Bijapur to demand 
peshkash from Ibrahim Adil Shah II."''"' The Bijapuri ruler at 
this time, was, apparently, eager to avoid any confrontation 
with the Mughals. He promptly sent peshkBsn and gave one of 
his daughters in marriage to Daniyal."* Before Daniyal and 
Khan-i Khanan could take charge of the operations in 
Ahmadnagar, Abul Fazl was already successful in pacifying 
some of the tracts in the Nizam Shahi territory. He occupied 
Bir, a Nizam Shahi stronghold to the east of Ahmadnagar, 
after forcing the Nizam Shahi troops to evacuate it."^ "" 
48. Pierre Du Jarric incorporates the infor-iation reproduced 
by V.A. Smith from one of the Portuguese account to the 
effect that already by the time Akbar decided to besiege 
Bahadur Shah inside Asirgarh, there eKistea an understanding 
between the Khandesh ruler and the Portuguese authorities 
under which the latter were committed to help the farmer in 
case of Mughal attack on him. 
49. Akb&rnama^ vol. Ill, pp-766-67; Futuhat-i Adil Shshi , ff 
245-46. 
50. See BsiSstin-us-SalBtin , pp-252-53. 
51. Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, p-277. See also Basatin-as-
Salatinf pp-253-54; MuT)tekhab~al-Laba£>, vol. I, p-215. 
52. Akbarnamaf vol. Ill, p-761. 
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During this time the Nizam Shahi officers had broken 
into two factions. Practically two parallel governments were 
existing in the Nizam Shahi camp; one inside the fort of 
Ahmadnagar led by Chand Bibi, who acted on behalf of her 
nephew, Bahadur, and the other outside the fort in the town, 
which was led by Abhang Khan, the leader of the Abyssinian 
party. Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur had tried to bring 
about a reconciliation by sending Rafiuddin Shirazi to 
mediate between the two warring factions but this attempt of 
his was not successful. Chand Bibi, remained firm in her 
attitude of refusing to admit Abhang Khan in the fort.""^ 
Instead she opened communications with Abul Fazl offering to 
surrender the keys of the fort to the Mughals provided that 
Abhang Khan was punished and she was assigned a jagir in 
Bir.S"^ 
On the other hand, failing to gam an upper hand, 
Abhang Khan laid siege to the fort. But on Daniyal's arrival 
near Ahmadnagar, Abhang Khan had to raise the siege and 
55 
withdraw towards Junnar. 
53. T^rikh-i Feri sht^i, vol. II, pp-163-64. Also Tazhi rAt-uI-
Muluk, f-aSB. 
54. Akbarn^iDia, vol. Ill, pp-764-65. Abul Fazl in his ariza 
to Akbar has referred about the arrival of Chand Bibi's 
envoys in the Mughal camp. See Har Seh Daftar , p-79. 
55. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, pp-77^-75; TariKh~i Fen shta , vol. 
II, p-ii^t. 
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By April, 1600 Akbar had already occupied Burhanpur and 
was besieging Asirgarh. He decided to supervise the siege 
operations at Asirgarh personally. Abul Fazl was recsiled 
from Ahmadnagar and was asked to supervise the operaticns in 
Khandesh. Side by side Akbar ordered the Mughal army at 
Ahmadnagar to exert more vigorously to secure the early-
capture of the fort. At this time he appeared to be anKious 
to finish his work in the Deccan as early as possible. In 
view of Prince Salim's activities in the North, he wanted to 
return to Agra without much delay. Akbar's presence at 
Burhanpur enthused the Mughal forces under Daniyal besieging 
Ahmadnagar to press vigorously. This also made Chanc Bibi 
anxious about the fate of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom. She 
renewed her offer of surrendering the fort to the Mughals on 
the condition of Bahadur being granted a jn,ariSBb o"' five 
thousand and equivalent Jagir^ and of herself being allowed 
to remain his guardian. Another condition was the safe 
passage to the garrison after the surrender of the fort. 
These proposals were carried by Mirza Ataullah Shirazi to 
Prince Daniyal.'^ 
To further encourage Chand Bibi, Daniyal and Khan-i 
Khanan sent some precious gifts and a khi 1 'at for Bahadur.^'' 
However inside the fort the proposal to surrender the fort 
was not acceptable to many nobles. There was a section of 
56. Fatiihat-i Adil Shahi, f-Ri^7, 
57. Ibid, ff-348-49. 
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the nobles amongst the garrison including Abhang Khan (the 
patron of Malik Ambar) and Chita Khan, who were particularly 
provoked by the proposal. At this turn Chand Bibi summoned 
Chita Khan, an old officer of Murtaza Nizam Shah I for 
58 persuading him to support her proposals. During their 
conversation Chita Khan became excited, ran out shouting that 
Chand Bibi was in league with the Mughals and that she 
intended to hand over the fort to them. He, subsequently, 
entered into Chand Bibi's private apartment alongwith an 
59 
excited group of soldiers and murdered her. 
After Chand Bibi's murder, Abhang Khan and Chita Khan, 
alongwith some other Nizam Shahi nobles continued the defence 
of the fort. The Mughal forces had laid mines in the walls 
of the fort which were blown up on 16th August, 1600, 
creating a breach. The besiegers stormed into the fort 
through this breach and the fort v-jas captured by the 
58. Tazkirat-uI-Malak , f~BBB. 
59. Ibid. See also Akbarnam^, vol. Ill, pp-774-75; F>itahat-i 
Adil Shahiy ff-S48-49; Tarikh~i Ferishta, vol. II, p-164. 
A.R. Kulkarni has introduced a Marathi document, 
Fat^/inama, in his paper, 'Akbar and the Condquest of 
Ahmadnagar', presented at the Seminar on 'Akbar and His Age', 
I.C.H.R. New Delhi, 15-17 October, 199E. (Mimeographed). 
Fatehnama gives a different version of Chand Bibi's death. 
It says that while fighting against the Mughal forces, at one 
stage, she realized that she had fallen out of grace of the 
Pir Auliyaf abandoned fighting and accompanied by her 
companions went to the kapit mahal (secret chamber of the 
fort). She did not retui-n afterv^iards. 
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Mughals.^''' Bahadur Nizam Shah was sent as prisoner to 
Gwalior. In the fort, besides other precious articles, an 
excellent library of rare books also came into the hands of 
the Mughals.*^^ 
The capture of Ahmadnagar did not lead to the 
annexation of the entire Nizam Shahi territory to the Mughal 
Empire. The territories annexed at this time consisted of 
the Ahmadnagar fort and the surrounding areas. A large part 
of the Ahmadnagar territory continued to be controlled by 
some of the Nizam Shahi officers, who latter on formed the 
core of resistance organized by Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani 
which would be noticed in the next chapter. 
The conquests of the forts of Ahmadnagar (1600) and 
Asirgarh (1601) established Mughais in the Deccan on a firm 
footing. Superficially it would appear that this was a 
60. Akbarriaima.^ vol. Ill, pp~774-75. 
61. Ibid. Regarding the capture of Ahmadnagar, the document, 
Fa.tehr>am^y records the traditions surviving in Marathwara 
region during the eighteenth century. According to this 
Fattehnamaf Mughal's success was facilitated by Prince 
Daniyal's showing proper respect to a certain Pir Aulxya. 
known as Saxyxd B^g-i Nizam^ whose dargah was located close 
to the gate of the fort. On the other hand, Chand Bibi, whc 
was reportedly fighting with all her might and inspite of 
many odds, suddenly had to stop the fighting and startec 
negotiations as she was not favoured by the Pir Aaliys. of the 
dargah. Fatehnama further says that, at one stage, during 
the fighting when the magazine on the fort was completely 
exhausted, Chand Bibi broke open her treasure, made cannon 
balls of gold and silver and bombarded them on the besieging 
army. cf. A.R. Kulkarni, 'Akbar and the Conquest of 
Ahmadnagar', op. cit. 
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prelude to the Mughal advance towards Bijapur and Golkonda. 
But in reality, at this time, the Mughals were only 
interested in holding on to the parts of the Deccan already 
annexed. It was only in the course of their endeavours to 
put down the Nizam Shahi nobility's resistance led by Malik 
Ambar, that they gradually developed further territorial 
ambitions in the Deccan. This aspect will be examined in the 
next chapter. 
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Ahmadnagar's Struggle for Survival? 160H6. 
Role of Malik Ambar and His Reorganization of 
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The Mughals had captured the fort of Ahmadnagar in 
1600, but the whole of the Kingdom could not be annexed to 
the Mughal Empire. The Nizam Shahi nobles, though divided 
among themselves, continued their resistance against the 
Mughal occupation forces. They defied the Mughal authority 
by raising to the throne a certain Prince Ali, purportedly a 
grandson of Burhan Nizam Shah I, with the title Murtaza Nizam 
Shah II and continued their struggle in his name. Although 
the Mughal forces under Prince Daniyal and Abdu.r Rahim Khan-i 
Khanan continued to put pressure, but the two prominent Nizam 
Shahi nobles, Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani, offered stiff 
resistance to the Mughals. 
As far as the personal lives and careers of Malik Ambar 
and Raju Deccani Are concerned, both of them are reported to 
have began their career from very humble positions. Ambar 
Jiu, as he is often called by the contemporary Persian 
sources, was an Abyssinian, purchased in the slave market of 
Beghdad by Khwaja Mir Baghdadi. He brought him to the Deccan 
and again sold to Mirak Dabir, better known as Changez Khan, 
l.Akt^rnama, vol. Ill, pp-7S3-S'^; Futuh<^t-i Ad i I Sha.hi y ff-
249-50; Sasatin-as SalBtin^ pp-£60-61. 
2.According to D.R. Seth, Malik Ambar's original name was 
Shambhu. See his article "The life and times of Malik 
Ambar', Islamic Culture, 1957, p-142. But, since no 
contemporary or later source is cited in support of this 
suggestion, one can not be very certain about this rather 
Indian name of young Malik Ambar who was known to be an 
Abyssinian. 
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3 
the W3.kil of Murtasa Nizam Shah I. Under his patronage 
Ambar learnt about the military and civil administration of 
the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. After his death Malik Ambar migrated 
to Bijapur joining service there as a junior officer. He, 
alongwith some other Abyssinian aroirs, returned to Ahmadnagar 
in 1595-96. This was the time when the Mughals under F'rince 
Murad and Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan were besieging the 
Ahmadnagar fort. It was the period of civil strife in 
Ahmadnagar over the issue of succession. At this juncture, 
Malik Ambar joined Abhang Khan,"* who was opposing the 
candidature of Chand Bibi's protege. On Abnang Khan's coming 
to terms with Chand Eiibi, Malik Ambar managed to enter the 
fort with the former. During the siege of the fort by the 
Mughals, Malik Ambar displayed his ability as a military 
officer, earning notice for harassing the besieging Mughal 
army by cutting their line of communications and disrupting 
their supplies. 
After the capture of the Ahmadnagar fart by the Mughals 
(1600), Malik Ambar became determined to resist the Mughals' 
further advance into the Nisam Shahi territory. He tried to 
revive the fallen Nizam Shahi dynastv- by declaring All, a 
3. Futahat-i Adil Shahi , ff-S67 b-6e a; Tazkz rat-al Maluk , 
ff-23^-35. 
^.Fatuhat-i Adil Shahi ^ f - e 6 a a . 
5.Ibid, ff-267 b-68 a.' 
6.Ibid. See also Tazki rat~al Muluk , ff-23H-35. 
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grandson of Burhan Nisam Shah I as the new Nizam Shahi ruler 
with the title Murtaza Nizam Shah II. In a similar manner 
another Nizam Shahi noble, Raju Deccani, who operated 
independently in the northern part of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, 
professing loyalty to the new Nizam Shahi ruler, Murtaza 
Nizam Shah II, resisted the Mughal occupation. There existed 
a rivalry between Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani on the issue 
of controlling administration and the new ruler. In i60S, 
Malik Ambar had arrived at an understanding with Abdur Rahim 
Khan-i Khanan leading to the suspension of the operations 
against him so he could concentrate his energies against his 
rival, Raju Deccani. 
Like Malik Ambar, little is known abour the early life 
Q 
and career of Raju Deccani. He too, is reported to have 
began nis career from a very humble position. He served 
under Sa'adat Khan, a prominent Nizam Shahi a.7nzr, and soon, 
by virtue of his qualities, became a chief personal servant 
(Krtwas) of Sa'adat Khan. Atter the death of Burhan Nizam 
Shah II (1595), when there was political chaos in the Nizam 
Shahi kingdom and the Mughals were besieging the fort of 
7.See Akb^rnBm^, vol. Ill, pp-7B3-S4; Fatuhat-i Adil Shahi, 
ff-£^9-50; Sasatin-us Salatin , pp-260-t>l. 
8. Abdul Baqi Nihawandi says that Raju Deccani was the son of 
Munna Deccani, a Hindu slave and mahaldar of Sa'adat Khan. 
Seerta asij— i Rahimi y vol. II, p-501. 
9.Futuhat-i Adil Shahi, ff-S6e a-b. While Abdul Baqi 
Nihawandi, the author of Ma'asii—i Rahimi , vol. II, p-501, 
says that Raju Deccani succeeded his father and became chief 
of mahaldars. 
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Ahmadnagar, Raju Deccani, alongwith his master Sa'adat Khan, 
moved to the hilly tracts and roamed there for five or six 
years. In the meanwhile, Sa'adat Khan had joined Mughal 
service under Prince Daniyal handing over his jagir and forts 
to his trusted servant Raju Deccani. 
Just after Sa'adat Khan's departure, Abhang Khan, an 
Abyssianian amir, wrote a letter to Raju Deccani persuading 
him to join Nizam Shahi service offering a high post (.Sahib-i 
Shaakat) at the court. He asked him to seize the territories 
of his master and oppose the invading Mughals. He wrote: 
" Sa'adat Khan was only a slave of Nizam Shah. He 
has turned to be a traitor and gone over to the Mughals. But 
you should act bravely because the reward of loyalty to sait 
is greatness. Guard carefully the territory and forts in 
your hands and try to add to them".''- Raju Deccani acted as 
suggested by Abhang Khan, soon gathering a fares of one 
thousand troops around him. Now from one side Maxik Ambar 
and from the other Raju Deccani engaged in harassing ana 
devastating the Mughal territories by their surprise raids, •'•"^  
After sometime Sa'adat Khan request Prince Daniyal to allow 
him to recover his former Jagir and the areas adjacent to it 
10. Fatuhat-i Adi1 Shahi, f-£68 b. 
11. Ibid, See also iia'asir-i Rahiwi , vol. II, p-501. 
12. Futuhat-i Adil Shahi ^ ff-S68 b-69. 
13. Ibid . 
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which were now in the possession of Raju Deccani and other 
Nizam Shahi nobles. The Prince granted the permission 
ordering Khwajgi Fatehullah to accompany Sa'adat Khan with a 
body of Mughal troops. But Sa'adat Khan's attempt was 
frustrated by same Raju Deccani whom he had entrusted the 
task of looking after his Jsgir and forts.^ 
In 1601, Akbar returned to Agra from Burhanpur after 
having conferred the territories of Khandesh, Berar and the 
fort of Ahmadnagar on Prince Daniyal. Subsequently the two 
Nizam Shahi nobles Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani came forward 
to stoutly appose the Mughal forces stationed in Ahmadnagar. 
Although they were envious of each other and had divided the 
Ahmadnagar territory into their own respective areas of 
influence, but both of them continued to pay allegiance to 
Murtaza Nizam Shah II. They were relentless m their 
opposition to the Mughals. Malik Ambar had established his 
effective control on the Telingana region, bordering upon 
Bijapur and Golkonda, upto four kos south of Ahmadnagar town, 
and from twenty kos west of Daulatabad upto the port of Chaul 
in the west. Raju Deccani, on the other hand, controlled the 
territory in the north which consisted of sarkars of Nasik 
and Daulatabad upto the frontier of Gujarat. The new Nizam 
Shahi ruler Murtaza Nizam Shah II was placed in the fort of 
1^. MB'3iSir~i Rahimi f vol. II, pp-502-03. 
15. See Tarikh~i Feri shta^ vol. II, p-165. For reference, 
see the appended Map-B. 
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Ausa. Revenues of a few villages were reserved for his 
expenses. 
To meet the challenge posed by the Ahmadnaga.r nobles, 
particularly by Malik Ambar and Raju Deccan, a new campaign 
was planned by the Mughal commanders in the Deccani. The 
Mughal army was divided into two commands, one headed by Abul 
Fazl proceeded towards Nasik for conducting operations 
against Raju. While the other force under Abdur Rahim Khan-i 
Khanan, was stationed at Ahmadnagar with the aim to conduct 
operations against Malik Ambar in the Telingana region.'"' 
While Malik Ambar was harassing the Mughals in one part of 
the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, his rival Raju Deccani was creating 
disturbances for the Mughals in another part. A number of 
Mughal expeditionary forces were sent to suppress the 
activities of Raju Deccani. Initially the expeditions 
succeeded in occupying some more Nizam Shahi territory. 
But Raju eventually mobilised large force and struck back at 
the Mughal army. He succeeded in recovering some of the 
territories earlier lost to the Mughals. After Abul Fazl was 
deputed by Prince Daniyal to deal with Raju Deccani, the 
latter withdrew to Daulatabad most of the territories 
controlled by him being occupied by the Mughals again. In 
16. Ti3.rikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-165. 
17. AkbarnamB, vol. Ill, pp-783-8'^. 
18. Ibid, p-788; p-790. 
19. Ibid, p-790; 793-94; 797. 
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short, RaJLi Deccani was defeated and the territories 
controlled by him occupied by the Mughals on several 
occasions, but his activities could not be fully contained. 
On the whole, the efforts of the Mughal commanders to put him 
down were not fully successful. Whenever an army was sent 
against him, he would withdraw to the hilly tracts, but would 
reappear in the plains soon after the moving av-jay of that 
army to some other region. Raju also failed to respond 
favourably to the moves by the Mughal authorities to persuade 
him to join the Mughal service. Even Prince Daniyal's 
messages asking Raju to join the Mughal service met with the 
same indifference. " Later on Prince Daniyal wrote to him a 
reprimanding letter challenging him to come into the open ta 
face the Mughal army. Raju Deccani replied in a similar 
21 
vein. Thus, Raju's activities against the Mu.ghals 
continued till he i-^as suppressed in 1605 by his rival, MaliK 
Ambar. 
While the Mughal operations were being conducted 
against Raju Deccani in the northern parts of what was 
originally Ahmadnagar Kingdom, Malik Ambar was gaining 
ground in Telingana, the southern part of the Kingdom. He 
continuously harassed the Mughals inflicting defeats on them 
SO. T^rikh-i Feri shta ^ vol. II, pp~165-66. 
El. Futu.hat~i Adil S.hahi , f-S69 b. 
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on several occasions. In May, 1601, when the situation was 
becoming rather bad from the Mughal point of view, an army 
under Abdur Rahman, son of Abul Fazl, was sent to Telingana 
for checking Malik Ambar. Mughal officers, Sher Khwaja and 
others accompanied him. Malik Ambar alongwith Farhad Khan 
and Mansur Khan Habshi with the combined forces of the 
Abyssinians and Deccanis came forward to oppose the Mughals. 
The rival armies met near Nander at the bank of river Manjira 
on l6th May 1601. After a sharp contest Malik Ambar was 
defeated. He fled the battlefield leaving behind many 
elephants and large quantities of provisions. After this 
humiliating defeat Malik Ambar sued for peace. Mughals, on 
their part, were also eager to conclude peace with malik 
Ambar. It was agreed that if he should send back Ali Mardan 
Bahadur alongwith the son of Mirza Yusuf (whom Malik Ambar 
had made prisoner in an earlier battle), and "e;;ecute a 
treaty of service" then the territories of Ausa, Dharur and 
part of Bir would be left to him. 
After Abdur Rahman retired from Telingana with his 
contingent, Malik Ambar again raised a large force and 
22. FutahBt-i Adil Shahi ^ ff-S67 b-6e a. 
23. Akbarnama, vol. Ill, p-791. 
24. Ibid, vol. Ill, p-793. Satish Chandra in his article 
'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals - A Reappraisal, says that 
" after defeating Malik Ambar at Nander in 1601, 
Khan-i Khanan adopted a conciliatory approach towards him, 
since the main opponent of the Mughals at that time was not 
Malik Ambar but Raju Deccani". See Indian Historical review 
op.cit. p-329. 
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attacked the Mughal outpost practically driving the Mughals 
out of the Telingana region. Two of the Mughal officers 
stationed in the region Hamid khan and Baz Bahadur were taken 
prisoners by Malik Ambar.^ '-' Emboldened by this success Malik 
Ambar, subsequently, marched into Bidar with the aim to 
extract a large sum from its ruler, Malik Barid: The latter 
was obliged to make peace with him by paying a huge amount, 
Malik Ambar also attacked the ruler of Golkonda, Muhammad 
pi. Quli Qutb Shah, forcing him to give twenty war elephants. 
Having achieved these successes, Malik Ambar once again 
directed his energies to fight the Mughals. 
Around this time (160S), differences seems to have 
cropped up amongst the Mughal officers stationed in the 
Deccan in the context of Mughal military operations against 
Malik Ambar. Although Abul Fasl has not made it clear as to 
exactly what were these differences but his remark that, "he 
(i.e. Abul Fasl himself) marched to help Khan-i Khanan after 
the latter apologized for not looking after the 
administration properly", suggests that owing to their 
mutual disagreements the Mughal officers were not able to 
make concerted moves against the Deccanis. Malik Ambar 
appears to have taken advantage of this situation. In the 
25. AkOBrnamBf vol. Ill, p-796; See also Tarikh-i FenshtB, 
vol. II, p-165. 
26. Akbarnama f vol. Ill, -p-S05. 
27. cf. Akbarnama^ vol. Ill, p-797. 
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meanwhile, Abul Fazl joined Khan-i Khanan at Parnur. The 
Mughal officers such as Sher Khwaja, Mirza Yusuf, Yaqub Beg 
and many others also assembled at Pathri. Malik Ambar 
alongwith Farhad Khan attacked the outposts but had to retire 
unsuccessful. 
However, it appears that Malik Ambar continued to 
retain his hold on the southern parts of the Ahmadnagar 
Kingdom. He did not sit idle and reorganized his army 
attacking several Mughal thsnas in the Telingana region. The 
Mughal commander, Khan-i Khanan, was also determinec to 
contain the activities of Malik Ambar. In 160E, he sent his 
son, Mirza Iraj, with a large army into Telingana. Several 
prominent officers were sent with Mirza Iraj, among them were 
included Mir Murtaza and Sher Khwaja, who were already posted 
in the region. On hearing about the advance of a large 
Mughal force, Malik Ambar immediately left for Damtur. From 
there he moved on to Kandahar. Around this time Farhad Khan 
Habshi joined Malik Ambar with three thousand horsemen. The 
Mughals continued the pursuit of Malik Ambar upto Nander 
where the rival armies clashed with each other. In this 
battle the Deccanis were beaten badly. Malik Ambar himself 
was seriously wounded. He would have fallen into the hands 
of the Mughals but for the timely action of some of his 
attendants in taking him away from the battle field. Twenty 
elephants and considerable provisions were captured by the 
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Mughals.^^ 
When Malik Ambar recovered from his injuries (160E), 
he, once again made overtures to the Mughals for a 
settlement. Khan-i Khanan, on his part, was also eager to 
end the conflict with Malik Ambar. The two sides agreed not 
29 to attack each other in future. The specific terms of the 
settlement are not mentioned but these must have been, more 
or less, the same as on the earlier occasion. During the 
next six years following this settlement there was, by and 
large, a continuous peace in the Ahmadnagar territory, so 
much so that the agriculture in the region, greatly ruined 
by the continuous warfare of the preceding years, once again 
started prospering. It is reported that atter the 
settlement of 1602, Malik Ambar had agreed to pay a visit to 
Emperor Akbar and take up service under him. 
E8. Akb^rnamBf vol. Ill, p-a07; Tarikh-i Fen shta, vol. II, 
p-165. 
S9. Abul Fazl does not give other details regarding this 
peace settlement of 1602, but he does say that after 
receiving the document of the "treaty" the Mughal troops 
withdrew from the region round Pathri. See Aktarnama , vol. 
Ill, pp-800-01. In the context of the settlement, Fenshta 
says that the proposal for peace settlement was made by 
Khan-i Khanan and Malik Ambar accepted the terms since he had 
to deal with his rival Raju Deccani. See Tari kh-i Ferz shta, 
vol. II, p-165. See also Tazki rat-ul Muluk , ff-234-35; 
Fiituhat~i Adil Shahi ff-26S b-69 a. 
30. Tazkirat-ul Malak, ff-234-35; Fatuhat-i Adil Shahi, ff~ 
268 b-69 a. 
31. Tazkirat-ul Maluk, ff-23A—35; Fatuhat-i Adil Shahi, f-269 
a. 
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After the Mughals had made a settlement with Malik 
Ambar (160S), Raju Deccani, commanding seven or eight 
thousand horsemen in the region to the north of Ahmadnagar, 
32 
continued to attack the Mughal posts frequently. In 160^-, 
Prince Daniyal came to Ahmadnagar for celebrating his 
marriage with the daughter of Ibrahim Adi1 Shah II. While 
passing through Nasik and Daulatabad, he sent a message to 
Raju, challenging him to face the Mughals in the open 
battlefield. But Raju sticking to his tactics of hit and 
run, refused to oblige the Mughals. Subsequently, after much 
persuasion, Raju Deccani made an agreement with the Mughals 
providing that he would let the country be cultivated and the 
revenues would be shared equally between him and the Mughal 
33 
occupation authorities. 
After Prince Daniyal's death (160A-) Abdur Rahim Khan-i 
Khanan assumed the overall charge of all the three subas of 
the Deccan. Now, that the Mughals had made settlements both 
with Malik Ambar as well as Raju Deccani, the mutual rivalry 
of the two leaders of Deccani resistance once again came into 
the open. Clashes started taking place between the followers 
of the two. Khan-i Khanan shrewdly fanned these clashes. 
Initially Raju emerged victorious forcing Malik Ambar to seek 
help from the Mughals. Khan-i Khanan promptly responded by 
32. Futuhat~i Adil Sha.hi , f-269 b; See also Tarikh-i 
Ferishta, vol. II, pp-165-66. 
33. Futuhat-i Adil Sh^hi ^ f-E69 a. 
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despatching a Mughal force under Mirza Husain Beg, the 
governor of Bir, to help Malik Ambar. With the Mughals' 
assistance Malik Ambar defeated Raju Deccani forcing him to 
34 
withdraw to Daulatabad. At this turn Raju's followers 
began to desert him accusing him of bad behaviour and high-
handedness. Malik Ambar immediately took all of them in his 
own service giving them salaries and assignments according 
to their status. He pressed his advantage by invading the 
territory held by Raju. Malik Ambar besieged and captured 
the fort of Patan where the treasures of Sa'adat Khan were 
stored .'^ ^ 
In 1607, after Malik Ambar had augmented his strength, 
he led another army against Junnar till then controlled by 
Raju Deccani. After its capture, Junnar was made the Nizam 
Shahi capital once again. From there Malik Ambar then sent 
an army to oust Raju Deccani from Daulatabad. In the 
fighting that ensued Raju Deccani was defeated and taken 
priscner; his territory was included in the Niram Shahi 
Kingdom, reorganized under Malik Ambar's leadership. Malik 
Ambar, thus, emerged fully victorious over his local rival. 
3A-. Tsrikh-i Ferishts^ vol. II, p-166. 
35. Futuhat-i Adil Shahi, ff-a70 a-b. 
36. Tsrikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-166. Fuzuni Astarabadi says 
that "when taking assurances Raju came to meet Murtaza Nizam 
Shah II, Ambar seized and imprisoned him, confiscating his 
horses, elephants and other property". See Futah^t-i Adil 
Shahi^ ff-E70 b-71 a. 
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Subsequently he, once again, concentrated his energies and 
resources to oppose the Mughal forces occupying parts of 
Nizam Shahi territory. The removal of Raju Deccani from the 
scene increased Malik Ambar's influence in the Nizam Shahi 
Kingdom. This had also increased the area controlled by him 
which now cams to include the important fort of Daulatabad. 
Besides carrying on successful military campaigns 
against the Mughals, Malik Ambar also reorganized the 
revenue as well as general administration of the territories 
of Ahmadnagar controlled by him. He is believed to have 
introduced a new revenue system in Ahmadnagar. Although he 
was a staunch adversary of the Mughals in the Dsccan, the 
Mughal court chroniclers sometimes do praise him for his 
military and administrative achievements. "In warfare, in 
command, in sound judgment and in administration", according 
to Mu'tamad Khan, "he had no rival or equal. He well 
understood that predatory (q^zZiSqi ) if4arfAr5, whicn in the 
language of the Dakhin is called bargi gi ri".^ ' Maiik Ambar 
organized a well disciplined army mainly consis-ing of light 
Maratha cavalry. He was the first to perceive the importance 
of Maratha cavalrymen. He recruited them in the Nizam Shahi 
army in large numbers and trained them in guerrilla 
37. cf. I qbalnam3i~i Jahar^gi ri , p-271 . 
See also Bhimsen, Tarikh~i Dilkusha (tr.), Sir Jadu Nath 
Sarkar Commemoration Volume, ed. and introduction by V.6. 
Ghobrekar, Bombay, 1972, part. I, pp-9-10. 
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38 
When Akbar died (1605), Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan was 
the sip<3hsalair in the Deccan. After his accession, Ja.hangir 
39 
confirmed him in the same position, implying that he 
wished to continue the military operations then being carried 
on by Khan-i Khanan against the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. By the 
time Jahangir ascended the throne, Malik Ambar had succeeded 
in mobilizing a strong army to face the Mughals. The 
rebellion of Prince Khusrau (1606) and the Safawid attack on 
Qandahar (1606), to begin with, did not allow Jahangir to 
take any bold initiative in the Deccan. Taking advantage of 
this situation, Malik Ambar was able to reconquer some of the 
Nizam Shahi territories lost to the Mughals earlier. At this 
time the dissensions among the Mughal nobles stationed in the 
Deccan had become sharp which seems to have indirectly helped 
Malik Ambar. He at this time was able to advance quite close 
to Burhanpur. 
In 1608, Khan-i Khanan was summoned by Jahangir to the 
38. cf. IqbsIn^mB-i Jah^ngiri , p-271-7E. 
39. Jahangir's Tuzuk-i J^hBrigiri, ed. Saiyid Ahmad Khan, 
Ghazipur and Aligarh, 1363-64, p-9; Abdul Baqi Nihawandi 
gives many details about the confirmation of Khan-i Khanan as 
sipartsaiar of the Mughal forces in the Deccan. See Wa'asir-i 
Rahimi vol. H , pp-51S-13; 
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court at Agra, ^"^  seemingly to explain the failure of the 
Mughal forces in suppressing Malik Ambar. On this occasion, 
Khan-i Khanan succeeded in persuading Jahangir to send him to 
the Deccan again with the promise of subjugating the whole of 
the Nizam Shahi Kingdom within a period of two years. For 
this purpose he requested "an additional force of twelve 
thousand sawars with ten lakh rupees" which was granted by 
Jahangir.^^ Mukhlis Khan, the Bakhshi of the Bhadis was 
appointed Bakhshz of the suba Deccan, with the object of 
i±.p 
assisting Khan-i Khanan in his campaign. 
To meet the renewed Mughal offensive under Khan-i 
Khanan in 1608, Malik Ambar not only advanced towards the 
Mughal frontier with SO thousand sawars but also sent letters 
asking for reinforcement to Ibrahim Adil Shah II, who, at 
this time, was inclined to help Malik Ambar in his endeavours 
to resist the Mughal advance. Ibrahim Adil Shah II was, 
apparently, apprehensive that once the Mughals gained a firm 
foothold in Ahmadnagar, they were bound to advance towards 
Bijapur. He was, therefore, generally, always agreeable to 
help Malik Ambar against the Mughals. In response to Malik 
Ambar'5 appeal the Adil Shahi ruler promptly sent a 
^O. cf. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p-70; Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi writes 
in an explicit language' that Khan-i Khanan was summoned from 
the Deccan and again sent there on an expedition on the 
advice of his (Khan-i Khanan's) mother. See Basatxn-ij.s 
SalatiTif pp-S61-63. 
41. Ta2ak~i Jahangiri, p-71, fia'asir~i Jahangiri^ pp-119-20. 
42. Tuzuk~i Jahangzri , p-71. 
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"^ 3 
contingent of ten thousand sawars to reinforce him. He also 
transferred to Malik Ambar the fort of Kandahar, for 
quartering his family and treasures.^^ Malik Ambar reserved 
the revenues of a whole uilayat amounting to three lakh hurts 
per a.TiTiiim for the maintenance of Adil Shahi army. To 
further strengthen this alliance Malik Ambar proposed the 
marriage of his son, Aziz-ul Mulk alias Fateh Khan, with the 
daughter of Yaqut Khan, an influential and powerful Adil 
Shahi noble. This marriage was solemnized with Ibrahim 
Adil Shah's permission in 1609. Thus Malik Ambar succeeded 
in securing Adil Shahi support in his struggle with the 
Mughals that ensued on Khan-i Khanan's coming to the Deccan 
in 1609. 
After Khan-i Khanan's arrival in the Deccan, initially, 
Malik Ambar suffered some reverses but soon he succeeaed in 
checking the Mughal advance. Khan-i Khanan was eventually 
^3. For the view that Ibrahim Adil Shah II was reacy tc help 
Malik fMnbdir out of a spirit of chivalry, ana for the 
description of the battles he had fought with the Mughals, 
see Futahst-i Adil Shshi ^ f-S7l a. 
^^. Kandahar (IS^'N, 77°E), an(i important and strong fort in 
the sarkar Nander, bordering with Golkonda. See Ar: Atlas of 
the Mughal Empire, sheet 1^-a. 
^•5. Fatuhat-i Adil Shahi, ff-271 a-b. See also 3asatin-'-is 
Salatin, pp-E63-64. 
^6. Basatin-us Salatin, pp-S63-64. 
^7. Fatuhat-i Adil Shahi, f-272 a. Ibrahim Adil Shah II was 
so much pleased with this alliance that he gave bride's dowry 
out of his own treasury. See Ibid. 
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forced to withdraw to Burhanpur requesting the Emperor far 
more reinforcement. The disheartening news from the Deccan 
disturbed Jahangir. To restore the Mughal prestige, he 
decided to send to Deccan Prince Parvez, in 1609, acrompanied 
by Asaf Khan as his ataliq. Raja Man Singh and a.Tnir-al 
umarB, Sharif Khan, also accompanied them. 
Reinforced by Prince Parvez and other leading nobles, 
Khan-i Khanan again set out for the conquest of Ahmadnagar. 
Malik Ambar, as was his usual tactics, avoided a pitched 
battle. By adopting their customary guerrilla warfare the 
Deccanis harassed the Mughals to the point that tney were 
5(') 
obliged to retire to Burhanpur. Subsequently, MaliK Hmbar, 
helped and encouraged by Ibrahim Adil Shah II, became very 
powerful in Ahmadnagar Kingdom. In his desperate bic to 
suppress Malik Ambar, in 1611, Jahangir despatched ancrher 
large army to Deccan which included Khan-i Jahan Lcai, Fidai 
Khan, Saif Khan Barha, Mo'tamad Khan (the aurnor of 
I qba.lria.ma-i Jaharigiri) and other senior amirs. Muhanmadi Beg 
51 
was appointed Sakhshi of this army. Besides this, Abdullah 
Khan, the sabedar of Gujarat, was also ordered to proceed 
48. Ma asir-i Rahimi, vol. II, p-516. But Jahangir in his 
memoirs, and Mo'tamad Khan do not give details aDout this 
failure of the Mughal forces in the Deccan. 
49. Tuzuk-i Jahangirif pp-74-75; Ma'asir-i Jahangi .>^^z , p-l£E; 
Ma' asi r-i 'Rahimif vol. II, p-516. 
50. Futuhat-i Adil Shahi, ff~274 b-75 a; see also Basatzn-us 
Salatiri, pp-S66-67. 
51. Tazuk-i Jahangirif pp-77-78. 
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towards Deccan after his mansab was raised to five thousand 
Z3it and sa.wa.r and the title of Firos Jung was conferred on 
him. 
On the advice of Asaf Khan, Jahangir was inclined to 
proceed to Deccan at the head of this army, but some other 
nobles at the court prevailed upon him not to march ta Deccan 
personally. Jahangir was persuaded to agree to Khan-i Jahan 
Lodi's proposal that he should be allowed to lead this army 
on the understanding that he would subjugate not only 
Ahmadnagar but the wilayat of Bijapur too, within a period of 
two years, "failing of which he should not be allowed to 
e n 
offer kornish at the court"."^'^ 
With the arrival of the army sent under Khan-i Jahan 
at Burhanpur in 1611, there crapped up differences a.-.ongst 
the Mughal commanders over the issue as to how to ccnduct 
operations against Malik Ambar which prevented thei^ from 
making a move for some time. Taking advantage of the delay 
in the starting of operations by the Mughals, Malik —mbar, 
already reinforced by an Adil Shahi army, besieger and 
5 2 . Wa a s i .•—i Ja.ha,T)gi ri ^ pp-123-2 '4 . 
For A b d u l l a h Khan F i r o z J u n g ' s b i o g r a p h y . see 
Zakhi rat-'il KhBiKianin , v o l . I I , p p - 1 7 3 - S 2 . 
5 3 . TLLzuk-i Jahangirif - 8 6 ; lia'asii—i Jahangiri p p - i 3 2 - ; 3 . 
5 4 - cf. BasAtin-us Salatin, p p - 2 6 8 - 7 0 . 
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captured the fort of Ahmadnagar (1611)."^ The Mughal qiledsr 
of the fort, Khwaja Beg Safawi, tried to prolong the defence 
of the fort in the hope of reinforcement from Burhanpur, 
which did not arrive due to disagreements among the Mughal 
nobles."^ Ultimately he had to surrender the fort to Malik 
Ambar. This victory achieved by Malik Ambar over a strong 
Mughal garrison greatly enhanced his prestige. 
Following the fall of Ahmadnagar to Maiik Ambar 
(1611), the differences between Khan-i Khanan, on the one 
hand, and Parvez and Khan-i Jahan Lodi, on the other, became 
sharp. The last two charged Khan-i Khanan of conspiring with 
Malik Ambar and of receiving from the latter one third of tne 
57 h^-^i 1 of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom. On the suggssticn of 
Parvez and Khan-i Jahan Lodi, Jahangir recalled Khan-i 
Khanan from Burhanpur replacing him there by Khan-i Janan 
Lodi as the si pahs-i^I^r. Additional reinforcements of ten 
thousand sai<'ars and two thousand ahadis under Khan-i Azam 
Mirza Aziz Koka, Khan-i Alam Paridun Khan Bar las anc other 
leading nobles were sent to Deccan. At this time, Mahaoat 
Khan, after his mansab was raised to four thousanc zat and 
three thousand sawar, was sent with Khan-i AzaiTi for tne 
55. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p-87; Ma'asii—i Jahangiri, pp-13£-33; 
Basatin-us Salatin, pp-268-70. 
56. Tazak-i Jahangi ri , p-a7. 
57. See Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p-a6; Ma'asir~i Jahangiri pp-133-
34. For the charge of Khan-i Khanan receiving has:1 from the 
Nizam Shah, see Futuhat~i Adil Shahi, p-275 b. 
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purpose of escorting Khan-i Khanan to the court. "^  
This massive concentration of the Mughal forces at 
Burhanpur did not improve the situation in the Deccan. A 
grand offensive against Malik Ambar planned in 1611, proved 
abortive due to Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung's rashness in not 
co-ordinating his moves with those of other nobles. This 
enabled Malik Ambar to defeat the Mughal contingent 
commanded by Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung near Khirki forcing him 
to beat a hasty retreat to Ahmadabad.' ' Subsequently, Malik 
Ambar took possession of the fort of Khirki as well. 
After the loss of Khirki and Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung's 
discomfiture, Jahangir, acceding to Khwaja Abdul Hasan's 
advise, re-appointed Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan (in 1612) as 
the sipahsslar of the Deccan after raising his marisab to S I K 
thousand zat and sai^iar . 
Around this time (1612) a policy of enticing the 
Deccani and Maratha sardars to leave Malik Ambar's company 
and join Mughal service began to take shape. Many leading 
Nizam Shahi amirs like Yaqut Khan, Adam Khan and the maratha 
58. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri., pp-88-S9 f Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, 
•pp-i'JJ-J4. 
59. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp-107-OS; Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, p-156: 
Also Basatin-us Salatin pp-271~72. 
60. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp-107-OS; Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, 
pp-i57-58. 
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sa.rdars such as Jadu Rai , Babuji Kantiya, Udaji Ram and 
others deserted Malik Ambar and were persuaded to join Mughal 
service. They are reported to have come to Balapur after 
deserting Malik Ambar's company. There they were welcomed by 
Shahnwaz Khan, the commander of the Mughal garrison. These 
nobles were welcomed in the royal service and were rev-jarded 
with cash and jagirs suiting to their status. Malik 
Ambar must have perceived development this as a serious 
threat to his position. Desertions by a large number of his 
followers had actually weakened his position. 
However, efforts were also renewed by the Mughals to 
dissuade Adil Shahi ruler of Bijapur from helping Malik 
Ambar. A collection of letters, S'llshari-i Balaghat , contains 
four letters of Khan-i Azam Mirza Aziz Kcka addressed to 
Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur, which were written around 
this time. '^  In these letters he has advised Ad i i Shah to 
desist from extending any assistance to Malik Ambar. On 
Ibrahim Adil Shah II's showing his inclination to come to 
terms with the Mughals, Mir Jamaluddin Husain Anju was sent 
as Mughal envoy to Bijapur. ^ On the whole, howes-er, these 
parleys were not very fruitful from the point of view of the 
61. Tij.zij.k-i Jaharigi ri f p-153; p-197, Ma'asu—i Jahangi ri , pp-
2ia-13; Also :~atuhat-z Adil Shahi , ff-276 D-77 b. 
62. Galshan-i Balg'hat^ India Office MS, 1S95, Ethe, 283. For 
an analysis of the four letters. See K.N. Hasan and Mansura 
Haidar's article 'Letters of Aziz Koka to Ibrahim Adil 
Shah II', PIrC, Allahabad, 1965, pp-161-67. 
63. Ma asi r~i Jahangi ri , p-204. 
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Mughals. Although Ibrahim Adil Shah II responded by sending 
a submissive letter isiriza) ^^'^ but being still apprehensive 
of Mughal designs in the Deccan, he appears to have 
continued to help Malik Ambar. 
On assuming command for the second time in the Deccan 
<161S), Khan-i Khanan found the Mughal camp somev^hat free 
from the internal differences and mutual jealousies. By this 
time, many of the senior nobles, earlier involved in mutual 
disagreements, had been either trsLnsferred from there or had 
died. Prince Parvez was the supreme commander only in name, 
the actual authority was in the hands of Khan-i Khanan 
AS 
himself. Thus having a free hand for conducting military 
operations, he began a systematic drive of enticing the 
Nizam Shahi nobles to join the Mughals. Since, desertions 
had already weakened Malik Ambar, he, appealed to Ibrahim 
Adil Shah II for help. In 1614, Ibrahim Adil Shah II sent 
Mulla Muhammad Lari at the head of a large army to help Malik 
Ambar for facing the Mughal offensive. Malik Ambar, 
perhaps, had also asked for help from Abdullah Qutb Shah of 
Golkonda which also arrived. Arrival of reinforcements from 6^. Tuzuk-i Jah3.ngi ri , p-114. 
65- Thomas Roe says that,"the Prince (Parvez) has the name 
and state, but the Chan (Khan-i Khanan governs all", cf. The 
Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to I rid i a (1615-19.^, ed. by William 
Foster (new and revised edition), Asian Publishers, 
Jalandhar, pp-69-70. 
6 6 . Fatahat-i Adil shahi, f f - S 7 6 b - 7 7 b ; s e e a l s o Tuzuk-i 
Jahangi ri, p p - 1 5 3 - 5 4 . 
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Bijapur and Golkonda appears to have encouraged him to 
advance upto Khirki to check the invading Mughal forces. But 
on account of differences that cropped up between him and 
Mulla Muhammad Lari and other Bijapuri nobles, Malik Ambar 
again became unsure of his position. He, therefore, again 
appealed to Ibrahim Adil Shah II to recall Mullah Muhammad 
Lari accusing him of colluding with the Mughals. ' The 
Mughals under Shahnawaz Khan, on the other hand, encouraged 
by the desertion from Malik Ambar's camp, marched towards 
Khirki to attack Malik Ambar. In a well contested battle 
Malik Ambar was defeated near Khirki. He took refuge in the 
fort of Daulatabad (1616). The Mughals cptured his artillery 
and a large number of horses, elephants and other provisions. 
The town of Khirki was burnt down by the Mughals.'^ '^  The 
Bijapur and Golkonda forces, till then accompanying Malik 
Ambar, withdrew to their respective regions after making a 
settlement with the Mughals. They jointly offered to pay 
twelve lakh hans to Prince Parvez, Shahnawaz Khan and other 
69 
officers. After this victory Shahnawaz Khan returned to 
Burhanpur with his contingent. Other Mughal officers also 
dispersed to their respective Jagirs. 
67. Ibid. 
68. Tazuk-i Jsharigiri pp-153-5'+; Maasi r~i Jahangiri, pp-E12-
13. Fuzuni Astarabadi writes, "So many horses, elephants and 
other kinds of property fell into the hands of the Mughal 
troops that they became rich". cf. Futuhat-i AdiI Shahi , 
ff-279 ab; SSO a. 
69. Futabat-i Adil Shahi, f-S80 a. 
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The main points of above discussion may be summarised 
as follows; During the period 1601-16, on several occasions 
the Mughals made attempts to over run the Ahmadnagar 
territories still held by the Nizam Shahi nobles but, on the 
whole, they were not able to achieve much headway. Following 
the capture of Ahmadnagar fort (1600), the Nizam Shahi 
nobility had reorganised itself to resist further advance by 
the Mughals. In the beginning Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani 
created problems for the Mughals and successfully prevented 
them in capturing more territories. Later during the peirod 
1601-05, due to growing rivalry between Malik Ambar and Raju 
Deccani, the Mughals did succeed in making some inroads, but 
after Raju Deccani's elimination in 1605, Malik Ambar, having 
reorganized the Ahmadnagar army in very short time, was 
successful in stemming the Mughal advance. He even succeeded 
in recapturing the areas lost earlier. Henceforth, there 
v«(ere two main planks of Malik Ambar ' s strategy; to strengthen 
his military position by obtaining military support of the 
Adil Shahis, and increasing use of Maratha t^rgi soldiers. 
The dissidence among the Mughal officers, posted in the 
Deccan, also greatly helped him. Malik AmDar started losing 
to the Mughals only after Khan-i Khanan returned to Deccan in 
1612, when pursued a systematic pal.icy of isolating Malik 
Ambar from Ibrahim Adil Shah II, and of enticing his Maratha 
and Deccani officers to desert him. It was this policy 
which resulted in Malik Ambar's defeat in the Battle of 
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APPENDIX-II 
Description of the Boundaries of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom 
during lAOl-O't. 
In 1600, the Mughals had captured the fort of 
Ahmadnagar, but the core of the Kingdom was still controlled 
by the Nizam Shahi nobles namely, Malik Ambar and Raju 
Deccani. They had divided the h4izam Shahi Kingdom between 
themselves in the southern and northern portions 
respectively. The Mughals controlled, besides the fort of 
Ahmadnagar, the sarkars of Paithan (19°N, 75°E) and Jalnapur 
(SO^iN, 76*'+E), from where they were conducting military 
operations against Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani. These 
territories, therefore, are shown in the appended map as the 
3.re3. occupied by the Mughals. 
Regarding the areas controlled by Malik Ambar and Raju 
Deccani during 1601-04, Ferishta has given specific 
information. According to Ferishta, in the southern part of 
the Kingdom, Malik Ambar held sway from the Telingana region 
bordering Golkonda and Bijapur upto one farsaj^ :;"} laoout 5km.) 
south of the town of Bir (19*'N, 75''E) ana 't kroh t about 16, 
km.) south of Ahmadnagar. In the western side, he controlled 
the area from SO kroh (about 80 km.) west of sarkar 
1. See Map. B. 
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Daulatabad (EOo+N, 75°+E) upto the port of Chaul.^ While the 
port of Chaul (IS^N, 7S°E) and some part of the coastal area 
was under the Portuguese occupation. 
On the other hand, Raju Deccani controlled the northern 
part of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom, which consisted of the 
sark^rs of Daulatabad and Nasik (EO°-N, 73"+E) bordering 
Gujarat. His control towards south was extended upto 6 kroh 
(about S4 km.) north of Ahmadnagar. 
2. cf. Tarikh-i Fe-rishta^ vol. II. p-l65. Also, for the area 
controlled by Malik Ambar, see Map. B. 
3. cf. Tarxkh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-165. See also Map. B. 
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After the Battle of Khirki (1616) the Mughals under 
Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan's leadership had somewhat retrieved 
their military position. But there were no territorial 
gains. Malik Ambar could not be fully crushed. Immediately 
after the battle, he withdrew to Daulatabad and from there 
started reorganizing his army. He also resumed raids into 
the Mughal territories which were in the nature of guerrilla 
warfare. On coming to know that the situation in the Deccan 
was not progressing satisfactorily, Jahangir was first 
inclined to march to Deccan personally, but on further 
thought he decided to send Prince Khurram replacing Prince 
Parves, as the nominal commander in the Deccan, while 
retaining Khan-i Khanan as the si pahsalar, the officer 
wielding real powers. Khurram had recently distinguished 
himself in the campaigns against Mewar. Before his departure 
to the Deccan, Khurram's mansat was raised to an 
unprecedented 20 thousand zat and 10 thousand sauar, besides 
some other favours. Khurram left Ajmer for the Deccan on 
6th October, 1616. He was accompanied by such leading amirs, 
Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung, Raja Suraj Singh, Dayanat Khan 
besides Mo'tamad Khan, who was appointed SaAvhsrti of the 
army. Simultaneously Jahangir also moved his camp from 
Ajmer to Mandu in order to boost the morale of the Mughal 
1. Tuzak-i Jahnagiri, p-161; tia'asir-i Jahanglri, pp-2S5-26. 
2. Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, pp-166-77; Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, 
pp-225-27. 
3. Ibid. 
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soldiers in the Deccan. 
Thomas Roe, who, by this time, had arrived at Ajmer, 
has stated that the appointment of Prince Khurram to the 
Deccan command was opposed by the commanders posted there, 
particularly by Khan-i Khanan, Mahabat Khan and Khan-i Jahan 
Lodi. He even suggests that these nobles had refused to 
serve under Khurram."' But this seems to be a.n exaggeration 
on the part of Thomas Roe. No other contemporary writer has 
mentioned the disagreement of the Mughal commanders in the 
Deccan, on this occasion, with Khurram's appointment. 
Moreover, Thomas Roe has also suggested that the differences 
between Khurram and Khan-i Khanan grev-j because the former 
earlier wanted Khan-i Khanan to be recalled from the Deccan 
as he "was a practiser with the Deccan, from whom he received 
pension". This testimony of Thomas Roe is not corroborated 
by other records. On the other hand it is known that after 
achieving victory over Malik Ambar in 1617, Prince Khurram 
recommended Khan-i Khanan for appointment as subed^r of the 
7 
Deccan. It might be imagined that on this point Thomas Roe 
A^.cf. Ma Bszr~i JahangirZf p-SS7. See also Tuzak-i 
Jahangiri, p-166. 
5. "All the cappatayens as Chan Ghana, Mahobet Chan, Chah 
John refuse to stay if this tyrant (i.e. Prince Khurram) 
come to command". See William Foster (ed.), The Embassy of 
Sir Thomas Roe to India, 1615-19 (new and revised edition), 
Asia Publishers, Jalandhar,1993, p-171. 
6 . Ibid, p p - 2 4 e - 4 3 . 
7 . Tuzuk-i Jahangi ri , p - 1 9 ^ . 
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is actually reproducing the rumours circulating at the court, 
on this occasion, reflecting the hostility of certain 
sections for Khurram. 
On his arrival in the Deccan., Khurram was welcomed by 
Khan-i Khanan, Mahabat Khan and Khan-i Jahan at the bank of 
Narbada. He arrived at Burhanpur in March, 1617. From there 
he promptly opened negotiations with the rulers of the Deccan 
states, in which, contacts with Bijapur were given greater 
importance. By neutralizing Ibrahim Adil Shah II. Khurram 
was actually anxious to isolate Malik Ambar. He sent his 
reliable men, Afzal Khan and Raja Bikramajit, to Adil Shah 
offering Mughals' friendship and protection in return for 
acknow1edging Mughal over lordship, promise of regular 
peshkash and above all, for pressurising Malik Ambar to 
return the territories he had captured from the Mughals. 
Ibrahim Adil Shah II, on his part, is reported to have 
welcomed the Mughal envoys by coming out upto 7 .•k:o5 to 
receive the farman and nishan of the Prince they were 
carrying, and indicated his acceptance of the demands put 
forward by h:;hurram. One might infer that the arrival of 
Khurram with such a large force at Burhanpur, and the 
presence of the Mugh^il . Emperor at Mandu, so close to 
Burhanpur, appear to have unnerved Ibrahim Adil Shah II as 
well as the Golkonda ruler, Muhammad Qutb shah. They, 
8.See Tazuk-i JAhangi ri , p-lBS; MB' asz r-i Jsha.7>gi ri , pp-aS9-
30. 
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apparently, felt that in the given situation, their interests 
would be better served if they made a settlement with the 
Mughals by accepting Khurram's demands. The Mughal envoys 
returned from Bijapur with costly gifts alongwith Ibrahim 
Adil Shah II's message amounting to an acknowledgement of 
the Mughal "suzerainty" and promising the return of the 
9 
territories taken away by Malik Ambar. Around the same 
time, a Solkonda envoy also arrived at the Mugnal court near 
Mandu. He was accompanied by Husain Beg Tabrezi, the envoy 
of the Safawid ruler, Shah Abbas I. The Golkonda envoy also 
brought with him precious gifts. 
Subsequently, under the pressure of Ibrahim Adil Shah 
II of Bijapur, Malik Ambar had to surrender to the Muqhals 
the fort of Ahmadnagar and the territory around Balaghat, 
which he had captured from them earlier. So far Malik 
Ambar was concerned, this was not the end of his fight. He 
cleverly retained the fort of Daulatabad and the area around 
it, in the hope of reviving his struggle at an opportune 
time. 
After the surrender of Ahmadnagar and Balaghat by Malik 
Ambar, in July 1617, on Khurram's recommendation, Jahangir 
9. Ta.zak-i Jaharigiri, p-lSS; Ma'a.sir-i JBhangiri, pp-235-36, 
10. T^zuk-i Jsharigiri, p-ia4. 
11. Ibid J p-188. See also Ma'Bsii—i Jaharigiri, pp-E4S-43. 
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appointed Khan-i Khanan as sabed^r of Berar, Khandesh and 
Ahmadnagar which together constituted the Mughal territories 
in the Deccan. His son Shanawaz Khan was deputed with twelve 
thousand sawars to control the territories around Balaghat. 
It was, again, on Khurram's request that Ibrahim Adil Shah II 
1'-' 
was entitled fsrzand (son), which was clearly a gesture 
acknowledging the key role played by the Bijapuri ruler in 
persuading Malik Ambar to return the Mughal territories. 
Ibrahim Adii Shah II could, thus, also be used to keep a 
watch on Malik Ambar's aggressive activities. It would 
appear that this move paid off from the Mughal point of view. 
Subsequently a rift between the Bijapuri ruler and Malik 
Ambar appeared which prevented the latter from getting any 
help from Bijapur during his struggle with the Muqhals 
renewed towards the end of 1617. 
It was, apparently, at the time of this settlement 
(1617) that the important role of the Maratha sard^rs ana 
their bargi soldiers in the Deccan was recognised by Jahangir 
by initiating a policy of recruiting them in the Mughal 
service. Some of the Maratha sardars, who accompanied 
Khurram in July 1617 to the imperial camp at Mandu, including 
Udaji Ram, Jadav Rai and Babaji Kantiva were rewarded with 
12. See TuzuK-i Jahangi ri , p-194; Ma asi i—i Jahangiri , p-247. 
See also Muntakhab-ul Labab, vol. I, pp-291-9S. 
13. Tuzuk-i Jaharigiri, pp-191--9S; p-Sit't. 
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"suitable" mansMbs and jagi rs. Jahangir specifically 
mentions the conferment of a mansab of 3000 zat and 1500 
sawar on Udaji Ram. ^ 
It may, in nutshell, be stated that Khurram's success 
in the Deccan in 1617 gave the impression of the Mughal 
positions in the Deccan being secured considerably. 
Subsequently, the Emperor accompanied by Khurram returned to 
the North. But for a restless and ambitious person like 
lialik Ambar, the war was never over. He remained busy 
throughout in reorganising his army and waited for an 
opportunity to hit back with renewed vigour. 
Two years after the 1617 settlement, at a time when the 
Emperor was away in Kashmir, Prince Khurram (now entitled 
Shahjahan) was preoccupied in besieging Kangra, and 
dissensions among the Mughal officers in the Deccan had 
resurfaced, Malik Ambar resumed his attacks on the Mughal 
outposts. In these attacks he used the recently recruited 
Maratha bargi soldiers, on a large scale. Though in the 
initial two or three engagements, the Mughals were able to 
gain an upper hand but soon Malik Ambar's farces started 
harassing the Mughals from different sides. He succeeded in 
1^. 3ee Tuzak-i Jahangiri, pp-194-95; 197. 
15. Tuzuk-i Jahangi ri , p-197. For the biographies of the 
Maratha sardars, namely, Kheloji Bhonsle, Maloji, Udaji Ram 
and Jadav Rai , See Zakhi rat-ul Khawariin , vol. Ill, pp-13S-33; 
139-^1. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
139 
cutting off their lines of communication as well as supply of 
provisions which forced the Mughals to withdraw from 
Balaghat. Hotly pursued by Malik Ambar, the Mughal forces, 
withdrawing from Balaghat, fell back to Balapur where Darab 
Khan, the younger son of Khan-i Khanan was encamped. At 
this point the Mughal forces made a stand. Raja Bir Singh 
Deo succeeded in repelling a contingent of the Deccanis. 
During this action, Mansur, a Deccani officer of Abyssinian 
origin, was killed. But this setback did not deter Malik 
Ambar from continuing his constant guerrilla raids on the 
Mughals entrenched at Balapur. This eventually forced, 
Mughal forces led by Darab Khan to vacate Balapur. They 
retreated towards Burhanpur. In this manner Malik Ambar 
succeeded in taking back from the Mughals the whole of 
Balaghat as well as sizable territories in Ahmadnagar and 
Berar regions. Subsequently by 1620 the only places still 
held by the Mughals were Burhanpur and the fort of Ahmadnagar 
which were also being closely invested by the Deccanis. 
Khan-i Khanan, who found himself ir. a difficult 
situation at Burhanpur, sent repeated appeals, one after 
another, to the court for help against the Deczanis who were 
16. Tuzuk-i Jah^ngiri, p-305; (la'asir-i Jahi^DQiri, p-305, 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid, pp-321-£E. 
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on the offensive. The Emperor sent to Khan-i Khanan rupees 
twenty lakhs with some reinforcements, but the situation did 
not improve. Malik Ambar even besieged Burhanpur. He also 
occupied areas in Berar and Khandesh from where his agents 
20 began collecting revenue. As Prince Shah Jahan, alongwith 
many leading officers, was busy in besieging Kangra, no 
significant assistance could be sent to help Khan-i Khanan in 
the Deccan. After Shahjahan's success in reducing Kangra, 
Jahangir again sent him to the Deccan. But the Prince 
delayed his departure to the Deccan possibly owing to his 
anxiety that in his absence from the camp Nur Jahan might 
enter into an alliance with Khusrau, who, although a 
prisoner, had again come to be treated mildly. He 
practically refused to march out until Khusrau's custody was 
transterred to him. 
19. In one of the letter sent to the court, Khan-i Khanan is 
reported to have written that if timely help was not sent, he 
would commit joahar after sacrificing his men. cf. Mirza 
Muhammad Amin Qazvini , BadshBhnama., British Museum MS, Or. 
173, Rieu, 1/258 b, f-OS. 
50. Tu.z'ik-i Jahaiigirif pp-321-22; See also Qazvini's 
Baidshahnaimaf f-S8. 
51. For an assessment of Shah Jahan's attitude on this issue, 
see Beni 'Prasad, History of JahaTigir^ Allahabad (reprint) 
1973, p-305. B.P. Saksena, History of Shah Jahan of Dihli, 
Allahabad, (reprint), 1976, p-26. See also Nurul Hasan, The 
Theory of Nur Jahan Junta' - A Critical Examination', 
Proceedirtgs of Indian History Congress, 1958, pp-3£4-35. 
SS. Mirza Kamgar Husaini, however, says that Khusrau was 
given in the safe custody of Shah Jahan since the personnel 
guarding Khusrau were negligent in performing their duties, 
cf. Ma'asi r-i Jahangi ri , pp-321-22. Qazvini gives a detailed 
account of the handing over of Khusrau to Shahjahan. See 
Badshahnama^ ff-S8-89. 
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After his misgivings were removed, Shah Jahan, at the 
head of a large army including one thousand shadis and a 
train of heavy artillery, came to Burhanpur in early 1621. 
Shah Jahan's arrival compelled the Deccanis to lift the siege 
of Burhanpur. At a council held by Shah Jahan at Burhanpur, 
he was advised by Khan-i Khanan to adopt dilatory tactics. 
It was suggested by him to postone the military operations 
for the recovery of Balaghat till the rainy season was over. 
This proposal supported by nobles like Abul Hasan, Abdullah 
Khan Firoz Jung and Darab Khan was outrightly rejected by 
Shah Jahan. He was in favour of attacking the Deccanis 
without giving them time to prepare themselves for facing the 
Mughal counter offensive. Shah Jahan divided his army into 
five contingents, two of which were commanded by the Prince 
himself, while the other three were put under Darab Khan, 
Abdullah Khan Firoz Jung and Khwaja Abul Hasan respectively. 
These forces advanced towards Ahmadnagar slowly all the time 
keeping their alert eyes against the likely guerrilla attacks 
by the ba.rgi soldiers of Malik Ambar. The Deccanis led by 
Yaqut Khan attacked Abul Hasan's contingent from the rear, 
but were defeated. Hotly pursued by the Mughal troops they 
fled towards Khirki, (then capital of the Ahmadnagar 
Kingdom), which was occupied by the Mughals without much 
fighting.^^ Malik Ambar had got the news of Mughal advance 
23. Qasvini's Bsdshahn^ma, ff-93-94, 
24. Ibid, f-94. 
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in time to vacate the fort of Khirki alongwith Burhan Nizam 
Shah III and his family. On entering Khirki the Mughals 
burnt down the whole of the town. 
After occupying Khirki, the Mughal forces proceeded to 
help the garrison of Ahmadnagar fort, which was still being 
besieged by the Deccani forces. When the Mughals reached 
Paithan, Malik Ambar, who had earlier withdrew to 
Daulatabad, opened negotiations with Shah Jahan offering tc 
surrender the territories, once held by the Mughals in the 
Deccan, and an additional fourteen kos wide strip adjoining 
27 the sarkar of Ahmadnagar. He also agreed to pay fifty 
lakhs rupees as peskhash collected from the Deccani rulers 
(dariiyadarari-i dakari), out of which eighteen lakhs were to be 
paid by the ruler of Bijapur, tv-jelve lakhs by the ruler of 
PR 
Ahmadnagar and twenty lakhs by the ruler of Golkonda. Shah 
Jahan, being anxious to return to the North as early as 
possible, promptly accepted Malik Ambar's proposal and 
concluded a peace in May, 16S1. It seems that as a result of 
25. Tuztik-i Jahangiri, pp-330-31 ; See also Ma asi r-i 
Jahangiri, p-332. 
26. Janangir himself writes in his memoirs that "the generals 
of the victorious army, with their revenge seeking soldiers 
(•Bipar> fiiria khwah), halted three days in the town of Khirki 
and destroyed the city which had taken tv-jenty years to 
build", cf. Tuzuk-i Jaharigiri, pp-330-31; See also tia'asii—i 
Jahangi ri, p-332. 
S7. Tazak-i Jahangiri , pp-330-31. 
28. Ma'asir-i Jahangiri , p-334. 
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this peace, the Mughal position in the Deccan was at last 
greatly secured, but Shah Jahan's rebellion, which broke soon 
after, disturbed everything that he had achieved in the 
Deccan during his last campaign. 
In April-May, 16SS, Shah Abbas I, besieged Qandahar, 
which was a bone of contention between the two, the Safawids 
and the Mughals, since long. Jahangir ordered large scale 
preparations for relieving the fort. An order was sent to 
Shah Jahan to come to the North as soon as possible and 
3(-) 
proceed immediately to Qandahar. Shah Jahan, suspicious of 
the moves of his rivals at the court, decided to use this 
opportunity for dictating his terms. Though he did not 
openly refuse to march but put forward some conditions before 
proceeding to the rescue of the Qandahar. 
After sometime these anxieties of Shah Jahan induced 
him to take steps which amounted to rebellion. In 16SS, he 
sent his men to occupy Dholpur, which was assigned m jagir 
to Prince Shahariyar. Subsequently, taking advantage of the 
Emperor's absence, he also made an abortive attempt to 
capture Agra."^ Failing to occupy Agra, Shah Jahan, pursued 
29. Qandahar (31 ^ 'N, 65''E), was an important and strategic 
fort to the west of Lahore, bordering with the Safawid 
Empire. See An Atlas of the Mughal Empire, op. c i t . , sheet -
2 A-B. 
30. Tazuk-i Jahangiri, p-3^3; tia'asir-i Jahangiri, pp-S-^ b-^ ?; 
Qasvini's Badshahnama, ff-103-0^. 
31. Tuzak-i Jahangiri, p-353; Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri, p-200. 
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by an army under Parvez and Mahabat Khan, retreated towards 
the Deccan. He crossed the river Tapti in September 1623. 
In Deccan, Shah Jahan ordered confining of Khan-i Khanan, who 
was suspected of secretly corresponding with Mahabat Khan. 
Many of Shah Jahan' s supporters had also deserted hifri by this 
time.'^'^ 
Being driven to extremity, Shah Jahan, now appeared in 
the Deccan as a rebel beseeching the co-operation and support 
of the Deccani rulers. He sent his confidant Afzal Khan to 
Malik Ambar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II with presents seeking 
their assistance. Malik Ambar politely refused to help. He 
is reported to have told Afzal Khan that he was "simply a 
follower of Adil Khan (tsbi '-i '"Adil Khsri ) , who was at 
present the head of all the Deccani powers <amada-i 
dij.niyada.r<Rn dakari) ^ so, first he should go there and explain 
33 his desire". Malik Ambar's refusal to assist Shah Jahan at 
this juncture, may be explained with reference to his 
hostility towards the person of the rebel prince for being 
humbled by him twice in the past. Malik Amoar•s attitude on 
this occasion could also be explained in terms of nis not 
being ready to get embroiled in the affairs of a rebel prince 
hotly pursued by a powerful Mughal army. Afzal Khan's 
32. Tazuk-i Jahangiri , p-369; Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, pp-377-78; 
see also biography of Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan in Ma asir-ul 
Umara, vol. I, p-706. For the desertion from Shah Jahan's 
camp, see Iqtalnama-i Jahangirif pp-S39; 248-49. 
33. cf. Tuzuk-i Jahangi ri , p-378. 
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reception at Bijapur was still more disappointing. Ibrahim 
Adil Shah II detained him outside the city for a long time. 
He had accepted the gifts sent by Shah Jahan but declined to 
help him."^^ As a last recourse, Shah Jahan went towards 
Golkonda. Muhammad Qutb Shah assisted him by supplying cash 
and provisions, but did not allow him to stay inside his 
Kingdom. Shah Jahan, thus, proceeded towards Orissa and 
Bengal.^^ 
At the time of the outbreak of Shah Jahan's rebellion 
(16E3-S6), Ahmadnagar and Bijapur were having disputes aver 
the possession of the fertile tract of Sholapur. When 
Parves and tiahabat Khan arrived in the Deccan for suppressing 
Shah Jahan's rebellion, both Ahamdnagar and Bijapur tried to 
seek their assistance against each other. In 1624, Malik 
Ambar sent his confidant, Ali Sher, to Mahabat Khan offering 
to wait upon him personally and also to send his eldest son 
37 for the Mughal service. Likewise, Ibrahim Adil Shah II 
offered to send a force of five thousand sawars unaer Mulla 
34. Ibid. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Sholapur (IT^'N, TS^E). In the beginning, Sholapur was 
included in the Nizam Shahi kingdom, but Bijapur had captured 
it in 1510-11. Since then there was going a dispute over 
this region. See for details Introductory Chapter. 
37. Tazak-i Jsharigiri, p-381; Ma'asir-i jBhangiri^ pp-389-90. 
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Muhammad Lari to assist the Mughals. This move was aimed 
at getting Mahabat Khan's help against Malik Ambar. Being an 
astute politician, Mahabat Khan did not respond immediately 
to these overtures of Malik Ambar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II. 
He kept both of them in suspense until Shah Jahan had left 
the Deccan, as it was feared that, if Mahabat Khan would 
favour one of the parties, the other one would certainly have 
gone to assist the rebel prince. In this manner Mahabat Khan 
succeeded in keeping Shah Jahan isolated and eventually in 
compelling him to leave the Deccan. Once Shah Jahan had left 
the Deccan, Parvez and Mahabat Khan decided to support 
Ibrahim Adil Shah II in his dispute with Malik Ambar. 
Jahangir approved this decision by issuing a farmari in Adil 
Shah's favour. Mahabat Khan's decision to.support Ibrahim 
Adil Shah was obviously designed to use him in suppressing 
Malik Ambar, who was perceived as the immediate and most 
formidable adversary of the Mughals in the Deccan. 
In compliance with the terms of the above alliance, 
Ibrahim Adil Shah II sent a force of five thousand 5ai<.>a.rs 
under Mulla Muhammad Lari to assist the Mughal army against 
Malik Ambar. Mahabat Khan, now, despatched a force into the 
38. Tuzak-i Jahangiri, pp-385-a6; Ma'asir-i Jaharigzri, 
pp-397-98. 
39. See Tazak-i Jahangi ri , p-377. 
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Balaghat territory, ' for protecting the Mughal military 
outposts there. The Mughal-Adil Shahi alliance and the 
movement of their forces worried Malik Ambar greatly. He 
vacated Khirki, the temporary Nizam Shahi capital, removing 
the family of Nizam Shah and his own establishment as well to 
the fort of Daulatabad. He himself marched towards the fart 
of Kandahar, on the frontier of Golkonda. Malik Ambar's 
declared aim in marching towards the frontier of Golkonda, at 
this juncture, was to realize the arrears of peshka.sh for the 
last two years, from Saltan Muhammad Qutb Shah. "^  But m 
reality, he appears to have moved closer to the Golkonda 
frontier in the hope of securing Muhammad Qutb Shah's 
protection in case of his being overtaken by the Mughai-Adii 
Shahi forces pursuing him. 
In 16S^, from the frontier of Golkonda Malik Amoar 
marched rapidly tov-jards the cit'/ of Bidar where he defeatea, 
in a surprise attack the Bijapuri contingent garrisoning tne 
fort. From there he marched rapidly to Bijapur devastating 
and plundering the territory on the way. Ibrahim Adi1 Snan 
^O. Balaghat region iBO^±N, 75<>-78*'E) was spread into 
Ahmadnagar, Khandesh and Berar. See An Atlas of the Magnai 
Empire, Sheet - 14-A. 
^ 1 . Kandahar (18"N, 77°E) was an important for in the sar.v.ar 
Nander situated to the south-east of the Ahmadnagar kinqaom 
bordering with Golkonda. See An Atlas of the Mughal Ejnoi re , 
op. c i t . . Sheet 1^-A. 
^ S . Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p p - 3 S 5 - 8 6 ; Ma'asii—i Jahanairi, 
p p - 3 9 7 - 9 8 . 
^ 3 . Tazuk-i Jahangiri, p - 3 9 1 . 
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II shut himself up in the fort of Bijapur, and wrote to the 
Mughals to send liulla Muhammad Lar i , who was then quartered 
at Burhanpur. In addition to this force, a Mughal force 
consisting of the contingents of leading nobles like Lashkar 
Khan, Khanjar Khan, Jadav Rai, Udaji Ram, etc. also set out 
from Burhanpur to rescue Ibrahim Adil Shah II. The advance 
of this army alarmed Malik Ambar. He wrote to the Mughal 
authorities at Burhanpur that the Deccani powers should be 
left to settle their disputes among themselves and that the 
45 Mughals should not interfere in their mutual relations. 
But the Mughal officers paid no heed to his protestations. 
They continued their march towards Bijapur which compelled 
Malik Ambar to raise the siege and withdraw into the 
Ahmadnagar territory. The combined armies of the Mughals and 
Adil Shahis kept on pursuing the retreating Nisam Shahi army 
under Malik Ambar. 
Being hotly pursued by the Mughals and Adil Shahi 
troops, Malik Ambar finally took a decision to make a stand 
against the allied army. He positioned his army at 
Bhatodi,'^ about ten miles south of Ahmadnagar. Here the 
44. Ibid, pp-391-92. See also IqbalriBmB-i-Jahangi ri , 
pp-234-36. 
45. Ibid, See also Mai'iSsir-i Jaf^angi ri , p-412. 
46. Bhatodi (19°N, 74<'E). The name of this place has been 
spelt either as 'Bhaturi' or "Bhatvadi.' by the modern 
writers. But Irfan Habib has given this name as Bhatodi. 
See ,^j> Atlas of the Mughal Empire, op. c i t . Sheet 14-A,p-_5-^, 
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rival armies fought a well contested battle (1625), in which 
Malik Ambar inflicted a crushing defeat on the allies. He, 
thus, was able to save the Nizam Shahi Kingdom from 
extinction on this occasion. During the contest, Mulla 
Muhammad Lari, the Adil Shahi commander, was killed, while 
many other Mughal and Adil Shahi officers were either 
48 
captured or fled from the field. 
This was the last major battle which Malik Ambar fought 
against the Mughals. By this time he had achieved 
considerable success and had managed to regain most of the 
Nizam Shahi territory from the Mughals, except the fort of 
Ahmadnaqar and adjoining aresi, including a stretch up to the 
Mughal posts in Jalnapur. 
After the Battle at Bhatodi (l6£5), Malik Ambar started 
a counter offensive against the retreating Mughal and Adil 
Shahi armies. He laid siege to the fort of Ahmadnagar which 
was defended energetically by the Mughal qiledar, Khanjar 
Khan. Leaving some or his oTTicers to continue the siege, 
Malik Ambar himself proceeded tov-jards Balaghat region where 
he succeeded in capturing most of the territory. Thereafter 
he once again moved towards Bijapur and wrested the coveted 
4 7 . Tuzak-i Jahsngzri, p - 3 9 a . 
4 8 . iPid. See a l s o Iqbalnam3~i Jshangiri p p - 2 3 6 - 3 7 . Also 
auritak.hab-iil Lub^bf v o l . I , p p - 3 4 7 - 4 9 . 
4 9 . Tuzuk-i Ja / iangj r i , p - 3 9 S . 
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territory of Sholapur from Bijapuv- (June, 1625)."' He, then, 
sent Yaqut Khan for investing Burhanpur. By now Malik Ambar 
had succeeded in recapturing mast of the territories which 
earlier belonged to the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, thus, making 
himself master of the entire Nizam Shahi Kingdom excluding 
the fort of Ahmadnagar. 
While Malik Ambar was busy in his above operations 
against the Mughals, Shah Jahan, pursued by Parves and 
Mahabat Khan, arrived in the Deccan <1625). Although, by 
this time, Shah Jahan was a spent force even then Malik Ambar 
welcomed him,"^ deciding to help him against the pursuing 
farces, apparently, with an aim to use his troops in the 
ongoing operations against the Mughals in the Deccan. Shah 
Jahan readily agreed to help Malik Ambar's officer, Yaqut 
52 Khan, in besieging Burhanpur. But, on the arrival of 
Parvea and Mahabat Khan near Burhanpur, Shah Jahan and Vaqu.t 
Khan were farced to raise the siege. They withdrew towards 
Ahmadnagar ."* 
Seme time afterwards, being ill and tired, Shah Jahan 
sent a petition to the Emperor apologizing for his "crimes 
50. Ibid. Also I qbslriama-i Jahangiri, pp-237-3a. 
51. Tazak-z Jathangzri, p-394; Ma'asii—i Jah<3ngiri, pp-^17-
18. 
5S. Tuzuk-i- Jahangirif p-39^; Ma'aszi—i jBhangiri^ pp-417-
18. 
5 3 . Tuzak-i Jahangiri, p - 3 9 5 ; Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, p - 4 1 9 . 
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56. 
committed in the past (Jars'im mazi)" It seems that, by 
this time, he had realized that he could not hope to regain 
his lost ground even with the help of Malik Ambar. Shah 
Jahan's real aim was to strengthen his position at the court 
for ensuring his accession in the eventuality of Jahangir's 
death in which Malik Ambar's support could not be of much 
use. Moreover, Ibrahim Adil Shah II, who was in alliance 
with Jahangir, was not expected even to give him asylum. Nor 
his earlier sKperience made him hopeful of securing help from 
the ruler of Golkonda. It was under these circumstances that 
he, despite friendly attitude of Malik Ambar towards him, at 
this juncture, decided to submit to Jahangir. 
By the time of Shah Jahan's submission (1626), Malik 
Ambar had succeeded in recovering most of the Nizam Shahi 
territory. He, therefore, thought it prudent to stop 
hostilities against the Mughals. Scon after this he died 
(14th May, 16E6).^^ 
Although Abdur Rahim Khan-i Khanan had somewhat 
succeeded in retrieving the Mughal position in the Deccan by 
1616. But, in fact, the gains made ^^ »e^ e not very-
significant. Later, Prince Shah Jahan, did succeed in 
isolating Malik Ambar from Ibrahim Adil Shah II and creating 
54. Tuzuk-i Jahangirif p-397. 
55. Zqbalnama—i Jaharigiri, p-a71 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
15S 
a rift between them. Shah Jahan's major success was the 
settlement with Malik Ambar in 1(S17. Another important 
dateline of Shah Jahan's success in the Deccan was the 
settlement with Malik Ambar in 1621. Inspite of these 
settlements Malik Ambar was never subdued fully. He was soon 
able to revive his resistance with the help of Maratha bargi 
soldiers. The outbreak of Shah Jahan's rebellion <l6S3-26) 
presented Malik Ambar with an opportunity of regaining 
territories from the Mughals. The victory in the Battle of 
Bhatodi fl6E5) was in itself a great achievement of Malik 
Ambar. By 1625, Malik Ambar, thus, was able to recovBv most 
of the Nizam Shahi territories from the Mughals and Adil 
Shah is. These successes of Malik Ambar delayed the 
extinction of the Nizam Shahi Kingdom for the next ten years. 
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After the death of Malik Ambar (1626), the struggle 
between the Mughals and the Nizam Shahi nobles had ceased for 
sometime. It is passible that during his last days Jahangir 
was not much interested in continuing the military campaigns 
in the Deccan. His main aim, perhaps, was to consolidate and 
preserve the gains that Akbar had made in the Deccan by 1600. 
On the other hand, the cessation of hostilities against the 
Mughals by Malik Ambar towards his last days, perhaps, 
stemmed from the fact that, by then, he had already succeeded 
in recapturing the entire territory of the Nizam Shahi 
Kingdom except Ahmadnagar and the adjoining areas including 
the stretch from here upto the Mughal outposts in Jalnapur. 
The surrender of Balaghat and adjoining territories by Khan-i 
Jahan Lodi in 16S7 to the Nizam Shahi nobles, had further 
strengthened their position i-is a yxs the Mughals."" 
However, the hostilities between the Mughals and Nizam 
Shahi authorities were rekindled with the outbreak of Rhan-i 
Jahan Lodi's rebellion. These were precipitated by Burhan 
1. Jalnapur (19'»N, 75 °E), located to the nortn-east of 
Ahmadnagar (19''N, ?'+<'£) bordering Berar. Control of this 
place was important for retaining the Mughals- hold on 
Ahmadnagar. 
S.The authors of Tuzuk-i J^h^rigiri , p-^-15; I qo^In^m^-i 
Jahi^rtgiri, pp-ES3-S4 and Ma asi;—i Jaharigiri, p-nBO, 
specifically say that Khan-i Jahan Lodi accepted a bribe of 
three lakhs of bans (about twelve lakh rupees) from Nizam 
Shah and surrendered to his officers Balaghat and adjoining 
area. Muhammad Amin bin Daulat-al Husaini not mentioning the 
amount simply says: "Khan-i Jahan, in order to extinguish the 
thirst of his greed, surrendered Balaghat to Nizam-ul Mulk". 
cf. Anfa-al Akbar, British Museum MS, Or, 1761, V, Rieu 
iii/102a9, f-2EEa 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
154 
Nizam Shah Ill's decision to give shelter to Khan-i Jahan 
Lodi. In this renewed struggle, the Nizam Shahis were 
hampered by a division among the nobles. As it appears from 
the subsequent events, while one section of the nobility was 
in favour of reconciliation with the fiughals, the other 
section was firmly in favour of continuing the resistance. 
The section advocating reconciliation was led by si ps.hsaiBr 
Yaqut Khan and Fateh Khan, the son and successor of Malik 
Ambar, who also occupied the position of p(?s/iwa. 
Earlier, following Malik Ambar's death, Yaqut Khan, on 
behalf of Fateh Khan and some other nobles, had written to 
Sarbuland Rai at Burhanpur, expressing their wish to join the 
Mughal service. Khan-i Jahan Lodi, the then subedar of the 
Deccan, promptly accepting their offer invited them to visit 
Burhanpur. Eventually, only Yaqut Khan and his followers 
joined the Mughals. Fateh Khan remained with Burhan Nizam 
Shah III. When Burhan Nizam Shah III revived the struggle 
against the Mughals in 1627, he is reported to have sent a 
force under Fateh Khan to molest the Mughal territory. The 
Mughal forces under khan-i Jahan Lodi and Lashkar Khan, 
however, succeeded in repulsing him.^ Fateh Khan, on this 
occasion, was suspected of not carrying out the raids whole 
3.Tuzuk-i Jahangiri, p-413; Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri p-2S0; 
Ma'asir-i Jahangiri, p-463. cf. Anfa-ul Akhbar ., f~240a.. 
4.Tuzuk-i Jaharigiri, p-'^l<^.; I qi>alriama-i Jaharigiri, pp-Sa2-a3; 
Ma'asi r-i Jahangi ri^ pp-466-67. 
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heartedly. He was even accused of colluding with the 
Mughals. Burhan Nizam Shah III also came to distrust him. 
On his return from this unsuccessful campaign Fateh Khan was 
imprisoned on the orders of Burhan Nizam Shah III."' Burhan 
Nizam Shah, at this time, was under the influence of nobles 
hostile to the Mughals. Two of them, Hameed Khan, the 
Abyssinian, and Muqarrab Khan were now appointed as peshu^ 
and si pahsalair respectively. Both these influential nobles 
endeavoured to muster support for Burhan Nizam shah III among 
the Maratha sardars. They also sought assistance, time and 
again, from the ruler of Bijapur for thwarting the Mughal 
military pressure. 
When Shah Jahan ascended the throne on Evth January, 
16Sa, his first concern as Emperor v«jas to recover the 
territories lost to the Nizam Shah which included Balaghat 
and adjoining territories surrendered to the Nizam Shahi 
authorities by Khan-i Jahan Lodi towards the last days of 
Jahangir's reign. Khan-i Jahan Lodi's rebellion anc 
subsequently, his being given shelter by Burhan Nizam Shan 
5. Iqbalnama-i Jahangiri., pp-2S3-S4. 
6.Ibid. The authors of both Maasii—i Jaharigiri, pp-Hoo-o?; 
and Ha asi r-ul Umara, vol. I, pp-7El-22, say that after Fateh 
Khan's imprisonment Hameed h'ihan became the centre of power 
imadai—al mahamm). 
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m 
7 
III was an additional set back for ths liughals. Apart fro 
helping to Khan-i Jahan Lodi against the pursuing Mughal 
army, Burhan Nisam Shah III also procured military assistance 
from the rulers of Bijapur and Solkonda. From these 
developments, Shah Jahan appears to have perceived that as 
long as Nisam shahi Kingdom survived there could be no peace 
for the Mughals in the Deccan. On coming to throne he, 
therefore, began his diplomatic manoeuvres to isolate Nizam 
Shahis from the other two Deccani kingdoms. He sent tv^ o 
brothers, Sheikh Muinuddin and Sheikh Mohiuddin, as envoys to 
g 
Bijapur and Golkonda respectively. Besides this, he also 
affected necessary changes in the Mughal setup in the Deccan, 
appointing Iradat Khan, entitled Asam Khan, as the new 
sabed^r. He deputed a well equipped army to pursue Khan-i 
9 Jahan Lodi. 
To begin with, the Mughal forces could not make much 
headway in their operations against the Nizam Shahi forces. 
The rebellion of Khan-i Jahan Lodi could also be crushed only 
after Burhan Nizam Shah III compelled him to leave the 
7.For a detailed discussion of Khan-i Jahan Lodi's reDellion, 
See Qazvini's BadshahriBma, British Museum MS, Or 173; Rieu 
i/S5Sb, f-lB-^  a. Also Abdul Hamid Lahori's Bsdsha.hn^7D^ , ed. 
by Kabirudding Ahmad and Abdur Rahim, Asiatic Society of 
Bengal, Calcutta, 1966, vol. I, pt. i, p-SS9. 
8.Qazvini's Satf srta/jnama , ff-214 ab . 
9.Ibid, f-175b; ISSa. See also Lahori's Sadshahr/ajns, vol. I, 
pt. i, p-257. 
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territory of Ahmadnagar Kingdom. '"^  Afber much pursuit Khan-i 
Jahan was killed in a skirmish at Sihonda, on 26th January, 
1631. The rebellion of Khan-i Jahan Lodi thus came to an 
end, but his earlier action of fleeing towards Ahmadnagar and 
Burhan Nizam Shah Ill's miscalculation of providing him 
shelter, had directed the wrath of the Mughals towards Nizam 
Shahis. Subsequently, the Mughals concentrated all their 
energies in uprooting the Nizam Shahis. 
During this time Shah Jahan's diplomatic mission to 
Bijapur proved to be a futile exercise. The offer sent in 
16E8, to Muhammad Adil Shah for an offensive and defensive 
alliance against the Nizam Shahis was, perhaps, not 
responded to by the Adil Shahi court. Shah Jahan's envoy, 
Sheikh Muinuddin, returned from Bijapur disappointed. One 
may presume that the Adil Shahi nobility had prevailed upon 
their ruler to decline the offer. At this time, Muhammad 
Adil Shah, was not an effective ruler; the actual power being 
in the hands of Khawas Khan, the peshuB, and his supporters, 
particularly, Murari Pandit and a few others. This section 
10. Qazvini's Badshahnama^ ff-S07b-8a; Lahori's Badshahnama, 
vol. I, pt. i, pp-33^-35. 
11. Sihonda (B5^N, 30°E), lies in sarkar Kalinjar of sata 
Agra. See An Atlas of the Mughal Eutpi re, sheet 3-A, p-E9. 
Presently this place is situated in District Banda of Uttar 
Pradesh. 
12. Qazvini's Badshahnama, ff-216b-17b; Lahori's Badshahnama, 
vol. I, pt. i, pp--34a-50. See also Ma'asii—ui Umara, vol. I, 
p-72?. 
13. See Lahori's Badshahnama, vol. I, pt. i, pp-359-60. 
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of the Adil Shahi nobility was strongly opposed to the idea 
of Ahmadnagar being annexed to the Mughal Empire. They had 
14 
made a common cause with the Nizam Shahi nobles. The Nizam 
Shahi noble Muqarrab Khan, the sip<3hssl<3r, was in constant 
touch with the Adil Shahi si pahsslar, Randaula Khan, both of 
whom were determined to stem the Mughal advance. It seems, 
the Mughals were not fully aware of the understanding 
prevailing between the Adil Shahis and the Nizam Shahis at 
this time. While holding parleys with the Adil Shahi 
commanders, Azam Khan also continued military operations 
against Ahmadnagar and, in 16S9, he succeeded in capturing 
Dharur "' and Parenda. Throughout the time these operations 
were on, Azam Khan was hopeful of an understanding with 
Bijapur and was waiting for a positive response from that 
quarter. The Adil Shahi commander, Randaula Khan, on his 
part, did not reveal his strategy and plans to Azam Khan. It 
was only after the capture of Dharur by the Mughals (16E9) 
that he opened negotiations v*<ith Azam Khan demanding the 
transfer of this stronghold to Bxjapur as a token of Mughal 
goodwill. It seems that the Mughals oecoming distrustful of 
1-^ . Ibid. 
15. Dharur (18°N, 76''E), located to the south-east of 
Parenda. During Shah Jahan's reign it was renamed as 
Fatehabad. See An Atlas of the Mughal ETj}pi re, Sheet 14-A, 
p-56. 
16. Parenda (18°N, 75°E) was an important fort on the border 
of Bijapur. See Ibid. 
For a detailed description of the Mugnal military operations 
and capture of Dharur and Parenda, See Qazvini's Badshahnama ^ 
ff-21£ ab; 214 b. 
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Randaula Khan declined to give Dharur to Bijapur which 
resulted in the failure of negotiations initiated by the 
Mughal envoy, Sheikh Muinuddin. Soon after, Khawas Khan, the 
Bijapuri peshwa, sent a force for helping Muqarrab Khan, the 
Nizam Shahi si pahsalar, then facing the fiughals. They 
together forced Azam Khan to vacate Parenda and retreat 
17 towards Dharur. 
The failure of the Mughal forces to gain any-
significant victory disturbed Shah Jahan. It was evident 
that Asaf Khan, the uakil, sent in 16S9 to co-ordinate 
military operations in the Deccan, was not able to improve 
the situation. He, therefore, decided to proceed to Deccan 
personally. Shah Jahan reached Burhanpur in February, 
•* ft 1630."^ Immediately on arriving in the Deccan, Shah Jahan 
began directing military operations personally. In these 
operations the Maratha sardars as well as the Deccani nobles 
were used on a noticeable scale. These Maratha sardars and 
Deccani nobles, most of whom had joined the Mughal service 
during Jahangir's reign, were presented before Shah Jahan 
for the first time after he arrived in the Deccan on this 
occasion. Each one of them was rewarded by Shah Jahan by 
19 giving marisao suiting their status. The prominent Maratha 
17. Qazi-irii's Badshahnama, f-216 a. 
18. Ibid., f-lS9 b. 
19. cf. Lahori ' s Badshahnama, i-oi. I, pt. i, p-293; 310. 
Also Qa:ri-ir)i ' s Badshahnama, ff-lS9 b-90 a. 
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sardBrs mentioned in this context included Shahji Bhonsle, 
who was assigned the psrg^riSi of Poona and the s^rk^r of 
Junnar as jagirs. This step aimed at further promoting the 
recruitment of the Maratha sardars and the discontented 
Deccani nobles into the Mughal service was a significant 
development from the Mughal point of view. In the subsequent 
campaign leading to annexation of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom to 
the Mughal Empire, these Deccani nobles proved to be of 
crucial importance, assisting Mughals to a great extent. 
With Shah Jahan's arrival on the scene, military as 
well as diplomatic moves of the Mughals became more vigorous. 
Militarily, many more territories were captured in the 
eastern and northern parts of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, which 
PI PP P'5 
included Kandahar, Sangamnir and Nasik. The territory 
of Nasik was handed over to Shahji Bhonsle as his jagir. 
This step v-jas taken, perhaps, to further consolidate and 
secure Marathas' support in the ongoing offensive against the 
EO. Grant Duff says that Shahji Bhonsle was one of the 
supporters of Khan-i Jahan Lodi. On his flight, Shahji, 
probably fearing the loss of his Jagir made submission to the 
Mughal Emperor. He v-^ as awarded a man sab and confirmed in his 
jagir. See Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas , first 
published 1363, (reprint) 1990, vol. I, p-75-
21. Kandahar (ie<>N, 77°E), situated in the eastern part of 
the kingdom bordering Golkonda. See Ari Atlas of the Mij.ghal 
Empire, Sheet 14-A. 
22. Sangamnir <19<>N, V^^E), situated in the northern part 
bordering Gujarat. See Ibid. 
23. Nasik (SO°N, 73°E), was an important pargana in sarkar 
Sangamnir. See Ibid. 
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Nizam Shahi nobles opposing the Mughals. Around this time, 
apparently, the anti-Mughal faction at the Nizam Shahi court 
was gradually getting weakened and the elements advocating 
submission to the Mughal Emperor were getting an upper hand. 
The arrival of Shah Jahan in the Deccan further intensified 
this process. In the same year, i.e. 1630, Burhan Nizam Shah 
III released Fateh Khan from the prison and raised him once 
more to the dignity of wakil. This was a set-back Tor his 
arch rival Muqarrab Khan, who was heading the faction 
advocating resistance to the Mughals. From the Mughal point 
of view, it was a major diplomatic victory since, from the 
very beginning, Fateh Khan was known for his pro-Mughal 
attitude. Another morale booster for the Mughals was 
Muqarrab Khan's joining them. Being let down by his master, 
he thought it prudent to leave Nizam Shahi service and join 
the service of the Mughal Emperor, where he was entitled 
per 
Rustam Khan and treated cordially. ^ 
The appointment of Fateh Khan created a controversy at 
the Nizam Shahi court. Those nobles, i-Jho, till this time, 
were opposing the Mughals bitterly, naturally resenrsd this 
move. Despite desertion by Muqarrab Khan they continued to 
oppose Fateh Khan and also sought assistance from Bi;apur in 
their efforts to resist the Mughals. Being alarmed by this 
S^. Qazvini's BadshBhnama , f-2S9b. 
25. loid. See also Lahori's Badshahnama, vol. I, pt. i, pp-
378-79. 
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militant pasture of the anti-Mughal faction, Fateh Khan 
opened secret negotiations with Asaf Khan, who tried to 
encourage him to follow this course. In fact, the Mughals, 
at this time, were rather uncertain regarding Fateh Khan's 
plans. They were apprehensive that he might enter into a 
deal with Bijapur. While apparently asking him to prove his 
sincerity, they were, all the time, pressurising Fateh Khan 
to depose Burhan Nizam Shah III. Succumbing to this 
pressure, Fateh Khan, in February, 163S, deposed and then 
killed Burhan Nizam Shah III replacing him on the throne by 
his ten year old son, Husain. Besides Mughal pressure, 
Faten Khan also seems to have acted in this manner out of a 
personal grudge for Burhan Nizam Shah Ill's keeping him in 
prison for tvMO years (16S3-30). The Mughals rewarded Fateh 
Khan by granting him jagirs till then held by Shah.ii Bhonsle. 
This obviously offended Shahji, who, leaving the Mughal 
service proceeded to Bijapur. ' 
In granting Shahji's Jagirs to Fateh Khan, the Mugnals 
seem to have indicated that in the changed circumstances 
Shahji's support was no longer crucial for tnem. The 
26. Both Qazvini and Lahori say that after removing Burhan 
Nizam Shah III, Fateh Khan placed his son, Husain, on the 
throne and later gave an impression that Burhan had died a 
natural death. See Qazvini's Badshahnama, ff-239 ab; 
Lahcri's Ba.dshahn3.ma, vol. I, pt. i, p-402. But Mirza 
Ibranim Subairi explicitly writes that Fateh Khan compelled 
Burhan Nizam to drink poison. See Basatzri-us Salatiri, p-396. 
27. Lahori'3 Badshahnama, vol. I, pt. i, p-^^B. 
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immediate threat to their authority in the Deccan, Burhan 
Nizam Shah III, was no longer there. The Ahmadnagar Kingdom 
was being controlled by Fateh Khan, who had been fallowing a 
pro-Mughal policy from the very beginning. It appears that, 
during this time, the Adil Shahi help to the Nizam Shahi 
nobles had also been discontinued. There was no prominent 
officer ready to lead the Nizam Shahi forces against the 
Mughals. The Mughals, therefore, did not perceive any 
further resistance from the Nizam Shahi nobility. In this 
situation Shahji and other Maratha sardars were perceived by 
them as a force which had no role to play. In other words, 
Shahji and other Maratha SBrdMrs were considered useful by 
the Mughals in so far as they could be used for putting down 
that section of the Nizam Shahi nobility who were not 
prepared to submit to the Mughals. 
From the Mughals' point of view, Fateh Khan's rise to 
power at the Nizam Shahi court was only a step towards the 
fulfillment of their plan to dismantle the Ahmadnagar 
Kingdom. They continued to put pressure on Fateh Khan 
demanding surrender of elephants and jewellery of Burhan 
Nizam Shah III, which were kept in the fort of Daulatabaa. 
In case of his refusal to comply with this demand, a well-
equipped army was kept ready to besiege Daulatabad ,*"' On 
hearing about the mobilization of the Mughal forces for this 
2B. Qazvini's Bsidsh^hriBwa, f-a39 ab 
29. Itid, ff-24^ ab. 
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purpose, Fateh Khan was obliged to send to Burhanpur 
elephants and jewellery that was demanded. He was also 
forced to send one of his sons with these presents. ' 
Further, he also agreed to have the khutba recited and coins 
31 
struck in Shah Jahan's name in the Nizam Shahi territories. 
This proved to be a virtual break up of the Nizam Shahi 
Kingdom. Some of the remaining Maratha sardars and Deccani 
nobles joined the Mughals, while others went to join service 
3S in Bi japur. 
In March, 163S, Shah Jahan returned back to Agra."^"^ It 
appears that, at this time, he was, perhaps, satisfied with 
Fateh Khan's formally accepting his overlordship. Shah 
Jahan's immediate aim in the Deccan was the subjugation of 
Ahmadnagar which, in his perception, was fulfilled to a great 
extent. Hence his decision to return to Agra in March, 163S. 
Though some other circumstances, such as the death of Mumtaz 
Mahal (7th June, 1631) and famine of 1630-3E, might also have 
contributed to Shah Jahan's early return to Agra, but the 
basic reason was the one stated above. This is borne by 
Lahori's testimony who states that after Nizam Shah had 
30. Ibid . 
31. Nizamuddin Ahmad Shirazi, Hadiqat-as Salatin j, ed . by 
Saiyid Asghar Ali Bilgrami, hyderabad, 1933, vol. I, p-91. 
3a. Ibid. 
33. Qazvini's Badshahnama, f-S'+T b; Lahori's Badshahtiama, 
vol. I, pt. i, p-^BB. 
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accepted the Mughal overlordship and the ruler of Bijapur 
was confirmed in his position, the Emperor decided to return 
to Agra.'^^ 
However, the affairs in the Deccan were not yet settled 
finally. Following Shah Jahan's return to the North (March, 
1632), the Adil Shahi nobles again began to create troubles 
for the Mughals by helping Shahji Bhonsle in recovering his 
jagzrs transferred by the Mughal authorities to Fateh Khan. 
This recurrence of fighting in the Deccan perturbed Shah 
Jahan. He recalled Asaf Khan and Asam Khan, appointing 
Mahabat ^xhan, Khan-i Khanan, as the subed^r of the Deccan. 
Mahabat Khan having earlier served in the Deccan possessed a 
considerable experience of conducting military operations in 
the Deccan. On his arrival in the Deccan in December, 163H, 
Mahabat Khan was approached by Fateh Khan for help against 
Shahji Bhonsie and the Adil Shahi forces assisting him."^ "^  
Mahabat Khan promptly responded to this appeal by sendmq an 
army under his son, Khan-i Zaman, tov^ards Daulatabad. "^"^  
The prospects of a Mughal army getting stationed at 
Daulatabad alarmed the Adil Shahi commander, Randaula Khan, 
who, perhaps rightly felt that once the Mughals establish 
3^. Lahori's BBdshBhnama, vol. I, pt i, p-4as. For the 
understanding between Asaf Khan and the pro-Mughal Adil Shahi 
nobles under Mustafa Khan, See Ibid, pp-41A—15. 
35. Qazvini's Sadshahnama, ff-a78b-79a. 
36. Ibid. 
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themselves at Daulatabad, their next target would be Bijapur. 
He, therefore, opened negotiations with Fateh Khan urging him 
not to invite the liughals; instead should join the Bijapur 
forces in stemming their advance. He argued that submission 
to the Mughals, at that stage, would be fatal for the 
interests of the Nisam Shah is as well as for the other 
kingdoms of the Deccan. Randaula Khan tried to induce Fateh 
Khan to take up arms against the Mughals by promising to give 
him three lakh huris in cash as well as liberal supplies of 
provisions and the determined support of the Adi1 Shahi army 
in his struggle against the Mughals. He made it a point to 
impress upon Fateh Khan that the Mughals were more eager to 
capture the fort of Daulatabad for themselves than to really 
help him. 
The arrival of the Mughal forces from one side and Adil 
Shahi overtures from the other, seem to have left Fateh Khan 
totally baffled. In face of this dilemma he C O U I G not taKe 
any resolute decision for sometime. Eventually, it turned 
out that he v-jas, perhaps, apprehensive of the Mugnal moves. 
Yielding to the persuasions of the Adil Shahi commander, he 
decided not to let the Mughals enter into the fort of 
38 Daulatabad. Mahabat Khan seems to have anticipated such a 
development and had already made extensive preparations for 
37. For details of Randaula Khan's overtures to Fateh Khan, 
see Qazvini'3 Badshahn^ma ^ f-S80b. 
38. loid. 
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besieging Daulatabad. 
After besieging Daulatabad for quite a long time 
Mahabat Khan succeeded in forcing the garrison of Daulatabad 
39 in October 1633, to surrender the fort to the Mughals. 
Fateh Khan seems to have realized that resisting the Mughal 
pressure for a long period was quite difficult. To save the 
lives of Nizam Shah and his family he opened negotiations 
with Mahabat Khan offering to surrender the fort on the 
condition that their lives be spared. Mahabat Khan 
graciously accepted the offer. After the removal of Nizam 
Shah's and Fateh Khan's families from Daulatabad, Mahabat 
Khan entered the fort. On this occasion khutba was formally 
recited at Daulatabad in Shah Jahan' name. " After sometime, 
Fateh Khan and the young Husain Nizam Shah II were presented 
before the Emperor. While Husain Nizam Shah was imprisoned 
in the Gwalior fort, Fateh Khan was admitted into the Mughal 
service. A khil'at and a cash reward of two lakh rupees was 
conferred on him. His property was also restored to him.'* 
With the occupation of Daulatabad and submission of 
39. Lahori's BadshahriBma, vol. I, pt.i, pp-512-13. Qazvini's 
Sad5/iahnama, f-E97b. 
40- For a detailed description of the capture of Daulatabad, 
see Lahori's Badstiahnama, vol. I, pt. i, pp-518-30. Also 
Qazvini's Badshahnama, f-297b. 
^1. Lahori's Badshahnamaf vol. I, pt.i, pp-540-41. Qazvini's 
Badshahnama, f-303a. 
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Fateh Khan and imprisonment of Husain Nizam Shah II, the 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom ceased to exist. But the process of 
annexation of the territory of Ahmadnagar Kingdom to the 
Mughatl Empire was not yet complete. Most of the northern 
parts of the Kingdom had already been occupied by the 
Mughals. But, in the eastern and southern parts, the Maratha 
sardars assisted by the Adil Shah is, were still holding on to 
the territories assigned to them by the Nizam Shahi 
authorities. By forgiving Fateh Khan and restoring his 
property, Shah Jahan, perhaps, hoped to win over the nobles 
sympathetic to Fateh Khan, who were still resisting the 
Mughals. Simultaneously, by sending the young Husain Nizam 
Shah to prison, Shah Jahan also did not want to leave 
out any legitimate claimant to the throne of Ahmadnagar. The 
task of annexing the entire Ahmadnagar Kingdom was, 
therefore, no longer very difficult provided the Maratha 
sardars, who were stubbornly keeping the resistance alive, 
were tackled tactfully. 
Meanwhile, Mahabat Khan conducted vigorous military 
operations against the Maratha sardars and the disaffected 
Deccani nobles defying the Mughals in the southern and 
eastern parts of the Ahmadnagar territory. He despatched 
forces to capture the strategically situated forts of Ausa 
and Udgir situated in the east and Parenda in the south, on 
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the frontier of Bijapur. For the Mughals the capturing of 
these forts was important. This was the only way of 
preventing the Adil Shahi nobles from creating trouble inside 
the Ahmadnagar territory. The fort of Parenda had alrsady 
been captured by the Adil Shahis, which posed a serious 
43 threat to the Mughal position at Ahmadnagar. The most 
alarming occurrence, at this time, from the Mughal point of 
view, was the installation of a young boy as the new Nisam 
44 -Shah by Shahji Bhonsle and some other nobles. bhahji even 
started collecting revenues from some areas in the name of 
45 this puppet Nizam Shah. 
The Maratha sardars supported by the Adil Shahi forces, 
thus, continued to resist the Mughals. Mahabat Khan was not 
very successful to contain their activities. His death in 
October, 1634, left the field wide open for the Deccanis. 
After him no competent Mughal commander was left there to 
deal with the Deccanis. Appreciating the gravity of the 
situation, Shah Jahan decided to come to Deccan psrscnally. 
He set out on his second visit to the Deccan after accession 
on Slst September 1635. This time he was aiming at settling 
42. See Lahori's Sadshahnama, vol. I, pt. xi, pD-33-34. 
Qazvini's Badshahnama , f-3S0b. 
43. The fort of Parenda was earlier neld by the Nizam Shahi 
officers, but after the submission of Fateh Khan ana Husain 
Nizam Shah to the Mughals, the Adil Shahi forces had occupied 
it. See Qasvini's Badshahnawa, f-319 b. 
44. Qazvini's Sadshahnama, f-336 b. 
45. Ibid. 
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the affairs of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom finally. He sent 
farmsris to the rulers of Bijapur and Bolkonda making 
stringent demands upon them. Muhammad Adil Shah of Bijapur 
was asked to desist from helping Shahji Bhonsle and to 
surrender the Nizam Shahi territories he had captured. He 
was also asked to pay regular peshkash to the Mughal 
Emperor. On the other hand, the ruler of Golkonda, 
Abdullah Qutb Shah, was asked to refrain from reciting the 
name of the Safawid ruler iNBli-i Iran) in the khatba . He 
was also asked to stop the practice cursing the first three 
Caliphs. Besides reciting khatba^ he was also required to 
mint coins in Shah Jahan's name and also pay a reguiar 
47 peshkash. These farmans were, perhaps, intendea to warn 
Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi authorities against creating 
obstruction in tne way of a complete annexation of the 
Ahmadnagar t^rritcry to the Mughal Empire. Simultaneously, 
vigorous military CDerations against the Maratha 'sardars ana 
the recalcitrant Nizam Shahi nobles were started. Shah Janan 
also despatched forces towards the frontiers of GoiKonda and 
Bijapur for prevertmq these kingdoms from sending help to 
the Nizam Shahi nccies. Well - equipped armies were sent 
46. Lahori's Sadsnannama, vol.1, pt. li, pp-lS5-2s. For the 
copy of the farman, see Ibid, pp-126-30. 
47. For Shah Japan's farmari to Abdullah Qutb Shah, see 
Lahori's Sadshahnama, pp-130-33. For the summarised 
translation of tne farman , see Riazul Islam's caieridar of 
Documents, op.cit, vol. II, p-149. 
48. Lahori's Baasnahnama, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-135-37. 
Qazvini's Badshahnama, ff-364a - 65a. 
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^9 to capture the strongholds controlled by Shahji Bhonsle. 
Shah Jahan's well planned and well executed military 
operations soon had the desired effect on the rulers of 
Golkonda and Bijapur. They realized that it was not within 
their power to resist the mighty Mughal armies for long. 
First Abdullah Qutb Shah complied with the dictates of Shah 
Jahan in April, 1636."'' Soon after him, Muhammad Ad i 1 Shah 
of Bijapur also followed suit by agreeing to a formal 
settlement with the Mughals in May, 1636."' Rulers of both 
the states agreed to the conditions put forward by Shah Jahan 
in the fsrmaris earlier addressed to them. They also sent to 
Shah Jahan suitable oeshkash besides other gifts. ""'"^  
The settlement with the two remaining poiMerful kingdoms 
of the Deccan stabilised Mughal position in the region. The 
Maratha sardar, Shahji Bhonsle, who aspired to revive the 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom, was left completely isolated. The Adii 
Shahi forces also joined the Mughals in pursuing him. 
Shahji Bhonsle was chased from one place to another. The 
Mughal forces captured the forts in his possession, one after 
^9. Qazvini's Sadshahnama, ff-3649-65a. 
50. Lahori's Badshahriama, vol. I. pt. ii. pp-173-80. See 
also Qazvini's Sadshahnama, f-3S9a. For a detailed 
discussion of the settlements of 1636, see chapter VIII. 
51. See Lahori's Badshahnama, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-167-74. 
52. Z£>id . 
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the other. Having been totally cornered by the combined 
armies, he, ultimately agreed to surrender the puppet Nizam 
Shah to the Mughals in September-October, 1636, but himself 
53 joined the service of the ruler of Bijapur. By the 
settlement of 1636, the territory of Ahmadnagar Kingdom was 
partitioned between Bijapur and the Mughals, a major 
share going to the latter. 
Thus came to an end the Nizam Shahi Kingdom, which at 
one stage had emerged as the most powerful successor state 
after the disintegration of the Bahmani Kingdom. By 1601, 
Akbar had annexed Khandesh and had also subdued some parts af 
the Ahmadnagar Kingdom. But it took the Mughals, inscite of 
their superior forces and vast resources, almost four decades 
to anneK the whole of the Kingdom. This speaks volumes for 
the firm roots that the Ahmadnagar Kingdom had struck among 
the local ruling groups including the Maratha s^^rdars during 
its existence as an independent state for one hunared and 
forty six years (1490-1636). 
Following this annexation the boundaries of ths Mugnai 
Empire in the Deccan came to be clearly defined ana were 
53. For detailed description of the military operations 
against Shahji, see Qazvini's Badshahnama, f f-370a-72a.: 
378a; 395a-97b. Lahori's Bad shahnama.^ vol. I, pt, ii, pp-
148, 151, 160, 165. Later, Muhammad Adil Shah assignee the 
Jagirs of Poona and Supa to Shahji. See Qazvini's 
Badshahnama, f-397b. 
5^. See Chapter VIII and the appended Map-C. 
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firmly established. Theoretically speaking, the settlements 
with Bijapur and Golkonda had extended the Mughal 
overlordship over these two remaining Deccan states as well. 
After 1636, peace continued in the Deccan for the ne;;t twenty 
years. During this period the two Deccani states improved 
their positions politically as well as economically. The 
detailed outlines and consequences of the settlements of 1636 
are going to be discussed in the next chapter. 
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APPENDIX-III 
Description of the Areas of the Ahmadnagar Territory Divided 
Between the Mughals and Bijapur in 1636-
By 1636, the Kingdom of Ahmadnagar had become extinct. 
In this ye3.r, a p6-3.ce settlement was concluded between the 
Mughals and Bijapur under which the Mughals had agreed to 
give the southern parts of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom to Bijapur. 
The rest of the territory of the Kingdom was annexed to the 
Mughal Empire. The map depicting this situation is based on 
the following specific information. 
The territories, which were transferred to Bijapur in 
May-June, 1636, have been specifically mentioned in the 
fBrui^T} sent by Shah Jahan to Muhammad Adil Shah. According 
to this fBrmBD, these territories towards south and east 
included the Wangi mBhsI (18°N, 75°E) and the forts situated 
therein, the ssrkar of Sholapur (17°N, 75<>E), with tne mahals 
connected with it, the sarkar of Parenda (19°+_N, 75°+E), with 
the wahals connected with it and the parganas of Bhalki 
(18<>N, 77°E) and Chitguppa (17'>N, 77 °E) in the east. Towards 
west, the whole of the region of Konkan, which was previously 
under the sway of Nizam Shah, and the forts situated therein 
including the parganas of Poona (18*>N, 73°E) and Chakan 
1. For the farmari ^ see Lahori's Badshahanama, vol. I, pt. ii, 
pp-167-7'4.. See also copy of the agreement (sawad ^ abdnama) , 
Itidf pp-S03-0'^. 
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(IS^N, TS^ 'E) were also given to Bijapur. This entire 
western area comprised fifty parganas and yielded an income 
p 
of about 20 lakh of haris per annum. The remaining territory 
which was about two-third of the whole of the Ahmadnagar 
Kingdom was annexed to the Mughal Empire.'^ 
Apart from the above mentioned territories, at the time 
of the settlement (May-June, 1636) the forts of Ausa (18'='N, 
76'^ E) and Udgir (18°N, 77°E) were still in tne possession of 
the Nizam Shahi troops. But, later in September-October, 
1636, these forts and the adjoining areas were also annexed 
to the Mughal Empire, after it was run over by the Mughal and 
Adil Shahi army.^ 
S. Ibid . 
3. Ibid. See also Map C. 
^. See Map C. For the detailed discussion of the combined 
Mughal and Adil Shahi military operations, see corresponding 
text in chapter-VII. 
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Settlements of 1636: Significance of the Mughsls' 
Treaties with Bijapur and Golkonda. 
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The extensive military campaigns by the Mughal forces 
in the Deccan had resulted in establishing their military 
superiority over the Deccan kingdoms. The powerful kingdoms 
of Bijapur and Golkonda had to agree to a settlement with the 
Mughals in 1636. The ruler of Bijapur, Muhammad Adil Shah, 
also agreed to co-operate with the Mughals in suppressing the 
Maratha sard^r, Shahji Bhonsle. After the activities of 
Shahji were finally crushed and Murtaza Nizam Shah III, a 
minor declared as ruler by Shahji, was handed over to the 
Mughals, the Ahmadnagar Kingdom, at last, became totally 
extinct. The position of the Mughals in the Deccan subse-
quently became unchallengeable. THe Mughal Emperor's over-
lordship came to be formally accepted by Bijapur as well as 
Golkonda rulers. 
It was hoped that the conclusion of the "treaties" 
could bring a prolonged period of peace and tranquility in 
the Deccan. The "treaties" had brought the military 
operations by the Mughals in the Deccan virtually to an end. 
Labori, commenting on this situation, remarks: "the struggle 
for the wiiayat of the Deccan, which had been going an since 
the time of Akbar, and which could not be terminated till 
then was brought to a successful close and shed lustre on the 
glorious Kingdom". 
l.See Lahori's Gads/ia/jnama, vol. I. pt.ii, p-Sl. English 
translation cited from Satish Chandra, "Deccan Policy of the 
Mughals', op.cit,, pp-232-33. Satish Chandra referring to 
this passage says that, "the treaties served to stabilize the 
position in the Deccan and held out hopes of a stable peace 
between the Deccan states and the Mughals, and of limiting 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
177 
The settlement between the Mughals and Bijapur could 
become possible only after 1635, when Murari Pandit and his 
patron, Khawas Khan, the peshhiB^ who were heading an anti-
Mughai faction at the Adil Shahi court, were murdered. 
After their murder, the new pes/iwa, Mustafa Khan, adopting a 
pro-Mughal policy readily accepted the terms offered by the 
Mughal Emperor. As stated in the preceding chapter, a fa.rmari 
of Shah Jahan demanding acknowledgement of overiordship, 
payment of twenty lakh rupees as peshkash and to restrain 
from helping Shahji Bhonsle, was received at Adil Shahi court 
in January, 1636. In return Muhammad Adil Shah was offered 
southern parts of the Ahamadnagar territory. He was also 
threatened that if he did not accept these proposals then his 
p 
Kingdom would be invaded by the Mughal forces. 
In January, 1636, Shah Jahan had also sent a similar 
farm^T} to Abdullah Cutb Shah. Apart from the usual demands 
of acknowledgement of overlordship and payment of peshk^sh , 
the Golkonda ruler was severely reprimanded for allowing, in 
his Kingdom, the cursing of first three Caliphs. He was 
asked to immediately stop this practice and also desist from 
...Continued... 
further Mughal advance in the Deccan". See Ibid, 
a.See Lahori's BadshBhri^mA, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-l£5-26. For 
the copy of Shah Jahan's farman sent through Mukarramat Khan, 
see Ibidf pp-lE6-30. Far the proposal and threats to Adil 
Shah, see also Qazvini's Sadshahnama, ff-3S0b-Sla. 
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reciting the name of the Safavid ruler (Uali-i Iran) in the 
khatba.'^ In case of non-compliance, he was threatened with 
an invasion of his Kingdom by the Mughal forces. 
While the military operations against the Nizam Shahi 
nobles were still on, the ruler of Bijapur showed his 
inclination to accept the demands made by the Mughal Emperor. 
Thereupon Shah Jahan sent him another farman in May, 1636. 
It was carried to Bijapur by Saiyid Abul Hasan and Qazi Abu 
Saeed. This farmari termed by Lahori as '" ahdriama (deed of 
agreement) contained, more or less, the same demands as were 
contained in the previous communication. The additional 
demand was that Muhammad Adil Shah should sign a statement 
conceding these demands. In this farman, the territories to 
be transferred to Bijapur out of the territory of the 
earstwhile Ahmadnagar Kingdom were specified. These 
included, Sholapur and the mahals attached to it, F'arenda and 
the adjoining mahals in the south, and the parganas of Bhalki 
and Chitguppa in the east. In the west, the entire territory 
of Konkan including the parganas of Poona and Chakan were 
transferred to Bijapur. On the other hand, the forts and 
territories, which were in Shahji's possession, and the forts 
3.For Shah Jahan's farman to Abdullah Qutb Shah sent through 
Abdul Latif Gujarati, See Lahori's Badshahnama^ vol. I pt.ii, 
pp-130-33. For summarised translation of the farman, see 
Riasul Islam's Calendar of Documents , op.cit^ vol. II, p-l*^?. 
4.See Lahori's Badshahnama, vol. I, pt. ii, pp-167-74. 
5.1 bid. See the appended Map-C. 
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of Ausa and Udgir, still then held by some of the Nizam Shahi 
nobles were to be surrendered to the Mughals. 
As stated earlier, the peshios, Mustafa Khan, the 
leading Bijapuri noble known for his pro-Mughal attitude, 
promptly responded to Shah Jahan's above ft^rmsn. He had Bn 
3irzd3sht despatched to Shah Jahan, acknowledging Muhammad 
7 
Adil Shah's receiving the royal farman. This srzdasht was 
couched in a very submissive language; Adil Shah comparing 
himself to a particle, said, he felt proud to receive the 
royal farman. He gratefully accepted the proposals put 
p 
forward by Shah Jahan. 
As is evident from Shah Jahan's farmari , termed as 
"ahdriavta (deed of agreement), it was in the form of a 
document addressed by a superior ruler to his understudy, who 
is addressed merely as Adil Khan, not as Adil Shah.' The 
settlement of 1636, between the Mughals and Bijapur, tnus, 
can not be regarded as a "treaty" isalh) as such between two 
sovereigns. In this settlement harsh terms were imposea on 
the ruler of Bijapur requiring him to sign the ' ahdrtama, 
without objecting to the language or the contents of the 
6.Ibid. 
7.Ibidf pp-174-75. 
3.1 bid . 
9.See Ibid, pp-167-74. See also sauad ^ahdnama, loid 
pp-203-0^. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
180 
document. There was no question of his proposing terms 
suiting his own interests. 
Similarly, the farmari addressed to Abdullah Qutb Shah, 
termed as inqiuyBdnama (deed of submission) was also 
conceived as a document addressed by a superior ruler to an 
understudy. The ruler of Golkonda was required to sign it 
10 
without protesting over the terms imposed upon him '' As 
stated above, besides other demands which were same as those 
made on Muhammad Adil Shah, many religious restrictions were 
also imposed on Abdullah Qutb Shah. He was reminded of "the 
contradiction" in his position of recognising the sovereignty 
of the Mughal Emperor and reciting khutba. in the name of the 
Safawid ruler, and was asked to immediately stop this 
practice, instead, he was asked to include the name of Shah 
Jahan in the khutba. 
The terms imposed on Golkonda were harsner in 
comparison to those dictated to Bijapur. The ruler of 
Golkonda was required to pay an annual peshkash of two lakh 
10. H.K. Sherwani, in this content, says that, "it was not a 
treaty between two independent sovereigns at all. Far one of 
the parties was 7T)tirid-i maarasi or hereditary disciple, 
Abdullah Qutb-ul Mulk, and the other was "the precep-or", 
the Emperor. cf. History of the Qutb Shahi Dynasty , New 
Delhi, 197-^, p-436. Jadu Nath sarkar also expresses si.nilar 
opinion. He observes: "the Qutb Shahi ruler agreed to become 
a vassal of the Mughal Empire". cf. History of Aurar>gzeb, 
New Delhi, (reprint), 1973, vol. I, p-19. 
11. For the copy of the farman to Abdullah Qutb Shah, See 
Lahori's Badshahnama, vol. I, pt. ii, p-130-33. 
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haris. No annual peshkash was demanded from Bijapur. 
Moreover, the Shia religious practices were restricted in 
Golkonda and the name of Safawid ruler was replaced in the 
khutba by that of Shah Jahan. The name of the Safawid ruler 
was recited in the khutba in Bijapur as well. But in the 
case of Bijapur no restriction on this count was imposed. 
The reason behind this different treatment could be that the 
ruler' of Golkonda was militarily weak and not in a position 
to resist the Mughal advance, if made. The ruler of Bolkonda 
promptly accepted the demands of Shah Jahan. He indicated 
his readiness to abide by these demands by signing the 
IP iTiqiYa.dTia.ma. (deed of submission). In case of his 
"disloyalty", Abdullah Qutb Shah was warned, his Kingdom 
would be annexed to the Mughal Empire. The Mughals in return 
took the responsibility of protecting Golkonda from its 
neighbours particularly Marathas and Bijapur. The Mughals 
also promised to compensate Golkonda for the losses it might 
suffer owing to the Bijapur's and Marathas' aggression 
against it.^^ 
In treating the Adil Shahi ruler less harshly than Qutb 
Shah, Shah Jahan was, perhaps, motivated by the 
consideration of not to offend the most powerful of the 
IS- For the copy of the iriqiyadnama ^ see Ibid ^ pp-178-80. 
13. Regarding the terms and conditions imposed on Golkonda, 
R.P. Tripathi says that the whole arrangement was a sort of 
"subsidiary system". cf. Rise and Fall of the Mughal Empire, 
p~452. 
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remaining rulers of the Deccan so as not getting involved in 
another prolonged war in the region which he wanted to avoid. 
Shah Jahan appears to have calculated that the Mughal 
interests in the Deccan would be better served if, after the 
settlement of 1636, the remaining two Deccan kingdoms, 
particularly Bijapur, the more powerful of the two, were kept 
busy in a conflict with their southern neighbours, the Hindu 
chieftains controlling Mysore and the Karnataka region in 
general. In the years, subsequent to the settlement of 1636, 
Shah Jahan, by and large, not only maintained a benevolent 
neutrality between the Adil Shahi and the Qutb Shahi ruiera, 
but also encouraged them diplomatically to e;;pand their 
dominions southwards. 
One of the changes, brought about by the settlement of 
1636 in Golkonda, was that the gold and silver coins came to 
be minted in the name of Shah Jahan which was one of the 
conditions put forward in the farmar; . As pointed by w.H. 
Moreland, J.F. Richards and some other modern scholars, prior 
to this settlement the Golkonda Kingdom did not issue any 
distinctive coins. The coin in circulation in Golkonda till 
1636 were the south India pagodi^ or han, stamped with the 
image of Vishnu. In Bijapur, on the other hand, the Adil 
14. W.H. Moreland (ed.), Relations of Golkonda in the Early 
Seyenteenth Century, London, 1931, p-91. Also, J.F. Richards 
says that, "The standard coin (in Golkonda) was that used by 
the indigenous pre-Muslim kingdoms: the p^dod^ or rtun stamped 
with the image of Vishnu", See Mugh^al Admin x strati an in 
Golkonda, Oxford, 1975, p-135. See also Om Prakash's article 
~Foreign Merchants and Indian Mints in the Seventeenth and 
Early Eighteenth Century', in J.F. Richards <ed.). The 
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Shahi rulers had a coinage system of their own but, there as 
well, the pre-Muslim south Indian pagoda, or huns were also in 
vogue. Shah Jahan in his farman to Muhammad Adi1 Shah had 
not specified the issuance of coins in his name. 
The prolonged peace that followed the settlement of 
.1636 in the Deccan seems to have favoured the rise of Maratha 
sardars to power. The involvement of the Mughals with the 
affairs of the North-West frontier during 1638-53, provided 
an opportunity to the Maratha sardars to widen their area of 
influence. After 1636, Shahji Bhonsle had joined the 
service of the Adil Shahi ruler. He was assigned jagirs at 
•I tr < J 
the pargariss of Poona and Supa and certain tracts in the 
western part of the Konkan region by Muhammad Adil Shah. 
Since there was no molestation by the Mughals after 1636, 
Shahji's clansmen and later his son, Shivaji, succeedea in 
establishing a strong base in that region. In the subsequent 
years, Marathas under Shivaji gradually augmented tneir 
power and territories, so much so that, by the time of 
Aurangzeb's accession (165S) it had became difficult for the 
Mughals to suppress the unrestrained activities of Shivaji. 
...Continued... 
Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India, Delhi, 1987, pp-
171-92. See also H.K. sherwani. History of the Qutb Shahi 
Dynasty, Delhi, 197A., p-179. 
15. Poona (IS^N, 73*>E) was a very large pargana in the Sar/kar 
Jannar. See An Atlas of the Mughal Empire, sheet, 14-A. 
16. Supa (la^N, 7'+**E), was a pargana in the sarkar Jannar, 
see Ibid. 
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It was this process, which ultimately resulted in Shivaji's 
establishing an independent Maratha Kingdom in 1674. 
After the settlement of 1636, Aurangzeb was appointed 
subedBr of the Deccan. This was the time when Shah Jahan 
began to concentrate his energies on the North-West frontier 
in so far he was engrossed in the Qandahar problem down to 
1653. In the Deccan, thus, the state of peace between the 
Mughals and the Deccan states resulting from the settlement 
of 1636 continued for about twenty years. This respite was 
used by the rulers of Bijapur and Golkonda to strengthen 
their positions i.'.z s-a-v-i s the local chiefs in the south and 
east. Being free from the fear of Mughal intervention these 
two states used their armies to conquer territories in the 
south and east. These were the territories of numerous small 
principalities that were constantly fignting among 
themselves. The Adil Shahi army began its operations in 
1636-37, in southern India, under sipBhsal^r RandaLla Khan, 
who succeeded in capturing Bednur, Mysore, eastern Karnataka 
17. The Persian commander, Ali Mardan Khan, had surrendered 
Qandahar to the Mughals in 1638. Subsequently, to ensure the 
safety of his frontier from a possible attacK of the 
Safawids, Shah Jahan concentrated his forces m tne North-
west, himself visiting Kabul in 1639-40. For detailed 
military operations of the Mughals in the North-West, see 
Lahori's ZSadsAjartnama, vol. II, pt. ii, pp-24-54. For the 
surrender of Qandahar by Ali Mardan Khan in 1638, See Ibid, 
p-35. 
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18 
upto Vellare, Jinji and Tanjore. A Qutb Shahi army 
commanded by Saeed Muhammad, entitled Mir Jumla, also seized 
southern and south-eastern principalities beyond the river 
19 Krishna. In this manner, the Bijapur and Gclkonda armies 
annexed the vast, rich and prosperous tracts across the 
Krishna and Tungabhadra rivers within a short time. 
Following these campaigns the rulers of Bijapur and Golkonda 
exacted heavy tributes from the subdued chieftains which 
compensated them for payment of large amounts as peshkaslt to 
the Mughal Emperor. 
In so far as the Mughals were concerned, no substantial 
improvement l^ (as registered in their position in the Deccan 
after 1636. No attempt was made by the Mughals to reform the 
administration for making it effective throughout Aurangzeb's 
first term as the sabedair of Deccan. It was the period when 
bulk of the Mughal armies were deployed on the North-West 
PC) 
frontier. Hence no forcetul military demonstrations were 
held on the Mughal frontier in the Deccan during 1636-56. 
The Mughal authorities were, thus, not able to counter the 
territorial expansion of Bijapur and Golkonda towards the 
IS. 3asatin~ij.s Salstin, pp-316-£0, For details, see Jacu 
Nath sarkar, House of Shii-sji , Calcutta, 1943, pp-M-T-'^ -S; 53-
59; 69-7"^. Also Jadu Nath Sarkar, History of Aur^y:gzeo , 
op.cit, vol. I, pp-118-119. 
19. For details of Mir Jumla's campaigns in tne south and 
Karnataka, see Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, The Life of Mir Jumla, 
New Delhi, End edn., 1979, pp-e7-58. 
20. For Mughal military operations in the North-West, see 
Lahori's Badshahnsma, vol. II, pp-S^-S^. 
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south. H.K. Sherwani, however, argues that the Mughals were 
not able to make any further military move for checking the 
southward expansion of Bijapur and Golkonda as there were 
frequent changes of "viceroys", particularly after 16A^4. As 
many as five "viceroys" were successively appointed between 
164A- and 1652. According to him, owing to administrative 
uncertainty caused by the frequent transfers of the 
"viceroys" the Mughals were not able to effectively intervene 
in the affairs of South India. He further suggests that 
the rapid changes of the "viceroys" also worsened the 
economy of the Deccan provinces. It was only after i65E, 
when Aurangseb was appointed "viceroy" of the Deccan for the 
second time, that steps were taken to improve the Mughal 
position in the Deccan. 
In any case, it is apparent, particularly after 164S, 
that inspite of the settlements of 1636, the relations of the 
Mughals with Bijapur and Golkonda were not always cordial. 
Form both sides there were constant complaints and counter-
complaints over one issue or the other. Although Shah Jahan 
did not take any steps to counter the expansion of the 
Bijapur and Golkonda kingdoms towards the South during 1636-
48, but he appeared to be quite impatient over this 
development. It were only his pre-occupations in the North-
Si. cf. H.K. Sherwani, History of the Qatt Sh^hi Dynasty, 
op.citf p-439. 
22. Ibid . 
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West, which deterred him from taking any action against 
these states. Otherwise he was, all the time, contemplating 
intervention in the Deccan to stop Bijapur and Goikonda from 
becoming too powerful. In this light one may suggest that the 
settlements of 1636 were not contemplated by the Mughals as a 
long term arrangement. These were only meant to allow a 
breathing space to them so bhat they could deploy their 
armies on the North-West frontier. As soon as the North-
western frontier was secured, Shah Jahan is reported to have 
directed Aurangzeb, in 1656, to intervene in Bijapur and 
23 — 
Goikonda. In this context the perceptive remark of batish 
Chandra is worth quoting: "Mughal decision to intervene in 
Goikonda and Bijapur in 1656-57 was not a sudden one; events 
in the preceding decade had gradually prepared the ground for 
it". Indeed, the basic instinct of the Mughals with regard 
to the Deccan states in the post - 1636 period was always 
that of intervention as and when the situation permitted such 
an attitude. It was this interventionist instinct, which 
after 1656-57, gradually developed into a drive aimed at 
extinguishing the two kingdoms and annexing their territories 
to the Mughal Empire in 16S6-S7. 
S3. For details. See Jadu Nath Sarkar, History of Aurangzeb, 
op.cit, vol. I, pp-127, 129, 131, 147, 148, 155. 
24. cf. Satish Chandra, 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals - A 
Reappraisal', op.cit, p-334. 
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During the sixteenth century a precarious balance of 
forces seems to have existed between the three Asian Empires, 
namely, the Safawids, the Uzbegs and the Mughals, which had 
common frontiers and overlapping territorial claims and 
ambitions in the region represented by modern Afghanistan. 
In the three cornered tussle that was going on among these 
powers, the Safawids and the Mughals were comparatively 
closer to each other politically as well as culturally, the 
rivalry betv-jeen them over Qandahar not withstanding. This 
state of Mughal-Safawids relations continued, by and large, 
into the first half of the 17th century down to Ife-H-S, when 
Qandahar was finally taken by the Safawids. Throughout this 
time, the two powers were each other's rivals over Qandahar. 
But, on the whole, this rivalry was not allowed by both of 
them to take the form of a general military conflict ar of a 
tussle arising from religious differences. As pointed out by 
Abdur Rahim, even at the time Shah Jahan was planning to 
regain Qandahar after Shah Abbas I's death in January, l6E9, 
though he appeared to be inclined "to form an anti-Persian 
league of Sunni powers", in reality he was not averse to 
making a deal with the Safawids behind the back of the Sunni 
powers, the Uzbegs and the Ottomans. 
In view of the above nature of the Mughal-Safawids 
relations, a suggestion by some modern scholars that there 
1. Abdur Rahim, 'Mughal Relations with Persia', Islamic 
Culture^ vol. IX, 1935, pp-U3-30. 
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was an "intrigue" between the 
Shi'ite Deccan states and the Safawids to thwart the Mughal 
aidvAnce towards the Dsccan is difficult to accept. It is 
sometimes assumed by these scholars that this "intrigue" was 
basically rooted in the Deccan rulers' Shi'ite leanings. For 
them (i.e. the Deccan rulers), according to this view, the 
Safawids were their "natural allies". They purportedly 
looked upon the Safawids as their preceptors and overlords 
and wanted the Safawid rulers to protect them from Mughal 
aggression. The Safawids, according to this vievj, were not 
averse to playing this role to the extent it was within their 
power to do so. 
In this chapter an attempt is made to e;<amine the 
validity of this view regarding the role of the Safawid 
Empire as the "natural ally" and "protector" of the Deccan 
states against "Mughal aggression". This is going to be 
tested with particular reference to the evidence that has 
survived on this theme in the form of diplomatic 
correspondence of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A 
similar re-e;;aminat ion was attempted earlier by 3.M. Raza 
Naqvi in the limited contaict of the question of the Safawid 
occupation of Qandahar in 16£a. The question sought to be 
2.See Abdur Rahim, op.cit.. Also S.H. Askari, 'Indo-Persian 
Relations V'Jith special Refejrence to the Deccan', Studies in 
Asi^D Hi story J New Delhi, 1961. 
3. S.M. Rasa Naqvi, "Shah Abbas and the Conflict between 
Jahangir and the Deccan States', Mediei'-sl India - A 
Miscellany, vol. I, Aligarh, 1969, pp-27S-79. 
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answered by him was as to what extent Safawid occupation of 
Qandahar in 16ES was aimed at helping the Deccan states. At 
the time S.M. Raza Naqvi wrote his above paper in 1969, a 
number of documents published since then were not before him. 
In the present study, which attempts a general reappraisal of 
the Safawids' attitude towards the Decern states, these 
lately published documents a.re used extensively to answer the 
general question as to what extent the Safawidn were inclined 
to help the Deccan states against the Mugnals and also 
whether the Safawids sympathy for the DeccA)! states stemmed, 
as suggested by 3.H. Askari and Abdur Rahim, from then-
anxiety to protect these rulers who claimed tc be staunch 
Shi•ites. 
Diplomatic contacts between the Deccan states and the 
Safav-aids dated back to the early years of the -eign of Shah 
Ismail Safawi, i.e much before the estab 1 i sr.ment of the 
Mughal Empire in Hindustan. It is worth noting that even in 
their letters of this early period, the Deccani rulers were 
proclaiming their adherence to asr/a-i ashr: faith (i.e. 
Shi'ism) and their having the khutba read in tre name of the 
Shah. The earliest such contact was establisned iri 130S, 
when Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur sent a letter to Shah Ismail 
Safawi through Saiyid Ahmad Harvi. The court historian of 
Shah Abbas I, Iskandar Beg Munshi, referring to those early 
^.Tarikh-i Feri shts, vol. II, p-12. 
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contacts, says that the Deccani rulers, including Nizam Shah, 
and Adil Shah as well as Qutb Shah, were always sending 
embassies to the Safawid court asserting that they professed 
Shi'ite faith and were having the khutba recited within then-
dominions in the Shah's name."* 
A closer examination of the political developments in 
the contemporary Deccan, however, goes to reveal that during 
the first decade of the sixteenth century a sharp rivalry 
existed among the states of Bijapur, Golkonda, Ahmadnagar, 
Berar and Bidar which had only recently emerged as 
independent kingdoms after the disintegration of the Bahmani 
Kingdom. In this situation some of the Deccan rulers, having 
Shi'ite leanings, were prone to seek Safawid moral support in 
their struggle against the rest of them. Yusuf Adil Shah's 
despatch of the above embassy to Shah Ismail in 1503 is one 
such case. It is noteworthy that Yusuf Adil Shah's 
conversion to Shi'ism and his decision to seek Shah Ismail's 
moral support coincides ^^ iith the beginning of his quarrel 
with Qasim Bar id, FatehuHah Imad Shah and Ahmad Nizam Shah. 
In making these moves he was, apparently, trying to 
S.Iskandar Beg Munshi, Tarikh-i Alam Ara~z Abbasi, Tenran, 
A.H. 1350 (AD. 1938), vol. I, p-116. 
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strengthen his position k-is-a-i/is his local rival. This 
goes to show that his decision to establish close contacts 
with the Safawid court was taken not so much out of a desire 
to make a common cause with a superior Shi'ite ruler but, 
apparently, it was prompted by the more mundane design of 
strengthening his position against his rivals in the Deccan 
by coming close to a newly risen powerful ruler in the 
Islamic world. The attitude of Saltan Quli Qutb Shah during 
this time goes to strengthen this inference. Although the 
Golkonda ruler of this period, Quli Qutb Shah had Shi'ite 
leanings (he was eventually converted to Shi'ism in 1509-10), 
there is no specific reference to any one of his emoassies to 
Shah Ismail's court making the same kind of professions as 
were made on behalf of Yusuf Adi1 Shah. The apparent 
explanation for his not sending an embassy to Shah Ismail 
seems to be that Quli Qutb Shah, during this time, unlike 
Yusuf Adi1 Shah, was not having any ongoing dispute with his 
6.Qa5im Bar id, the uazir of Bahmani Kingdom did not like the 
independent authority exercised by Yusuf Adi1 Shah of 
Bijapur. He made a coalition with Fatenullah Imad Shah and 
Ahmad Nizam Shah against him. Ahamd Nizam Shah of Anmadnagar 
had demanded the territory of Naldurg from Bijapur. On Vusuf 
Adi 1 Shah's refusal to surrender that territory, he joined 
the alliance of Barid Shah and Imad Shah. The joint forces 
of these allies marched against Bijapur in 150H—05. Far 
details see Tarikh-i Ferishta, vol. II, p-5. M.A. Naycem has 
given detailed description of this invasion see. External 
Relations of Bijapur Kingdom (14S9-i6S6 j^ Hyderaoad, 1974, 
p-20. 
7.The author of Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Aboasi , writing in 1616-
17, does mention the arrival of embassies at Shah Ismail 
Safawi's court from Ad i 1 Shah, Nizam Shah as well as Qutb 
Shah but, in the case of last two he does not mentions the 
recitation of khutba in Shah Ismail's name. See vol. I, p-
116. 
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neighbours and hence he was, apparently, not particularly 
keen to ingratiate with Shah Ismail or seek his moral 
support. There is, in any case, no evidence to suggest Shah 
Ismail's responding to Yusuf Adil Shah's above embassy by 
extending any help or even moral support to him against his 
rivals in the Deccan. 
The Ahmadnagar Kingdom's close contacts with the 
Safawid court seem to have began only after Burhan Nizam Shah 
I converted to Shi'ism under the influence of Shah Tahir in 
1537-38. Although Burhan Nisam Shah I was involved in a 
territorial dispute with the rulers of Bijapur and Berar 
since 1504-05, on no occasion before 1544-45, he is reported 
to have established direct contact with the Safawids for 
winning their favour and support. It was only after Shah 
Tahir became his political and religious guide that he was 
persuaded to use the influence of this Shi'ite divine for 
gaining favour with the Safawid ruler. Shah Tahir's letter 
written sometime during 1535-'4-0, reproduced m Nuskh^-i 
JaOTi'-ai Murasil^tf goes to show that he was trying to 
impress the Safawid ruler with the spread of Shi'its faith in 
the Ahmadnagar kin It seems that he became instrumental in 
8.F"or Burhan Nizam Shah's conversion to Shi'ism under the 
influence of Shah Tahir, see Burhan-i Maasir, p-251; See 
also Tarikh-i Feri shta, vol. II, p-104. 
9.See Abul Qasim Haider Aiwaghuli, Naskha-i Jami-al 
Murasilatf British Museum MS, Add. 768S, fol. aE4a-b. Cited 
from Riazul Islam's Calendar of Documents, op.cit., vol. II, 
p-122. 
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bringing Burhan Nizam Shah I and Shah Tahmasp closer after 
the former was converted to Shi'ism. This is borne by Shah 
Tahmasp's letter to Burhan Nizam Shah I of the year 1545-^6, 
where the Shah, while referring to Shah Tahir's (Shah Tahir 
had already died by this time) services as a religious divine 
and to the personal qualities and wide learning of his son, 
urges Burhan Nizam Shah I to maintain regular friendly 
contacts with the Safawid court and also invites him to 
convey his "desires" (mad'a.) without any hesitation. As i t 
is well known, around this time, Burhan Nizam Shah I was 
having a dispute with Ibrahim Adil Shah I (who also claimed 
to be a Shi'ite and close adherent of the Safawid ruler) over 
the territories of Sholapur and Naldurg. The above cryptic 
message of Shah Tahmasp to Burhan Nizam, in this light, could 
only be interpreted as a signal to the effect that he was not 
entirely on Adil Shah's side and was prepared to consider 
Burhan Nizam Shah I's claims or viewpoints on the current 
dispute between them. 
After the Mughal Empire was firmly established in North 
India, it began a drive of territorial expansion tov-^ ards the 
Deccan, which became particularly pronounced in the later 
years of Akbar's reign (siege of Ahmadnagar in 1595). This 
10. For Shah Tahmasp's letter to Burhan Nizam Shah I, See 
Khwar Shah bin Qubad-ul Husaini, T^rikh-i Qutti , ed. by Syed 
M.H. Zaidi, New Delhi, 1960, pp-95~96. The British Museum 
manuscript of this book is entitled as T^rikh-i EIchi~i Nizam 
Shah, British Museum MS, S3513. 
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growing involvement of the Mughals made the Deccani rulers, 
including Ibrahim Adil Shah II and Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, 
panicky. They started seeking Safawids' help against the 
Mughal expansionism. While doing so they were often induced 
to emphasise their adherence to Shi'ism and their special 
ties of allegiance to the Shah. They tended to give an 
impression that they were being harassed by the Sunni (ahl~i 
khiIsfat) Chaghtais on account of their being close to the 
Safawids. They even went to the extent of attributing 
religious motives to the Mughals for their aggressive policy 
in the Deccan. In their letters to the Shah, written during 
the first quarter of the seventeenth century, they appear 
particularly keen at inciting his religious feelings. The 
contents of some of these letters which have became knoi-^ n 
during the last twenty years are examined in the following 
pages. 
In a collection of letters, entitled Mi^ki^ti b-i Zamana-i 
Salat2rt-i Saf ahJi ya, Nasir Ahamd has identified a number of 
letters of the rulers of Bijapur, Golkonda and Ahmadnagar 
addressed to the Safawid ruler Shah Abbas I. These letters 
were written between 1609-10 to 1626-S7. Each one of these 
letters is bitterly denunciatory of the Mughals who sometimes 
3ire also refsrred as ahl~i khi lafat, diO obviously discreet 
11. i1akatit~i Zamana-i Salatin-i SafatAiiya, Asafiya Library, 
Hyderabad, MS, No. ISlq^, fol . ^ 0 ^ . Nazir Ahmad has published 
six letters in Medie^'al India-A Mi scel IaT}y ^ Aligarh, 1969, 
vol. I, pp-2aO-300. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
196 
allusion to their being Sunni "heretics". 
The earliest letter of this collection is the one sent 
by Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur through Mir Khali 1 
t P Khashnswis in 1609-10. In this letter Ibrahim Adil Shah II 
proceeds to assure Shah Abbas I that " The 
Deccan territories form as much a part of the Safawid Empire 
as the provinces of Iraq, Faras, Khurasan and Azerbaijan". 
He further assures him that " the names of the Safawid 
monarchs have been recited in the khutba. and will continue to 
be recited in future", and describes his own position as an 
old servant of the Shah who is administering and protecting 
the region under his control as a Safawid governor. Further, 
he tries to instigate the Shah to come to his rescue by 
invading the Mughal Empire from the North-West in the 
following words: "Although we, on our part, are fully 
determined to defend our countries and would not allow the 
Mughal ruler to occupy an inch of them, it is necessary that 
His Majesty should unhesitatingly come forward to help us in 
this vital matter. Further, as the inhabitants of these 
region (i.e. the Deccan) had peaceful life under the 
protection of His Majesty's ancestors, our request is that 
His Majesty should not leave us undefended. It becomes even 
more pertinent in the light of treatment meted out to His 
Majesty's (Safawid) envoy at the Mughal court. The Mughal 
12. Iskandar Beg Munshi gives the date of Mir Khalil's 
arrival at the Safawid court around 1613-13, vide Tarikh-i 
Alam Ara-i Abbasi^ vol. II, p-866. 
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ruler sat on the jharokha called him to wait on him but 
dismissed him without taking the trouble of reading the 
letter brought by him, where as an insignificant envoy from 
Rum (Constantinople) received reception and honour more than 
was due to him. This is quite an opportune moment. A 
well-equipped army from the side of Qandahar be sent and it 
is most probable that two to three lakh Afghan warriors, who 
had intercepted the Mughal ruler on his way to Kabul in his 
recent visit, would join the victorious army. Thus, it 
would be fully capable of taking possession of the 
invaluable Mughal treasures fit to be kept in His Majesty's 
coffers. So far as we are concerned, I myself alongwith 
other brothers (reference to the rulers of Golkonda and 
Ahmadnagar) 3irs ready to join the victorious ariTsy and it 
would not be too much to desire the occupation of the whole 
of India in no time. I refrain from adding some other points 
lest they should be source of inconvenience to His Majesty. 
These would be explained to Your Majesty at the prcper iTiament 
by my trusted envoy, Shah Khalilullah, who had sometime been 
in His Majesty's service. We hope to receive favourable reply-
soon".^^ 
13. The reference of Jahangir's treatment of the Safawid 
envoy and the undue welcome accorded to the ambassador of 
Rum is nowhere mentioned in the Mughal sources )'^or in 
T^rikh-i Al^m-i Ara-i Abb^si. 
1^. Makatib-i Zamana-i Salatm-i Safauiiya^ f-40^. For text of 
the letter, see Mediei-al l7>dia-A Miscel lany, vol.1, pp-280-
85. For translation of the letter, see M.A. Nayeem, External 
Relations of Bijapar Kingdom^ Appendix-I, pp-S75-76. Also 
Riasul Islam, Caler^dar of Documents ^ vol.11, pp-131-33. 
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In another letter sent after sometime through the same 
envoy, Ibrahim Adil Shah II describes himself as a governor 
of the Safawid Empire (in sabedar) and asks the Shah to send 
his victory letters ifstehTismas ) to him in the same manner as 
were sent to the other provincial governors. "* 
The contents of the above two letters Are to be seen in 
the context of Ibrahim Adil Shah II's alliance with Malik 
Ambar. This made him a party to Malik Ambar's struggle 
against the Mughals. As, around this time, the Mughal 
pressure on Malik Ambar and his Bijapuri allies was 
increasing, the latter appeared eager to persuade Shah Abbas 
I to create a diversion for the Mughals in the North-West. 
Thus, we find Ibrahim Adil Shah II instigating Shah Abbas I 
against Jahangir by referring to the alleged discourtesy-
shown to his envoy by the Mughal Emperor. Although Shah 
Abbas I did reciprocate the embassy of Shah Khalilullah by 
sending his envoy Talib Beg in 1619-20, there is no 
evidence to suggest that he had paid serious attention to 
Adil Shah's urgings to invade the Mughal territories. ^^ lhlle 
reporting this embassy, Iskandar Beg Munshi does not make any 
reference to the Shah's planning to move against Qandahar 
around this time. As is known, Shah Abbas I . eventually 
15. Mediev'Bl India-A Hiscel larty , vol.1, pp-SS5-87. For 
translation, see Calendar of Documents, vol.11, p-136. 
16. Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Atbasi ^ vol. Ill, p-95I. 
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17 
attacked Quandahar two years later i.e. in 16SE. It would, 
therefore, be not very correct to imagine that the above 
letters of Ibrahim Adil Shah II were aimed at co-ordinating 
the moves of the Deccan states with Shah Abbas I's plan to 
attack Qandahar. However, it is interesting to note that, 
side by side, with writing letters to Shah Abbas I full of 
such malice and ill will for the Mughals, Ibrahim Adii Shah 
II was also addressing petitions to Jahangir pledging his 
18 loyalty to the Mughal Emperor. This goes to show that, at 
this time, Ibrahim Adil Shah II's real concern was to 
dissuade the Mughals from making further annexations in the 
Deccan. Thus, side by side, with inciting the Safawids to 
invade the Mughal Empire, he was, apparently, also not averse 
to trying to achieve the same goal by placating the Mughals. 
Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, the ruler of Solkcnda, also 
sent a letter to Shah Abbas I, through an envoy Qazi Mustafa 
in 1609-10. In this letter he emphasised his religious and 
political ties with the Safawid dynasty and sought the 3hah s 
protection against Mughal aggression. He writes: ''The 
Kingdom has been incessantly harassed and disturbed by the 
^hl-i fasad-o taghys-Ti (the men of villainy ana wicKedness?. 
The main reason for this harassment are the religious ana 
political ties (nisba.t-i diniy^ was dunnyawiyya) wnich this 
17. Tuzak~i J^hsingi ri , pp-34<+-45. Also Tarikn-i Alaw Ara-i 
Abbasif vol. Ill, p-970. 
18. Tazuk-i Jshartgi ri , p-142. 
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dominion has maintained with that dynasty, (i.e. the 
Safawids)". Quli Qutb Shah requests the Safawid protection 
an the plea of his firmly believing in their "ui lB/a.t and 
19 im^mat" . 
There is no indication that, at that occasion, Shah 
Abbas I made any move or sent any assurance in response to 
this letter. But it seems that his usual response to such 
letters, written by the Deccan rulers, would be to use his 
friendly contacts with the Mughal court for persuading 
Jahangir not to be very harsh with them. A letter that he 
sent to Jahangir in 1613, asking him to forgive the Deccan 
rulers, particularly Saltan Muhammad Qutb Shah testify to 
this effect. A similar letter that the Shah wrote m 
1616-17, is of particular significance, because here he 
assures that if after Jahangir's condoning "the faults" of 
the Deccan rulers, " they do anything contrary" to the Mughal 
Emporar's wishes, then the Shah himself would take the 
pi 
responsibility of chastising them. 
19. Mediei'-al Iridia-A Miscel lany, vol. I, pp-291-^ it. f-or 
translation of the letter, see Calendar of Documents , vol. 
II, pp-146-47. 
20. Abdul Husain Nasiri al-Tusi, Munshaat-i Tusi Blochet, 
2338, ff~165 b-66 b. Cited from Calendar of Documents , vol. 
II, p-171. 
21. Muhammad Salih, Majmua-i Makatib~i Muktalzfa, Majlis 
Library, (Tehran), MS, 2247, (Catalogue X, 3349), fftp)33-34. 
Cited from Calender of Documents, vol. II, p-132. 
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It seems that Shah Abbas I's attitude in regard to the 
Deccan states continued on the above lines down to 1620, when 
he seems to have finally decided to use force against 
Qandahar. The last letter that the Shah wrote, recommending 
the case of a Deccan ruler to Jahangir in the same friendly 
language as in the above two letters, dated back to 16£0 
itself. This was a letter brought back, by Qasim Beg to 
Jahangir in which the Shah refers to the arrival of the 
Mughal envoy, Khan Alam, and requests Jahangir to allow Qasim 
Beg to proceed to the Deccan, so that he is able to deliver 
the message that the Shah had sent to the Deccan ruler 
without much delay. 
It is significant that in the same year (1620), perhaps 
sometime after sending Qasim Beg to the Mughal court, Shah 
Abbas I attacked Kej and Mukran (then ruled by chiefs who 
paid allegiance to the Mughal ruler) and occupied these ti-jo 
places. Annexation of these territories adjacent to 
Qandahar was obviously a part of Shah Abbas I's plan to wrest 
Qandahar from the Mughals by force. In one of his subsequent 
communications addressed to Muhammad Qutb Shah, Shah Abbas I 
not only reports his annexation of Kej and Mukran but goes on 
to say that this would eventually pave the way for easier 
22. Anonymous Jahangirn^ma^ MS, R.A.S. See also Nasrullan 
Falsafi, Zindsigari i - i Shah Abbas Auual ^ Tehran, 1955, vol. IV, 
PP-30S-03. For the translation of the letter, see Calendar 
of DocumentSf vol. I, p-19^. 
23. Tarikh-i Alam Ara-i Abbasi , vol. Ill, p-958. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
soe 
communication between Iran and the Deccan states. This 
appears to be turning point in the attitude of the Safawids 
towards the Mughals. Perhaps Shah Abbas I adopted this 
attitude because he thought that it was an opportune moment 
for snatching Qandahar from the Mughals. As we know from 
Abdur Rahim's study of the Mughal relations with Persia, till 
this time the Shah was pressing Jahangir to return Qandahar 
to the Safawids in a friendly manner. But it seems that, 
sometime in 1620, a final decision was taken to use force for 
achieving the same goal. From this time onwards Shah Abbas I 
started talking in a totally different language in his 
communications with the Deccan rulers. The tenor of his 
letter to Muhammad Qutb Shah illustrates this change. 
From a letter of Burhan Nizam Shah III to Shah Abbas I 
25 that he sent in 16EU-E1 through Habsh kihan, we come to 
know that prior to this date, Shah Abbas I had sent a 
communication to the Nizam Shah through Muhammadi Beg.'^ 
Although the contents of the communication are not known, we 
can assume that as, by this time, the Shah had already 
adopted a militant attitude towards the Mughals, the 
contents of this letter would have been similar to those af 
the Shah's above letter to Muhammad Qutb Shah. It is 
a^. See anonymous, Tsirik.h-i Qtitb Sh^hi , India Office, MS, 
179, Ethe, 456, i/176, ff-239 b-41 a. 
25. Mediei-^I Indis-A Miscellar,y ^ vol. I, pp-29'^-95. 
26. For Muhammadi Beg's embassy to Ahmadnagar, See Tarikh-i 
Al<3im Ara-i AbhBsi vol. Ill, p-951. 
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significant that the Nizam Shahi envoy, Habsh Khan, who 
carried the letters to the Safawid court in 1620, stayed on 
there. This is an indication of the fact that the two courts 
were maintaining close contacts with each other throughout 
1621 and early part of 16SE, when Qandahar was finally taken 
by the Safawids. It is noteworthy that Habsh Khan 
accompanied Shah Abbas I during the siege of Qandahar. Habsh 
Khan's presence with the Safawid army during their attack on 
Qandahar was surely symptomatic of the active collaboration 
between the Safawids and the Nizam Shahis against the tiughals 
on this occasion. 
We know from Abdur Rahim's study that after Qandahar 
was occupied by Shah Abbas I, he adopted a conciliatory 
attitude towards the liughals. Now he was no longer 
interested in giving an impression to the Deccan states, as 
he did since the time of his letters to the Qutb Shah and the 
Nizam Shah in 1620, that he was prepared to fight the Mughals 
and even extend military help to them. Subsequently, he was 
all the time trying to expalin to Jahangir his action on 
Qandahar, and to ensure that this episode should not rupture 
Safawid-Mughal relations and lead to a prolonged conflict ana 
tension between them. 
27. For Shah Abbas I's letter justifying the occupation of 
Qandahar and assuaging and requesting Jahangir to maintain 
cordial relations, see JBmi-al Insha fol. £72b-7i+a. For 
Jahangir's reply, see Ididf fol. 27^b-75a. Also Tazuk-i 
Jaih^ngi ri f pp-3^8, 350-52. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
EO-if 
From the above discussion based on the letters 
exchanged between the Deccan rulers and the Safawids, it is 
apparent that the rulers of the Deccan states did try to use 
the influence of the Shah for furthering their own interests. 
The assertion of Abdur Rahim and S.H. Askari, that there was 
an intrigue between the rulers of the Deccan states and the 
Safawids against their common adversary on the basis of 
religious affinity, however, does not seem tenable. On the 
other hand, the contention of S.M. Raza Naqvi that there was 
no such intrigue has been substantiated, to some extent, by 
the argument developed in the above narration. However, an 
understanding between the Deccan rulers and the Safawids on 
some particular occasions can not entirely be ruled out. It 
is obvious from the tenor of the letters despatched by the 
rulers of the Deccan states, that they (i.e. the Deccanis) 
tried to incite the religious feelings of the Safawids 
against the Mughals. But the Safawids themselves were 
engaged in a relationship with the Mughals which was ve^y 
delicate in nature. Notwithstanding their differences over 
faith, the only bone of contention oetween them was the 
possession of Qandahar. However, until 16'f8, when a sort of 
regular war between the Mughals and the Safawids did 
commence, none of them declared a full-fledged war for 
occupying Qandahar. On the other hand, the Safawid rulers 
were exchanging embassies with the Deccani rulers from a very 
early pericd, taut on their part, they never responded 
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rulers in their letters. Although Shah Abbas I did take over 
the territories of Kej and Mukran, previously under nominal 
allegiance to the Mughals, this was not done until he had 
finally decided to use force against Qandahar. Shah Abbas I 
certainly had no intention of creating diversion for the 
Mughals in Qandahar for the benefit of the Decc&n rulers, he 
only wanted to occupy it for himself. 
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The once powerful Bahmani Kingdom had began to 
disintegrate during the last decade of the fifteenth century. 
Perennial conflicts between the groups of self-seeking and 
ambitious nobles had resulted in the break-up of Bahamani 
Kingdom into five smaller independent kingdoms. Since there 
were no clearly defined boundaries of these newly established 
kingdoms, from the very beginning , their rulers were 
continuously involved in internecine wars over one or the 
other territorial disputes. These disputes were often 
complicated by factors like intervention by powers located 
outside Deccan, religious controversies or the support; of 
the local Maratha and other potentates to one or the other 
Kingdom at different points of time. In the course of this 
struggle each one of them, but more importantly, Ahmadnagar 
and Bijapur, appear to be struggling to emerge victorious 
and establish its supremacy over the whole of Deccan. 
In the initial years, Ahmadnagar's struggle of 
supremacy was mainly directed against Bijapur and to a Issser 
extent against the parent Bahmani Kingdom located in Bidar. 
The de f^cto ruler at Bidar, Qasim Barid, being averse to 
the idea of Ahmad Nizam Shah, the founder of the Ahmacnagar 
Kingdom, becoming too powerful, was keen, from the very-
beginning, to contain his rising power. On the other hand, 
as early as 1^93, Ahmad Nizam Shah developed a dispute with 
Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur over the territory of Sholapur and 
its dependencies. In the subsequent years, in the repeated 
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precipitated, on one pretext or the other, the disputed 
territory of Sholapur changed hands several times. But the 
dispute over Sholapur between them remained unresolved down 
to 1636 when it was finally transferred to Bijapur by the 
Mughals under the settlement of 1636. Similarly, with the 
Imad Shahi rulers of Berar, the Nizam Shahi dynasty was 
throughout having a love-hate relationship which appear to 
have been partly moulded by their conflicting claims over 
Pathri. This situation came to an end only in 157'+, with the 
annexation of Berar by Ahmadnagar. The Qutb Shahi rulers of 
Golkonda, on their part, generally tried to protect their 
interests by allying with whichever power, among Bijapur, 
Bidar and Ahmadnagar, seemed gaining an upper hand at a 
particular point of time. 
It was during first half of the sixteenth century, the 
period of growing mutual rivalry among the Deccan kingdoms, 
that the Portuguese extended their sway on the western coast 
by establishing their control over Chaul (1507), 3oa (1510), 
Diu (1535) and Daman (15^6). Thus, by the midale of the 
sixteenth century, the Portuguese had emerged in tne coastal 
region as the formidable rivals of the littoral states of 
DBCcai'ny namely Ahmadnagar and Bijapur. The two states were a 
party to an attempt by a joint naval force of the Saltanate 
of Gujarat and the Mamlaks of Egypt to dislodge the 
l.See F.C. Danvers, The Portuguese in Iridia^ London 
(reprint), 1966, vol. I, pp-126, 139, 210, if£0. 
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Portuguese, in 1507, from Chaul. 
Regarding the Nizam Shahi ruler it is noteworthy that, 
during the first half of the sixteenth century, they had to 
fight on a number of fronts for maintaining their strong 
presence in the Deccan. Apart from facing the intense 
rivalry of the other neighbouring post-Bahmani Deccan 
kingdoms, the Nizam Shahi rulers also growingly became 
involved in the affairs of Khandesh and Gujarat in the north. 
There Are indications that with the establishment of 
the Mughal Empire in North India, the political equations in 
the Deccan began to change. The despatch of congratulatory 
letters by the Deccan rulers to Babur on his triumph at 
Panipat (1526) was not, apparently, a formal e;;ercise. They, 
perhaps, feared the Mughal advance into Malwa and 3ujarat in 
a foreseeable future which should have placed the latter in 
a position to intervene directly in the affairs of Anmadnagar 
and Berar through the instrumentality of Khandesn. Such a 
scenario appear to have made all the Deccan kingdoms eager to 
enlist Babur's support in the ongoing mutual warfare among 
them. Ahmadnagar, which had a long standing rivalry with the 
Sulta.ri3,te of Gujarat, would in the short term perspective 
also have preferred to support any passible move by the 
Mughals directed towards weakening the position of the Saltan 
a.Ibid. 
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of Gujarat. It was, possibly, due to his preoccupation in 
consolidating his position in North India, that Babur did not 
pay much attention to the situation in the Deccan. He did 
not respond to above letters of the Deccan rulers. Babur"s 
not taking interests in the affairs of the Deccan and his not 
making any move towards Malwa and Gujarat must have been 
viewed at the Ahmadnagar court with mixed feelings. While 
the Ahmadnagar authorities must have felt relieved to see 
that an immediate advance into Malwa and Gujarat was not on 
Babur's agenda. At the same time they would have certainly 
been disappointed to know that Ahmadnagar's arch rival in the 
north, the SultiSn of Gujarat, was not going to come under the 
Mughal military pressure in the foreseeable further. 
Humayun, after his accession on 30th December 1530, 
however, adopted a different attitude towards the Deccan 
states, particularly Ahmadnagar. He was, apparently, for 
establishing lively diplomatic contacts with them which, till 
1535, appear to be aimed at preventing Ahmadnagar and 
Khandesh from aligning with Bahadur Shah in an alliance 
against the Mughals. Humayun was, perhaps, aware that 
Bahadur Shah had conferred the title of 'Shah' on Burhan 
Nizam after humbling him militarily in 1531 with an aim to 
secure Ahmadnagar Kingdom's support in the eventuality of a 
Mughal invasion of Gujarat. This should explain why, 
following his campaign in Gujarat, Humayun also demanded 
peshk^iSh from Burhan Nizam Shah. The ruthless invasion of 
Khandesh by him on the same occasion (i.e. 1535) was his \3t 
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another strategic move to deter the Faruqi ruler of that 
Kingdom as well from helping Bahadur Shah. 
Subsequently, Burhan Nizam Shah's attitude towards the 
Mughals as well as Surs was essentially a cautious one. He 
maintained correspondence with Humayun and, later on, with 
Sher Shah Sur as well as Islam Shah. His primary aim in 
adopting this policy was to maintain cordial relations with 
whichever power that might seem establishing its sway over a 
major part of North India. Burhan Nizam Shah I's main 
concern was the situation in Gujarat. He felt apprehensive 
when it was ruled by a strong Saltan , but was not averse to 
take advantage of its weakness in times of internal strife. 
After Humayun's coming tc Gujarat in 1535, down to 1540, he 
appeared to look to Humayun for preventing Bahadur Shah and 
after latter's death in FeDruary, 1537, his successor, Mahmud 
Shah III, from attacking Ahmadnagar again. His letters to 
Humayun of the period, 1537-40, suggest tnis. Fallowing 
Humayun's discomfiture at the hands of Sher Shah (1540), he 
started correspondence with the latter possibly with the 
same aim, namely, for keeping the successor of Bahadur Shah, 
SultiSin Mahmud Shah III, under military pressure. As the 
affairs of the Sur Empire tended to be disturbed towards the 
close of Islam Shah's reign, Burhan Nizam Shah I revived 
correspondence with Humayun while he was still at Kabul. 
After Burhan's death in 1553, his successor, Husain Nizam 
Shah, also maintained correspondence with Humayun till as 
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late as 1555. 
After consolidating his conquests in North India, Akbar 
anne;<ed, one after another, lialwa (1562), Mewar (1568) and 
Gujarat (157E). These moves of Akbar were viewed by Murtaza 
Nizam Shah I with concern. He, apparently, perceived these 
moves as a part of Akbar's grand design to threaten 
Ahmadnagar from two sides, from the side of Gujarat and from 
across Khandesh and Berar. To obstruct the one possible line 
of Mughal advance towards Ahmadnagar, Murtaza Nizam Shah I 
annexed Berar in 157^^. This brought him in a situation of 
direct confrontation with the Mughals. The Mughals, 
subsequently, decided to use the displaced nobles of Berar 
for preventing the Ahmadnagar authorities from consolidating 
their hold over Berar. Akbar tried to pressurise the 
Khandesh ruler to become an instrument of this policy. The 
Khandesh rulers, Muhammad Shah II and after him Raja Ali 
Khan, were forced to occasionally co-operate with the Mughals 
in furthering this policy, but their real sympathies always 
lay with Ahmadnagar. Whenever possible they connived to help 
them. 
Akbar's policy with regard to Ahmadnagar tended to 
become more openly interventionist in the ISSOs. His 
decision to give shelter to Burhan-ul Mulk (1581) and the 
public declaration, in 1583, of his intention to invade 
Deccan, if the rulers of the region did not agree to formally 
submit to him, followed by an attempt to militarily intervene 
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in Berar in 1586, were the important manifestations of this 
policy. Akbar's decision in 1589 to allow Burhan-ul Mulk to 
proceed to Burhanpur and make a bid for occupying the 
Ahmadnagar throne, at a time, when he himself was still 
bogged down in the North-West, goes to indicate that the 
Mughal policy with regard to Ahmadnagar, developing since 
1581, was becoming more and more pronouncedly 
interventionist. 
However, Akbar's plans of establishing Mughal sway over 
Ahmadnagar by helping Burhan-ul Mulk came to a naught when 
the latter, after establishing himself there in 1591, 
defiantly refused to comply with his dictates. Burhan Nizam 
Shah II, being a capable ruler, had succeeded in reuniting 
the Ahmadnagar nobility under him. Moreover, he was capable 
of organising an alliance of the Deccan states in a situation 
of Mughal invasion of Ahmadnagar. It was, perhaps, this 
perception of ground realities in the Deccan that Akbar did 
not order the Mughal forces, mobilized in Malwa m 1591, to 
advance into Ahmadnagar forthwith. At that time, Akbar 
preferred to postpone the military intervention in Ahmaanagar 
possioly in the hope of taking such a decisive step after the 
situation there had become mors favourable for the Mughals. 
Such a moment came in 1595, when Burhan Nizam Shah II's death 
led to a multifacet factional fight among the Nizam Shahi 
nobles over the issue of succession. As is well known, in 
1596, despite Chand Bibi's desperate efforts to resist the 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
213 
Mughal attack, the Ahmadnagar authorities were forced to cede 
to the Mughals the territory of Berar. 
From this time onwards (i.e. after 1596), the Mughais 
became involved in continuous military operations against the 
Nisam Shahi nobles, who resisted stubbornly the establishment 
of the Mughal authority in the ceded territory. These 
military operations continued unabated culminating in the 
capture of Ahmadnagar in 1600 and the anne;;atiGn of Khandesn 
after the fall of Asirgarh in 1601. Thus, by 1601, in 
addition to the territory of Khandesh, Akbar succeeded in 
annexing to his empire the whole of Berar and a major part of 
Ahmadnagar territory including Bir, Jalnapur and the fort of 
Ahmadnagar itself. These territories forming the three 
Mughal subas of Deccan under Akbar, namely, Dandesn, 
Ahmadnagar and Berar, served as the base for the Mughals' 
military operations in the Deccan during the rsigns of 
Jahangir and Shah Jahan. These operations v-^ ere aimed at 
firmly retaining the Khandesh, Berar and northern part of 
Ahmadnagar Kingdom as the imperial territories by putting 
down reorganized Nizam Shahi nobility led by Malik Amoar, 
either by overwhelming it militarily or by undermining its 
strength by engineering rifts between different sections of 
the nobility, particularly Malik Ambar's Maratha followers 
and the Deccani ami'rs. 
At this point it is pertinent to briefly comment on the 
objectives which Akbar wished to gain by adopting an 
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annexationist policy in the Deccan from 1595 onwards. Modern 
scholars have put forward many suggestions, some are mutually 
contradictory, for explaining Akbar's objectives in the 
Deccan. V.A. Smith suggests that Akbar's objective in the 
Deccan was to contain the growing power of the Portuguese, 
who were already established on the western coast. This 
suggestion is obviously made on the strength of a passing 
reference in one of Akbar's letters to Abdullah Khan Uzbeg 
(1586) to his desire to remove the Portuguese from the 
coastal region of India after he was free of his pre-
occupations in the North-West. But the fact that after the 
occupation of Gujarat in 157S, Akbar did not initiate any 
steps to remove the Portuguese from Daman and Diu, go to show 
that Akbar was not serious about his plans to uproot the 
Portuguese. An abortive attempt by Qutb-ud din khan, the 
Mughal governor of Gujarat, in 1580, to e;;pel the Portuguese 
from Daman was not followed up by a systematic military 
pressure against the Portuguese enclave at Daman."" It is 
obvious that, during this time, the Mughals did not possess 
required naval power and expertise in firearms for putting 
down the Portuguese in the coastal regions. Akbar's pious 
wish in this regard expressed in his letter to Abauilah Khan 
3. V.A. Smith, AkbAr the Grea.t Moguls op-cit., pp-S63-6H-. 
^.For Akbar's letter to Abdullah Khan, see Jami-al Irisha ,op. 
cit.f ff-l?6b-99a. See also Aktarn^Tna., vol. Ill, pp-Sll-l£. 
5.For the attack on Daman by the Mughals, See Akba^rnama , vol. 
Ill, pp-HBO-ai. Abul Fasl does not mention anything further 
about this expedition. 
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can not be considered a sufficient basis for accepting V.A. 
Smith's suggestion. 
More recently, Satish Chandra, in his path-breaking 
study of the Deccan Policy of the Mughals, has highlighted an 
economic motivation of this policy under Akbar, which is very-
persuasive. He is of the view that, apart from Akbar's 
desire to safeguard the trade route to the Gujarat sea-ports 
and to dominate "Surat hinterland", Akbar's objectives in 
Ahmadnagar were limited. According to him, Akbar had no 
desire to annex the entire Ahmadnagar state. His 
territorial ambitions were limited to acquiring Berar and the 
Nizam ' Shahi Balaghat, which together with Khandesh farmed 
the economic hinterland of Surat. In this deaate, Shireen 
Moosvi has pointed to yet another important aspect, namely, 
the annexations in the Deccan being aimed at "seeking larger 
revenues and enlarging imperial resources". According to 
her, this quest for more revenues was bound to drive the 
Mughal ruling class to expand the empire towarcs the Deccan.' 
Jahangir, after his accession (1605), tried to follow 
his father's policy of limited expansionism in the Deccan. 
But, to his utter dismay, he discovered that the Mughal 
6.Satish Chandra, 'The Deccan Policy of the Mughals-A 
Reappraisal', op.citf pp-3S6-27. 
7.Shiren Moosvi, 'The Mughal Empire and the Deccan-Econimic 
Factors and Consequences, op.cit, pp-365-66. 
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endeavours to consolidate the gains they had already made in 
the Deccan were being effectively thwarted by the indomitable 
Malik Ambar. Despite large scale mobilisation of the forces 
in the Deccan, down to 16S1, the liughals could not make any 
significant territorial gains in the region. Malik Ambar 
offered the Mughals stiff resistance with the help of the 
Maratha bargi soldiers. He reorganised the b^rgis and 
utilized their services effectively not only for checking the 
further spoliation of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom by the Mughals, 
but also for preventing them from establishing their firm 
control in the territories conquered under Akbar. From this 
time onwards, the Marathas came to play an important role in 
the history of Ahmadnagar as well as of Bijapur. Jahangir 
too seems to have fully recognized the important role they 
had come to play in the Deccan. It is borne by his 
recruiting a number of Maratha sardars in the Mughal service. 
It was only after the inclusion of many Maratha sardars as 
well as some other disaffected Deccani nobles in the Mughal 
service in 1616-17, that the Mughals could launch a full 
scale offensive against Ahmadnagar forces led by Malik Ambar. 
The way for the second successful Mughal thrust against 
the Ahmadnagar nobility led by Malik Ambar, in 16E1, was 
paved by their hectic diplomacy in isolating Malik Ambar from 
Goikonda and Bijapur. It was a signal achievement of the 
Mughal diplomacy that, in 16S1, Ibranim Adil Shah II was 
persuaded to co-operate with them in thexr military 
operations against Malik Ambar and his followers. After this 
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final assault the backbone of resistance in Ahmadnagar had 
largely been broken. 
Shah Jahan appeared to be determined, from the very 
beginning of his reign, to extend the Mughal sway over the 
whole of Ahmadnagar. The act of giving shelter to rebellious 
Khan-i Jahan Lodi by Nizam Shah seems to have convinced Shah 
Jahan that there could be no peace for the Mughals in the 
Deccan as long as the remnants of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom were 
not swept away. He, therefore, adopted a manifestly 
aggressive policy towards Ahmadnagar from the very beginning. 
Winning over of a large number of Nizam Shahi nobles through 
diplomatic manipulations was one effective plank of his 
policy. A generally pro-Mughal attitude adopted by Fateh 
Khan, one of the foremost Nizam Shahi nobles of the period 
1626-33, goes to reveal that, during this time, many such men 
were conniving with the Mughal authorities in their renewed 
military operations against the remnants of the Ahmadnagar 
Kingdom. 
Following Fateh Khan's surrender to the Muqnals in 
1633, Shahji Bhonsle tried to mobilize the Nizam Shahi nobles 
and the Maratha sardars for continuing the resistance. But, 
in the face of desertion by a majority of the Deccani and 
Abyssinian nobles and active hostility of the Adil Shahis, 
he was not able to make much headway. Although he had put up 
a Nizam Shahi prince as the puppet ruler in whose name he 
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tried to carry on the resistance but it was of no avail. He 
was forced to surrender the puppet Nizam Shah to the Mughals, 
himself joining service in Bijapur court. 
By reaching a settlement with Bijapur in 1636 on the 
sharing of the Ahmadnagar territory, Shah Jahan was able to 
convince Muhammad Adil Shah that after this the Mughal 
expansion in the Deccan would come to a halt. But the 
revival of armed clashes between the Mughals, on the one 
hand, and Bijapur and Golkonda, on the other, after 1656, go 
to show that, so far as Mughals were concerned, the 
settlement of 1636 was only a ploy to gain time for 
temporarily diverting the Mughal forces from Deccan to the 
North-Western frontier, where a conflict with the Safawids 
over Qandahar was brewing. In the short term perspective, 
the kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda stood to gain, both 
politically as well as economically, from the settlements of 
1636. But the most significant outcome of the settlement cf 
1636 was, no doubt, the extinct ion of the Ahmadnagar Kingdom 
•which left the field open for the Mughals to prepare ground 
for the eventual annexation of Bijapur and Golkonda. 
Lastly, it may also be noted that, although, Ahmadnagar 
as well as other Deccani states maintained close contacts 
with the Safawid rulevs of Iran, but there does not exist any 
evidence suggesting that the Safawids' moves with regard to 
Qandahar were, at any time, dictated by their desire to help 
Ahmadnagar or any other Deccani kingdoms, who, othterwise. 
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were so close to them. The Safawids obviously did not 
favour a military confrontation with the Mughals over any 
issue other than Qandahar. However, Shah Abbas I's appeal to 
Jahangir, in 1617, to be generous towards the Ue^cs.n kingdoms 
does point to his feeling of concern for them. He was, 
apparently, keen to ensure the preservation cf Deccart 
kingdoms, but for achieving that goal he was certainly not 
prepared to bring about a rupture in the relatiorts with 
Jahangir. Such a rupture he was prepared to risk, as ne did 
in 16ES, only for Qandahar. 
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In the following is given the list of the sources which 
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